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During the last days of writing this dissertation the Ecuadorian president had to declare a
national state of emergency as protests erupted when the government tried to pass a law
that ends decades of fuel subsidies. While directly affected taxi and bus drivers were the first
ones to call for the abolishment of the reform package including the end of fuel subsidies,
they were quickly joined by unions, students and other social groups. With growing crowds
the protests sustained over days and even became violent, threatening the stability of a
country that has long been plagued by periods of instability and protests that in the past
led to the ousting of several presidents.1 Last year, teachers in Senegal organized a country-
wide strike and protested their working conditions for weeks (Zanoletti, 2018), and South
Africa still remembers the shooting of striking platinum mining workers in Marikana 2011,
a rural area close to Johannesburg.2 Their struggle for decent working conditions and wages
is still ongoing; just at the beginning of this year another strike occured with more than
300 workers spending several days underground protested ongoing sackings in the mining
sector.3 In Niger, the protest wave of 2010 led to the ousting of President Mamadou. Even
though international media reported it as an uprising for democracy, protesters were mainly
concerned with their dire economic situation due to constantly rising living costs (Mueller,
2013).4
Protests countering economic policies, working conditions, lack of employment opportu-
nities and living costs in general have become more widespread across many developing and







I am grateful to Stefanie Walter, Valentin Lang, Céline Colombo and Thomas Willi for their very helpful
comments on the structure and substance of this introduction.
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protests in these countries (ACLED, 2019). The rising number of protests and strikes ad-
dressing people’s dissatisfaction with their economic conditions are apparently at odds with
the massive economic catch-up process of developing countries worldwide. Their relative
share of global GDP is increasing and economic growth in these countries has surpassed that
of advanced economies for a considerable period of time (OECD Development Centre, 2010;
Fosu, 2010). Over the past 20 years GDP per capita in low- and middle income countries
has more than doubled, simultaneously the average life expectancy has increased by more
than 5 years (UNDP, 2013). This positive development also applies to the world’s poorest
region, Sub-Saharan Africa, where countries like Nigeria and Kenya have become economic
strongholds. At the same time the international economic integration of these countries has
advanced significantly. Despite the volatility of international markets, exemplified by the
2009 financial crisis, developing countries have been able to double their volumes of trade in
goods in the past decade (UNCTAD, 2017). Similarly, this group of countries became more
attractive to international capital flows, which are a decisive substitute for the lack of do-
mestic capital (UNCTAD, 2017). After decades of overall low levels of foreign capital inflows
plagued by tremendous fluctuations, there has been a clear upward trend since the economic
crisis (OECD Development Centre, 2010). With these three big economic transformations
for developing countries in the era of globalization - economic development, international
trade and foreign investment - the economic outlook for many developing countries is now
more positive than it has been for decades.
So why do we see rising levels of protest conveying the message of discontented citi-
zens just when the economic prospects in many developing countries are improving? One
possible answer is to dismiss material explanations of people’s political attitudes and behav-
ior altogether and instead attribute the increase in protest to changing values and political
culture (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006). However, this seems to be premature, given the
explicit economic demands of protesters for higher wages, better employment conditions
and affordable costs of living. Another approach is to attribute the increasing number of
demonstrations and strikes to exactly these positive economic developments, which produce
the resources necessary for political action (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). While this expla-
nation corresponds to previous findings on higher protest levels in more affluent countries
(Auvinen, 1997; Dalton, Van Sickle and Weldon, 2010), it overlooks, besides the explicit
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economic grievances of protesters, two important caveats to the overall positive economic
trends in developing countries: large areas of these countries as well as substantial parts of
the population still remain relatively poor. Clearly, aggregate economic trajectories conceal
variation in economic conditions within countries and cannot tell us exactly who profits and
who is left behind in terms of economic development and openness, let alone how this affects
people’s attitudes and behavior. Therefore, another explanation for the increasing rate of
protests despite these economic transformations could be that rapidly improving economic
conditions throughout the developing world create inequalities within countries, because the
gains from growth and integration are not distributed equally. Thus, the rising number of
protests could result from the uneven distribution of economic gain in societies. Against this
background this dissertation studies economic drivers of protest (behavior) in developing and
emerging countries.
The important point disguised by these aggregate statistics is that development and
international integration are unevenly distributed within countries. This applies to the dis-
tribution across both space and individuals. First, economic transformations, like rising na-
tional GDPs and higher trade volumes, conceal spatial disparities in economic development
levels and the varying extent of international integration at the sub-national level (Kanbur
and Venables, 2005). Often, countries simultaneously have regions that are heavily industri-
alized and internationally integrated and areas that remain disconnected from international
markets and stagnate at low development levels (Kanbur and Venables, 2005; Burgess and
Venables, 2004). Existing literature on the link between the economy and protest is rich, but
has focused on the relationship with national economic conditions (Auvinen, 1997; Bussmann,
Scheuthle and Schneider, 2006; Robertson and Teitelbaum, 2011; Berazneva and Lee, 2013;
Hendrix and Haggard, 2015; Karakaya, 2016). Similar, research on the economic drivers of
individual protest behavior has linked it to economic conditions at the country level (Dalton,
Van Sickle and Weldon, 2010; Kern, Marien and Hooghe, 2015; Dodson, 2015; Solt, 2015;
Grasso and Giugni, 2016). Only very few studies of protest have accounted for sub-national
variation of economic factors (Raleigh, 2015; Almeida, 2012; Christensen, 2019). Yet, there
is a growing literature that emphasizes the importance of local economic conditions for in-
dividual political behavior (Dippel et al., 2016; Colantone and Stanig, 2018a; Alkon, 2017;
Isaksson and Kotsadam, 2018b; Knutsen et al., 2017). This dissertation connects to the
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localized accounts of individual political behavior and asks how local and regional economic
conditions affect protest (behavior).
Second, the gains of rising development levels and international integration are unevenly
distributed across people, exemplified by the joint growth of income inequality (Alvaredo
et al., 2018). Reports suggest that large parts of the population worldwide now live in
societies that are more unequal than two decades ago, with the most depressing effects
occurring in developing countries that have been the front-runners of economic development
(UNDP, 2013). South Africa, for example, a very successful developing country, is amongst
the most unequal countries worldwide and while Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa have
‘caught up’ economically, these regions experience the highest level of inequality worldwide
(Mueller, 2018). The joint rise of economic development and inequality in the majority of
developing countries refutes the promise that ‘a rising tide lifts all boats’.5 On the contrary,
many boats are left behind and societies marked by high levels of inequality could be breeding
grounds for protest and social instability (Davies, 1962; Gurr, 1970). Being disadvantaged
in highly unequal societies may give rise to grievances about the distribution of economic
opportunities, welfare and living conditions, that motivate people to protest.
While the importance of economic dissatisfaction as an explanation for why people
demonstrate has often been contested (Dalton, Van Sickle and Weldon, 2010; Brush, 1996;
Gurney and Tierney, 1982), new research in the context of developed economies has re-
emphasized how economic grievances can drive political action. At times of dire economic
conditions, the public is more likely to take to the streets with the contention that it is
bearing the costs of the financial crisis (Kriesi, 2012; Grasso and Giugni, 2016; Bernburg,
2015; Rüdig and Karyotis, 2014; Kern, Marien and Hooghe, 2015). Deteriorating economic
prospects seem to induce the type of economic grievances that motivate people to protest,
both in advanced and developing economies(Kurer et al., 2018; Mueller, 2013). This disser-
tation picks up on the re-emerging importance of economic grievances and dissatisfaction
for protest behavior and assesses how economic transformations and their distributive con-
sequences affect people’s subjective perceptions of their material situation.
5This phrase has been accredited to John F. Kennedy, who used it first during a speech in Arkansas in
1963 (https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-heber-springs-arkansas-the-dedication-greers-
ferry-dam). It reflects the famous prediction of Kuznets (1973) that even though societies become more
unequal when their economic development level rises, inequality declines and everyone profits after reaching
a certain level of development.
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Overall, the dissertation is structured into two steps to scrutinize the links between
economic development, international trade, foreign investment and protest. First, it assesses
if and for whom economic development, international trade and foreign investment create
or alleviate economic grievances. To do so, it focuses on the individual level, subjective
distributive effects of these economic forces. These subjective perceptions are the main
drivers of political behavior in general and protest in particular (Langer and Smedts, 2013;
Justino and Martorano, 2016). To understand precisely who perceives that they profit or
lose out, all papers of the cumulative dissertation account for the sub-national variation of
economic transformations and heterogeneous distributive effects of local economic conditions.
Figure 1.1 shows how Chapter 2 of this dissertation focuses on the disparate effects of local
development levels and asks who perceives that their boat has been left behind and whose
subjective economic situation is positive. Notwithstanding the importance of mobilization
and opportunity to protest, people without a cause are highly unlikely to participate in
protest. By carefully assessing the perceived distributive effects of economic conditions, we
are one step closer to understanding if and how varying economic conditions affect protest
(behavior).
Second, the dissertation not only traces who wants to protest, but also takes into ac-
count that people need to be able to demonstrate (McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Meyer and
Minkoff, 2004). It reflects recent empirical findings that show how grievances and societal
context together affect protest participation (Shadmehr, 2014; Kriesi, 2012; Kurer et al.,
2018). Therefore, Chapters 3 and 4 model both how economic conditions create material
grievances and the regional or local economic context in which these grievances are either
mobilized or remain inert (Nicholls, Miller and Beaumont, 2013; Traag, Quax and Sloot,
2017). In particular, Chapter 3 shows that appeasing the social group that is generally most
active in protesting leads to less participation despite the uneven distribution of economic
gains. On the other hand, Chapter 4 highlights that a high share of aggrieved people may
nevertheless overcome the hurdle of collective action. Tracing for whom economic develop-
ment, trade and FDI create economic grievances and in which local contexts these grievances
are mobilized sheds light on the puzzling joint rise of economic conditions and protest in de-
veloping countries and helps us to understand whether positive economic trajectories could
nevertheless threaten political stability.
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Economic Transformations




        (Chapter 2)
(Chapter 3 & 4)Protest (Participation)
Individual Subjective Welfare
+
Figure 1.1: Overview of Argument and Structure of the Dissertation
1.2 Argument
The argument put forward in this thesis regarding the relationship between economic con-
ditions and protest centers around the localized and heterogeneous distributive effects of
economic development, trade and foreign investment and how these economic conditions
also affect the local context, which fosters or hinders mobilization to protest. Therefore, the
first section of the argument lays out the substantial and fine-grained variation of economic
conditions within countries. It argues that in economies that are tremendously fragmented
we must look to the local context to understand the economic conditions to which people are
exposed. It then traces how local economic conditions determine the demand for labor, which
in turn affects whether people feel that they profit or remain economically disadvantaged.
The next section of the argument suggests that these economic grievances can be mobilized
in specific contexts, where either a majority is aggrieved or political entrepreneurs take up
the task to mobilize aggrieved people. If economic losers are in the minority or they are not
mobilized in their communities they remain silent. The argument therefore suggests that
the heterogeneous distributive effects of development, trade and investment either instill or
inhibit protest depending on their distributive effects and the societal context.
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1.2.1 Varying Local Economic Conditions and their Distributive Effects
When the economy takes a hit workers fear pressure on their wages or are even faced with
the threat of job loss. When people live in an economically less developed region, they must
sustain their livelihood through smallholder farming since there is no thriving firm to employ
them. When a multinational company invests in a community they hire some people but
not all, which means that some are able to secure well-paying jobs, while others are stuck
with the income they had before the investor arrived. Distributive effects are common to
development, trade and foreign investment and all of these economic transformations affect
the material well-being of people.
The argument developed here builds on the assumption that the distributional conse-
quences of these economic forces affect people’s perceived material well-being. I build on this
basic assumption and propose two factors that condition the effect of economic development,
trade and investment. First, economic conditions vary and only affect people conditional
to geographical exposure. This refers to whether people live in a highly or less developed
area, in a community with or without foreign investment and also concerns their region’s
exposure to international competition. And second, local economic conditions create both
winners and losers depending on the fit of individual skills to local labor market demands.
The first condition, ‘geographical exposure’, is important due to the spatial clustering of
economic activity. Variation of economic conditions across regions, cities and neighborhoods
within the same country often far exceeds differences across national borders (Kanbur and
Venables, 2005). We know that economic development and growth, as well as outflow and
inflow of goods, services and capital are often confined to a few growing cities or economically
dominant regions (Venables, 2005). Empirical evidence shows that regions that are more
‘endowed’ in terms of resources, infrastructure and accessibility in the first place, tend to
develop faster, attract investment from multinational firms and become hubs for international
trade in goods and services (Rivas, 2007; Chiquiar, 2005; Démurger et al., 2002). These
advantages are reinforced by increasing returns to scale and transport costs which further
the agglomeration of firms, suppliers and workers in few selected places and increase spatial
inequality (Krugman, 1991, 1996). The international integration of countries also furthers
the deepening of these spatial disparities (Rodríguez-Pose, 2003).
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Figure 1.2 visualizes these spatial disparities for South Africa. The illustration relies
on illumination during night hours recorded by weather satellites. Research has shown how
this highly disaggregated source of data is a reliable and accurate proxy for the economic
conditions at regional and neighborhood level (Weidmann and Schutte, 2017; Mellander
et al., 2015). With a GDP per capita of more than 7,200$ and a growth rate of more
than 7% in 2010, South Africa was the most economically advanced country in Sub-Saharan
Africa. Despite these shiny numbers, large parts of the country remain dark during the night,
meaning that the economic activity in these places is relatively low. Economic activity is
clustered and varies dramatically within this country that is successful overall.
,
Figure 1.2: Night lights for South Africa in 2010. Lighter cells show areas with more illumination
emitted during night time, recorded on a scale from 0 DN (places without any night light) to 63 DN
(maximum illumination that can be recorded). Data for night lights from National Geophysical
Data Center (2012).
A myriad of studies show that these spatial disparities affect people’s economic situation,
in particular the wages they can receive (Lin, 2003; te Velde and Morrissey, 2003b; Fally,
Paillacar and Terra, 2010; Amiti and Cameron, 2007; Head and Mayer, 2006; Breinlich, 2006;
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Hanson, 2005). Similarly, spatial inequalities are an important factor explaining existing
income inequality (Korpi, 2008; Isserman, Feser and Warren, 2009). In line with the empirical
findings that underline the importance of accounting for these disparities when analyzing the
individual level effects of economic conditions, this dissertation puts forward a new notion
of exposure to economic transformations. In essence, I propose that the specific degree of
economic transformation in the environment where people live, i.e. high local economic
development level or low level of regional exposure to international competition, determines
the distribution of individual gains, which affects people’s perceived economic welfare.
Macroeconomic models stress that individual exposure works through being employed in
a sector (Frieden and Rogowski, 1996) or firm (Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding, 2010) that
faces international competition. In contrast, I propose that there is an often neglected but
nevertheless important and necessary condition for being exposed to an economic condition:
living in a community or region where the particular economic transformation, be it economic
development or international integration, is actually present. Why is it important whether
people live in a community that is highly integrated into international markets or remains
sheltered from international competition? And similarly, whether people live in an area with
a relatively low or high level of development?
Research on mobility and commuting patterns shows that the distance people can cover
on a daily basis to generate income is limited. The average commuting time to work across
countries and time is roughly one hour (Marchetti, 1994). While this means that people who
can use superior infrastructure such as motorized transport can cover greater distances, they
tend to be confined to a certain local area around their home (Kung et al., 2014). These local
areas and their economies are the environments in which the large majority of people earn
their living, e.g. through wage employment or by selling products. The economic conditions
in these local areas therefore directly affect the material well-being of people.
So far the argument proposes that the economic conditions that matter for people,
whether the level of development or the extent of exposure to international competition,
are local. I also argue, however, that not everyone living in the same local context, with the
same economic conditions, is equally affected. While there is no consensus in the literature
as to who wins and who loses from economic development (Partridge, Rickman and Lev-
ernier, 1996; Cutler and Katz, 1992; Dollar and Kraay, 2002; Dollar, Kleineberg and Kraay,
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2016) or trade and investment (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2005; Richardson, 1995; Feenstra and
Hanson, 1997; Hanson and Harrison, 1999; Ha, 2012; Helpman et al., 2017), scholars agree
that these economic conditions exert substantive distributive consequences.
The second part of my argument suggests that the distributive effects of these economic
conditions run through their impact on local demand for labor. People are affected differently
depending on the match of their individual skill set to local labor market demands. Local
economic conditions determine the relative demand for labor: Demand in an area that
is heavily engaged in international trade, with many exporting firms is not only higher
than in areas unconnected to international markets; the type of labor that is demanded
in thriving, internationally integrated environments differs as well. Research shows that
international integration shifts demand in favor of more skilled workers (Richardson, 1995).
Greater demand for skilled labor also means that these workers have better opportunities to
gain employment and receive higher wages. Thus, if exposed to international competition,
skill determines who wins and who loses (Walter, 2010, 2017; Rommel, 2018; Helpman,
Itskhoki and Redding, 2010).6 The same shift in demand for labor occurs when the economy
develops. At low levels of development a dominant primary sector does not require high-
skilled workers. Development moves economic activity to manufacturing and services and
these sectors require on average more skilled workers (Herrendorf, Rogerson and Valentinyi,
2014; Lee and Wolpin, 2006). People whose skill set matches the local demand for labor,
determined by the level of development and the extent of international integration, find work
and command a good salary. Those who do not fit the local labor market demands have
difficulties securing employment and eventually lose out.
All arguments made in the following three chapters of this dissertation build on the simple
premise that only people who are ‘geographically exposed’ to high levels of development and
integration feel their uneven distributive effects. Within these local economies, those who
do not fit the labor market demands are economically dissatisfied and aggrieved, while those
who match the demand, the winners, are satisfied with their economic situation. These
economic grievances then affect people’s likelihood to participate in protest.
6The growing demand for skilled labor, increasing employment opportunities and competitive salaries
characteristics of open economies is seen in developing and developed nations alike. This contradicts factoral
trade models that expect that the abundant factor, the low-skilled in developing countries, wins (Menendez,
Owen and Walter, 2018). Similarly, sectoral models are not able to account for rising wage gaps within
exposed and sheltered sectors (Frieden and Rogowski, 1996).
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1.2.2 Economic Dissatisfaction, Opportunities and Protest
The next step of the argument contends that we not only need to understand how economic
conditions affect economic grievances to know who protests (Gurr, 1970; Davies, 1962).
While the first part of the argument, and Chapter 2 in particular, aims to understand who
wants to protest, the second part of the argument takes stock of who can protest. It argues
that understanding when protest occurs and who actually participates requires an analysis
of when people’s grievances are mobilized in their social contexts (Kriesi, 2012; Opp, 2009).
However, the focus of this dissertation is on the link between local economic conditions
and protests. This warrants an argument that acknowledges how these economic conditions
and their uneven distributive effects impact the social context, in which people are either
mobilized or remain absent.7 I propose two specific ways in which people can be mobilized
that are impacted by the uneven distribution of economic gains. First, people overcome
the hurdle of collective action when they perceive their grievance as a wider social problem
and expect a large number of similarly aggrieved followers to turn out. And second, they
tend to mobilize when their grievances are picked up by political entrepreneurs who organize
demonstrations.
The local level of economic development, trade and foreign investment determines whether
an individual is economically dissatisfied or content, but the distributive effects of these eco-
nomic transformations also create other winners and losers. I argue that it is important
which social group actually benefits and that the distribution of winners and losers in the
local context affects who is able to express their grievances through protest.
The first contextual condition of protest, which social group wins or loses economically,
is important as research shows that there is a clear division of labor when it comes to protest.
While more educated, middle-class people tend to be generally more active (Bratton, Mat-
tes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005; Dalton, Van Sickle and Weldon, 2010; Verba, Schlozman and
Brady, 1995) and adopt the role of organizers and spokespersons for the protest, the less
educated classes are the ‘foot soldiers’ (Mueller, 2018; Pearlman, 2018). Generally, politi-
cal entrepreneurs have a decisive role in the process of mobilizing existing grievances and
providing opportunities to join protests (Kurer et al., 2018). Going back to the discussion
7This does not rule out other important factors that explain the occurrence and frequency of protest, such
as the political environment (Tarrow, 2011; Kriesi et al., 1992) or other individual resources (McCarthy and
Zald, 1977; Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995; Brady, Verba and Lehman Schlozman, 1995).
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on the distributive effects of economic development, trade and foreign investment, we would
expect that the high-skilled are the main profiteers of higher development and deeper inter-
national integration. This means that the rise of these economic forces alleviates economic
grievances for the social group that is most prone to participate in and organize protest (Van
Aelst and Walgrave, 2001). While some accounts argue that the positive material impact
on this group might give rise to other political demands that are expressed through protest
(Mueller, 2018), it is disputed as to whether a wealthy and economically secure middle class
is not more likely to remain quiet (Bellin, 2010; Nathan, 2016; Rommel, 2018). In addition
to this, we would not expect a direct link between a positive change in economic conditions
and protest but rather an indirect, delayed impact. And this only applies if these highly
skilled people demand greater political influence due to higher development and increased
international competition. Thus, the immediate impact of better economic conditions on
high-skilled people should be protest-deterring. I argue that this is also consequential for
those who are less skilled and miss out on the benefits of development and international
openness. While they are aggrieved and want to protest, they are less able to do so, because
the high-skilled protest entrepreneurs remain inactive.
While this suggests an overall protest-decreasing effect of improving economic conditions,
we argue in Chapter 4 (co-authored with Tobias Rommel and Stefanie Walter) that there
is another contextual condition of protest that allows dissatisfied people to overcome the
mobilization hurdle. Despite not being able to count on the mobilization efforts of appeased
high-skilled workers, they can find their strength in numbers. The distributive effects of
economic conditions create not only individual winners or losers, but also determine their
ratio in a certain area. Thereby, they influence the relative number of people who want to
protest. Research shows that the number of potential allies and similarly aggrieved people is
central to understand whether or not we see collective action (Granovetter, 1978). First, the
numbers show people whether they can reasonably expect their claims to be heard, which is
only the case if enough people are willing to turn out and a certain level of public contestation
is reached (Klandermans, 1997; Van Zomeren et al., 2004). And second, high numbers of
similarly aggrieved people in close proximity (Sewell, 2001; Traag, Quax and Sloot, 2017)
convey the message to the individual that their grievances are legitimate. Outside factors
instead of individuals are to blame for grievances, if a sizeable number of people shares them
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(Snow, 2013; Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2013). Thus, where the distributive effects
of economic conditions create a high ratio of aggrieved economic losers, we should see protest
despite the problem of collective action.
The argument connecting appeased winners and aggrieved losers to protest traces how
the distributive effects of these economic conditions not only affect individuals separately,
but impact the wider social context in which protest occurs. It proposes that the effects
of economic conditions on protest behavior depend not only on the existence of economic
grievances that determine whether people want to protest, but hinges on the question whether
their social context is conducive to becoming active. Chapters 3 and 4 show how foreign
investment projects and international trade impact the likelihood of protest and account for
both grievances and the opportunity to express them.
1.3 Case Selection and Chapter Summaries
The puzzling joint rise of economic development, international integration and protest in
developing countries warrants this dissertation’s closer examination of the link between eco-
nomic conditions and protest (behavior), with a focus on who might be aggrieved despite a
prevailing broadly positive economic trend. The following three chapters of this dissertation
develop the theoretical argument further and empirically test how local economies affect
people’s economic grievances and their protest behavior. While the second chapter assesses
the link between economic development and subjective welfare, the third chapter tests how
international economic integration in the form of foreign direct investment projects affect
people’s propensity to participate in protest. Both chapters focus on African developing and
emerging countries. Selecting African economies as cases to empirically test my argument
provide the opportunity to study a wide range of developing countries, with vastly differ-
ent national and sub-national economic conditions. While the African continent has more
least developed countries (LCDs) than any other continent, it is at the same time home
to emerging economies such as South Africa and Nigeria. Economic conditions across and
within these countries vary widely and so do the economic challenges faced by these coun-
tries. Despite their often extremely low levels of GDP the average growth rate of African
LCDs is around 5%, reflecting the puzzling observation that protest occurs despite a positive
economic trend (Essoungou, 2011). When just in May 2019 the African Continental Free
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Trade Area (AfCFTA) came into force, the African states parties to this treaty, created
the world’s largest free trade zone. Foreign investments have surpassed the amount of aid
received by African countries, underlining the importance of this international capital inflow
for the selected countries (OECD, 2018). And even though investments are still flowing
heavily into extractive industries, a shift toward FDI in services and manufacturing and
production for growing local markets is on the way (UNCTAD, 2017). Again, the selected
African countries are good examples of the positive economic outlook that seems to be at
odds with economically aggrieved and protesting citizens. Similarly, the political contexts in
the selected countries differ but reflect the larger universe of developing countries worldwide.
The sample encompasses representative democracies such as Botswana, nations plagued by
democratic deficits and countries considered to be ‘unfree’ (Freedom House, 2013). While the
sample of countries selected mirror the wider universe of developing countries, the analyses
of the two chapters account for any country-level variation and focus on the impact of local
economies. Finding an effect of local development and openness on individual grievances
and protest behavior in this sample of countries should provide generalizable insights for a
large number of developing countries worldwide.
The last chapter looks at the link between economic globalization and protest events. It
also underlines how this relationship relies on the distributional consequences of globalization
and how they affect individual attitudes and concerns, similar to the aim of the second
chapter. It extends the empirical assessment of this link to an emerging market on a different
continent, Russia. Russia exemplifies the importance of accounting for sub-national variation
of economic conditions. The economic conditions and level of contestation in its 83 regions
vary tremendously. Nonetheless, it is another example of a country that is confronted with
the joint rise of economic conditions and protest (Bayulgen, 2010). In this regard, it is
representative of many emerging economies that have opened up economically and have
an encouraging economic outlook but whose citizens nevertheless seem to be troubled by
economic grievances. Russia also reflects the political conditions in many emerging countries
that are neither outright autocracies nor fully democratic. By focusing on a single country, we
can rule out other important explanations for protest, such as the level of repression, freedom
of speech, legal regulations of economic openness and opportunity structures or country-
level grievances (Robertson, 2007). The results from this case test the generalizability of the
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argument, which should be applicable to all developing and emerging countries. Analyzing
whether the distributive effects of economic openness also result in grievances and protest in
a different context provides further evidence regarding the importance of accounting for sub-
national variation of economic conditions and heterogeneous distributive effects of economic
openness. The results also help us to understand the broader dynamics of political (in-
)stability in countries.
By providing evidence about the different steps of the theoretical argument (visualized in
Figure 1.1) that links economic conditions and political behavior in different contexts, both
on the individual and event level, the three contributions jointly emphasize the importance
of local economic conditions. They produce evidence relating to link between the hetero-
geneous distributional consequences of local economies, individual economic grievances and
subsequent protest (behavior).
1.3.1 Chapter 2 - Heterogeneous Effects of Local Development
This chapter assesses the first link of the overall argument connecting local economic condi-
tions and the subjective welfare perceptions of people. It starts from the observation that
despite tremendous growth and economic development in the past few years, inequality is one
the rise and our understanding of how economic development affects people is still limited.
In particular, we know little about the subjective effects of economic development, and how
people rate their personal welfare at different development stages. This is not only important
as welfare perceptions underpin both political attitudes and behavior, but also allows us to
evaluate whether economic development - an important policy objective worldwide - really
has a positive effect on everyone.
The argument of this chapter suggests that people’s welfare perceptions are dependent on
the fit of their individual skill set to local labor market demands that change fundamentally
depending on the level of economic development. The structural transformation of the
economy that accompanies economic development shifts employment opportunities from the
agricultural sector to manufacturing and services. However, manufacturing and services
require another type of labor to thrive, namely more skilled workers. It follows that the
more developed the local community, the higher the demand for skilled, more educated
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people. In less developed ares, on the other hand, employment opportunities are fewer and
predominantly require less-skilled labor.
This means that the low-skilled only match the labor market demands in less developed
environments, here they can sustain their income and are not relatively worse off. In more
developed contexts, however, skilled labor is in greater demand, which increases the wage
gap between low- and high-skilled workers. Skilled workers gain relatively more, but the
mismatch of less-skilled workers to these heightened labor market demands creates dissatis-
faction with their material situation. In turn, the less-skilled feel left behind in more devel-
oped contexts than in less thriving areas where they are more satisfied. The high-skilled, on
the other hand, have a better perception of their welfare in these highly developed contexts
where they can gain well-paid employment.
I test this argument for 36 African countries, matching individual survey data with
items on perceived living conditions and employment insecurity with a proxy for economic
development, night lights. To measure local economic development, which determines the
type of labor demanded in the community, it is necessary to use more fine-grained data than
official national and regional accounts. Night light is illumination emitted during night hours
and is a by-product of weather satellites. It is an accurate and highly disaggregated proxy for
economic development. I use the night light data to measure the local economic development
level around each respondent. In line with my argument, I interact this local development
measure with the individual education level of respondents, approximating their skill level.
Following the conditional argument, I expect that the higher the education level and the
more developed the local context, the more satisfied are people with their welfare. On the
other hand, the less skilled living in a more developed local environment have a greater
likelihood to report economic insecurity and dissatisfaction with their living conditions.
I use Bayesian multilevel analysis to test both whether a respondent experiences economic
insecurity and how they rate their living conditions. The analysis confirms that the highly-
skilled are most dissatisfied with their living conditions at low levels of economic development,
while the low-skilled are most insecure in highly developed environments. The results hold
across a number of robustness tests, varying the size of the local environment that matters for
people, excluding respondents who live in areas with unnaturally high light emission from gas
and oil fields, as well as when scrutinizing the effect of economic growth instead of economic
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development levels. The findings emphasize the importance of local economic conditions
for people’s well-being and show the unequal effect of economic development leaving behind
large parts of the population.
1.3.2 Chapter 3 - The Effect of FDI on Protest Participation
The third chapter takes the argument one step further and analyzes how international inter-
ventions in local economies in the form of foreign direct investment affect people’s political
behavior. It contributes to the research on the effects of economic globalization in terms
of societal stability and analyzes whether investments by foreign multinationals impact the
propensity to participate in demonstrations. This is especially important as the newest wave
of protest activity in Africa coincides with the growing importance of FDI in these countries,
which now even exceeds official development assistance.
I connect FDI with protest participation again through its distributive consequences in
the communities where the investment takes place. In line with recent empirical findings on
the distributional effects of economic globalization in general and foreign direct investment
more specifically, I argue that these multinational firms predominantly require high-skilled
people for their production and are willing to pay higher wages for these workers. Thus, the
employment situation of well-educated workers in host communities improves substantially,
while the demand for less-skilled workers stagnates or even declines when their employers
are faced with competition from foreign multinationals.
The particular distributive consequences of foreign direct investment reduce material
grievances for the high-skilled and therefore their likelihood to engage in protest. This is of
particular relevance with regard to the propensity to participate for all educational groups, as
research on protest behavior shows, that organizers of protest are on average well educated
and mobilize others to join demonstrations. With this cohort content with the positive
material effects of FDI and refraining from organizing protest, other groups - such as the
low-skilled who actually could express their grievances on the streets - lack the opportunity to
do so. This suggests that foreign direct investment specifically reduces protest participation
by highly-educated skilled workers, but also works against the mobilization of the less-skilled,
given that the group that organizes protest now abstains.
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I test this argument by newly matching geolocated FDI project data and individual
survey data from African countries. By matching FDI projects and individual respondents
I can measure who is ‘exposed’ to this economic force in terms of living in a community
that hosts an FDI project. Using a difference-in-difference design, I reference people in areas
with ongoing FDI projects against respondents who live in a community that is going to
host a project in the future, but which hasn’t been implemented yet. Similar to the second
chapter, the argument requires an interaction between the presence of an FDI project and
the individual education level of the respondent. I expect that the likelihood of experiencing
economic grievances and subsequently engaging in protest decreases most for highly educated
FDI-exposed respondents. The less educated, on the other hand should be more concerned
about their employment situation when FDI flows in, nevertheless, their participation rate
should not pick up, as opportunities to join strikes and demonstrations are less numerous.
The results of the analysis confirm that well-educated people in particular are less likely
to report protest participation after FDI projects are implemented in their communities.
Despite persisting worries about employment and wages for the less educated when living in
communities which host FDI projects, their propensity to protest is not substantially higher.
This suggests that while economic grievances might be induced by FDI, they also need to be
mobilized in order to result in protest participation, which seems to be missing in these FDI
host communities. The results show that even though FDI creates both winners and losers
it has an overall positive effect on social stability due to its specific distributional effects
favoring the societal group that organizes and mobilizes for protest.
1.3.3 Chapter 4 - International Trade and Public Protest
with Tobias Rommel and Stefanie Walter
The final chapter picks up on the question raised in the third chapter connecting eco-
nomic globalization and domestic political stability. However, it mainly does so on a more
aggregated level and tests how regional exposure to international trade affects the occurrence
of protest events in Russia. Russia is a country in which the importance of accounting for
spatial disparities cannot be overstated. Its regions are tremendously different, especially
with regard to economic conditions and exposure to economic globalization. If we want
to understand whether international openness affects protest, we need to account for such
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disparate conditions. We must also spell out clearly how these economic determinants cre-
ate both winners and losers, inducing economic grievances that ultimately threaten social
stability.
We argue, in line with the theoretical arguments made in the previous chapters, that
economic globalization and protest are linked through the distributional consequences of
international trade. Building on empirical evidence of rising wage gaps in emerging coun-
tries and innovations in modern trade theory, we argue that international trade increases
disparities between high and low skilled people exposed to globalization. In regions with
a relatively low-skilled population, international trade amplifies economic grievances. Less
skilled workers in exposed regions cannot profit from economic globalization and interna-
tional competition puts pressure on their wages and increases the threat of unemployment.
Regions with a high-skilled workforce, however, profit when they open up to international
trade. In turn, political discontent in regions where the low-skilled losers of trade make up
the majority of the population rises with increasing exposure to international trade, whereas
it has a pacifying effect on regions dominated by the winners of free trade, the high-skilled.
When regions are dominated by economically disadvantaged citizens, the likelihood of protest
rises, as the pool of potential protesters and followers is significantly higher than in regions
that have little to no exposure or where people that profit from openness dominate. In
these exposed regions with a highly skilled workforce international trade should decrease the
number of protests.
We examine this argument, focusing on variation in both trade exposure and protest
prevalence in Russian regions using negative binomial regression models on data from 2007-
2012. In line with the other chapters, arguing for the same distributive consequences favoring
the highly skilled, we use an interaction between regional education levels and the intensity
of exposure to international trade to test our argument about the destabilizing effect of
economic globalization in regions with a less-skilled workforce. In addition to that, we test
the underlying mechanism that connects trade and protest via its distributive effects and
economic grievances and analyze whether international trade affects unemployment rates
and average wages differently in regions with a differently skilled populace. Last, we add
an individual level analysis, which tests how individual skill, proxied by the respondent’s
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education, and regional exposure to trade can result in perceptions of economic difficulties
that can be deemed economic grievances.
The results of the analysis confirm that average education levels in the regions of Russia
indeed condition the effect of trade intensity on protest frequency. While high exposure to
international trade leads to more protests in regions with low average education levels, it has a
pacifying effect in regions that are equally exposed to international competition but in which
residents are well-educated. We also find that the regional wage and unemployment level
vary depending on both average education levels and exposure to trade, with regions with a
high-skilled working force profiting economically. The individual level results confirm that
poorly educated Russians face more economic difficulties when they live in regions exposed
to trade, whereas well-educated people are able to profit economically and experience more
economic security in the face of economic globalization.
The findings of this chapter confirm two important stipulations of this dissertation; first,
they show both on the regional and individual level that the distributive effects of economic
conditions do not affect all people alike. International trade, similarly to foreign direct in-
vestment as well as economic development, creates both winners and losers and if we want
to understand how these economic determinants affect people’s attitudes and behavior we
need to account for the varying impacts of economic conditions. Second, the results under-
line the importance of accounting for subnational variation in both economic and political
conditions to understand the precise link between economic openness and social stability.
Last, the findings confirm again that skill, which is acquired through education, is a central
attribute of people that determines whether they can profit or are left behind when the
economy opens up or grows.
1.4 Summary and Implications
The three chapters jointly provide substantial evidence for the importance of accounting for
spatial disparities of economic conditions and analyzing thoroughly how economic grievances
and protest behavior are connected to geographically varying economic conditions. Data
limitations in terms of availability of individual wages in the survey data used in the second
and third chapter, or the lack of a survey item on individual protest participation in the case
of the fourth chapter on Russia should caution us against premature claims that distributive
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effects are the only possible pathway from economic conditions to grievances and protest
behavior. The same cautionary note on the importance and impact of economic conditions
and their distributive effects relates to the ever present challenge of identifying the impact
of economic conditions. However, this dissertation aims to call attention to the simple fact
that people live in very different, confined economic environments where they need to make
a living. Whether and how well they are able to sustain their livelihood depends on local
economic conditions. The combined results of the chapters of this dissertation also alert us
that not everyone profits identically from economic development and globalization. Finally,
the findings finally show that despite the uneven distributive effects of development, trade
and foreign investment, people only protest if their social context is conducive to mobilizing
their grievances.
1.4.1 Implications for Research
First, researchers cannot treat spatial economic disparities as mere nuisances of how the
economy works. The propensity of spatial clustering of economic activities in certain areas
of a country and the importance of agglomeration effects for economic actors also lead to
vastly different economic realities for people living in the same country. These disparate
economic conditions impact people’s attitudes and behavior and are therefore important for
the study of political attitudes and behavior more broadly. Local economies impact not
only the social fabric of communities (Autor, Dorn and Hanson, 2019), democratic values
(Ballard-Rosa et al., 2017), support for international integration (Colantone and Stanig,
2018a; Broz, Frieden and Weymouth, 2019), and voting behavior of citizens (Dippel et al.,
2016; Colantone and Stanig, 2018b) and constituents (Feigenbaum and Hall, 2015). They
are decisive breeding grounds for economic dissatisfaction (Chapter 2) and provide the social
context in which these grievances either remain unaddressed (Chapter 3) or are mobilized
(Chapter 4).
Clearly, the disaggregation of national economic conditions can provide a fruitful avenue
for further research into the political behavior of people. In this regard, Chapters 2 and 3 of
this dissertation showcase new empirical approaches to link disaggregated data on economic
conditions and individual attitudes and behavior (Kotsadam and Tolonen, 2016; Knutsen
et al., 2017; Isaksson and Kotsadam, 2018a,b). They rely on the availability of georeferenced
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economic proxies, such as night lights (Weidmann and Schutte, 2017), and the efforts to add
longitude and latitude to political events data and individual survey data (BenYishay, Parks,
Runfola, Tanner, Trichler, Heuser, Dolan, Batra, Goodman and Anand, 2017). Geographical
information is now also available for a number of economic activities, such as the location
of active oil and gas fields (Lujala, Buhaug and Gates, 2009), active and inactive mining
sites (Christensen, 2019) and foreign direct investment projects (Owen, 2019). Researchers
will have even more opportunities to geographically link both political and economic data
at different levels of disaggregation in the future. Making use of these data sources and
research strategies could help us to represent our integrated but highly disparate world more
accurately.
Second, even though recent contributions have raised doubts about the importance of
material effects for individual attitudes (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006; Mansfield and Mutz,
2009), the combined evidence of this dissertation suggests that we should continue to both
theorize and test the distributive effects of economic conditions and their importance for
people. The results presented here show that the material implications of trade, FDI and
economic development matter for people. They build on clear expectations about the het-
erogeneous effects of economic conditions that are in line with empirical evidence on rising
inequality and wage gaps, as well as theoretical advances (Walter, 2017; Helpman, Itskhoki
and Redding, 2010; Melitz, 2003). Even if we think that the link to political attitudes and
behavior does not run through the material effects of economic conditions, the importance of
knowing who profits and who might be left behind both objectively and subjectively should
matter greatly to scholars interested in the equality and cohesion of societies at large.
The uneven distributive effects of economic development, trade and foreign investment
have been recorded by numerous reports of international organizations (for example, UNDP
(2013)) and noted by a vast scientific literature (for an overview see Anderson (2005)). Re-
searchers interested in the relationship between economic conditions and political behavior
should consider these heterogeneous distributive effects and think about the implications for
the political phenomenon of interest they study. The controversy on economic drivers of
contentious political events such as civil war (Christensen, 2019; Magee and Massoud, 2011;
Sorens and Ruger, 2014; Barbieri and Reuveny, 2005; Blanton and Apodaca, 2007; Flaten
and de Soysa, 2012; Hegre, Gissinger and Gleditsch, 2003; Hartzell, Hoddie and Bauer, 2010;
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Nieman, 2011) and protest (Dodson, 2015; Robertson and Teitelbaum, 2011; Christensen,
2019; Hendrix and Haggard, 2015; Bussmann, Scheuthle and Schneider, 2006; Karakaya,
2016) could profit from a more explicit engagement with the distributive effects of devel-
opment, trade and foreign investment that can help to make sense of hugely contradictory
findings.
The findings of this dissertation also draw attention to the importance of perceived,
subjective effects of economic conditions. These perceptions are not necessarily the same as
objective effects (Tibesigwa, Visser and Hodkinson, 2016), but they matter most for people
as their subjective views create the grievances that are decisive for their actions (Langer
and Smedts, 2013). Data limitations in the individual survey data does not allow us to draw
conclusions about the objective distributive effects of economic development or globalization,
however, the results show that these economic conditions clearly impact perceived economic
well-being. Political science research interested in the relationship of inequality and political
behavior, such as the vast literature on horizontal inequalities and civil war (Langer and
Mikami, 2013) but also less violent forms of behavior such as protest (Justino and Martorano,
2016), has just started to acknowledge this potential gap between subjective and objective
inequalities. With the growing number of individual-level surveys fielded worldwide, scholars
have a huge opportunity to ask people both about their perceived well-being and subjective
inequalities as well as their objective material situation and clarify further whether the two
overlap, when they diverge, and which of the two is decisive for subsequent political attitudes
and behavior. Even if this is not the predominant research interest, studies should be clear
on why they use perceptions or objective data and how that impacts their findings.
Third, the results of Chapters 3 and 4 warrant a closer look at the conditions in which
economic grievances are mobilized or remain unexpressed. They clearly show that scholars
of contentious political behavior need to take into account both motivation and opportunity
to understand if and when people become active (Kriesi, 2012; Kurer et al., 2018; Grasso and
Giugni, 2016). While the conditions that enable people to express their demands through
collective action might differ substantively, the two chapters suggest that economic condi-
tions not only impact grievances but also the social context in which they are mobilized. A
rigorous focus on the link between economic conditions and protest profits from also describ-
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ing and assessing how the distribution of gains and losses across social groups and across
local contexts impedes or fosters protest.
1.4.2 Policy Implications
The findings of this dissertation also have important implications for various policy areas in
developing countries. Chapter 2 speaks to the importance of taking a critical look at the goals
being pursued by developing countries worldwide. While the Sustainable Development Goals
adopted in a joint resolution of all member states of the United Nations in 2015 recognize the
importance of battling growing economic inequality, they still maintain that growth is the
means to create employment opportunities for everyone (United Nations General Assembly,
2015). This means for example that the aim is to achieve at least a 7 percent annual growth
in GDP for LCDs. However, the results of Chapter 2 suggest that the twin goals of growth
and equality might be incompatible, if policy makers do not ensure that everyone can profit.
As of now, the positive effect of higher development on material living conditions seems to
bypass large parts of the population. In contrast, those who cannot participate adequately
in more developed economies feel that they are left behind and they perceive worse of their
economic conditions. States need to re-evaluate which goals are fundamental and which
might have to be adjusted in order to honor the pledge that ’no one will be left behind’.8.
One step to achieve these ambitious goals is to analyze and address the spatial disparities
that dominate the economies of developing countries even more than in advanced economies.
While governments cannot move mountains or invent access to ports in landlocked countries
and will have similar difficulty dissolving the forces of agglomeration, spatial inequality con-
tributes significantly to overall inequality (Kanbur and Venables, 2005). Spatial disparities
of economic conditions need our attention, especially if they fall together with ethnic and
political inequality and further destabilization of regions and countries. Potential interven-
tions include infrastructure programs that connect remote areas (Escobal and Torero, 2015)
and place-based compensation measures for economically lagging regions (Rodríguez-Pose,
2018; Busso, Gregory and Kline, 2013). Such interventions have been more prominent in
the US, Europe and Asia but might also provide a tool for developing countries worldwide
to tackle this challenge (Kline and Moretti, 2014).
8see https://www.un.org/development/desa/en/news/sustainable/leaving-no-one-behind.html
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The second, important policy implication relates to finding that educational attainment is
key to profit from improving economic conditions and globalization. Economic development
and globalization affect the demand for labor in one particular direction; toward more skilled
workers. Therefore, education remains the most important way to ensure that people are
able to benefit and subsequently participate constructively in their local communities and
wider societies. If educational differences in developing and emerging countries persist and
large parts of the population continue to lack access to higher education, we will most likely
see a widening gap in perceived economic well-being; indeed, millions of people will feel they
have been left behind in a growing, internationally integrated economy. While the universal
developing goals of 2000, the MDGs, advocated for universal primary education, this is
only a small step in the direction of ‘leaving no one behind’. The results presented here
show that economies and labor markets in developing countries require high-skilled workers.
Only higher education provides people with the tools to be successful in thriving, globally
competing economies.
Third, the studies presented here should remind us that economic forces have substantial
distributive effects that are not naturally geared toward ensuring equality and social stabil-
ity. In contrast, governments must provide the means with which we can shape the impact
of these economic determinants on people, not only by providing universal access to high-
quality education but also by cushioning the negative effects with social welfare programs
(Rudra, 2004). Spatial inequalities and the uneven distribution of economic inequalities will
not disappear overnight, even if governments worldwide make it their prime goal. There-
fore, governments in developing countries should invest in social welfare programs instead of
cutting them back or only targeting their own clientele (Rudra and Haggard, 2005; Rudra,
2002). After all, redistributive policies remain a direct way to help the losers of development
and globalization to sustain their livelihood and participate in their societies.
The uneven distribution of development and globalization gains in developing and emerg-
ing countries is strikingly similar to that observed in advanced economies (Walter, 2010;
Rommel and Walter, 2018). The necessity to create societies where everyone can thrive
and participate politically, despite these heterogeneous effects, thus poses similar challenges
worldwide. Importantly, governments need to understand more clearly what happens to
citizens who feel that they are left behind economically and how these perceptions can be
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reversed. Recent studies in industrialized countries have highlighted the problem of the de-
clining middle class, which is an essential stabilizer of democracies (Kurer, 2018). The results
of Chapter 3 highlight that economic gains for that middle class can have a protest-deterring,
stabilizing effect on communities. However, we should not forget those at the bottom end
of society. Particularly in developing and emerging countries, huge parts of the population
remain relatively impoverished and cut-off from access to high-quality education. These
people still often lack individual resources, such as literacy, information, transportation and
income, to protest, but are deeply dissatisfied with their economic situation (Mueller, 2018).
Chapter 4 suggests that a critical number of such aggrieved economic losers in a region can
overcome collective action problems and protest becomes more prevalent. Policy makers
in developing countries should be interested in adopting preventive measures to undercut
the threat of increasing numbers of economically disenfranchised people who might at some
point threaten social stability.
The examples of aggrieved, protesting citizens and workers at the beginning of this syn-
opsis seemed to be puzzling given the positive economic trajectories of developing countries
worldwide. But if we look beyond these glossy numbers, the spatial disparities and uneven
distribution of gains can help us to make sense of the joint rise of economic outlook and
protest. The Marikana mining protests show that it is often low-skilled labor that is ex-
ploited and economically insecure in a globalized economy. And protesters who criticize
rising costs of living can be reconciled with a growing economy if we understand that not
everyone profits when economies develop. The social implications of growing (subjective)
disparities are substantial and far reaching. They could not only affect social stability by
igniting widespread protest, but lead to apathy and the retreat from political engagement by
certain societal groups (Solt, 2008) or still result in more violent forms of political resistance
(Hartzell, Hoddie and Bauer, 2010; Nieman, 2011). There is huge uncertainty about the
direction the pendulum swings, if this problematic social situation is not addressed. Policy
makers and researchers alike should be interested in preventing both social instability in
the form of growing and more violent conflict, as well as a situation in which parts of the




Heterogeneous Effects of Local Development in Africa
Abstract
Evaluating the effect of economic development is often done by measuring its impact on
poverty and inequality with little regard for how economic development affects perceived
individual welfare. However, people’s welfare perceptions are crucial as they underpin
both political attitudes and behavior. I argue that perceived well-being is dependent
on the fit of local labor market demands that change with economic development and
people’s skill sets. A mismatch results in poor welfare perceptions of the highly-skilled
living in areas of low development and low-skilled workers in the most developed areas.
To measure the development levels of people’s local economic environments, I combine
geocoded Afrobarometer survey data and night lights. Bayesian multilevel analysis con-
firms that the highly-skilled are most dissatisfied with their living conditions at low levels
of economic development, while the low-skilled are most insecure in highly developed en-
vironments. These findings emphasize the importance of local economic conditions on
people’s well-being and show the unequal effect of economic development leaving behind
large parts of the population.
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Developing countries worldwide promote economic development to reduce poverty and im-
prove the living standards of the population, albeit with mixed results. Concerns remain
about the poor being left behind and attendant rising inequality (Ahmed et al., 2007; Raval-
lion, 2016; Alvaredo et al., 2018; Kim, 2008; Kanbur and Venables, 2005). Yet, to understand
the effects of economic development comprehensively, we should not only assess its objective
effects but also gauge how it affects citizens’ perceptions of their own well-being. At the
same time, we need to account for the vastly different economic conditions to which people
are exposed despite living in the same country, and focus on the impact of the development
levels of people’s local communities when linking development to individual perceptions and
attitudes.
This paper, therefore, analyzes the effect of economic development from a novel angle
and asks how local economic development affects subjective economic welfare. It builds
on the link between economic development, the structural transformation of the economy,
and the accompanying shift in the relative demand for skilled labor. In essence, I argue that
individual welfare perceptions depend on the (mis)match of people’s skills and local demand,
which is determined by the development level of the local area. Assessing the subjective
effects of development is not only important to judge the success of development strategies,
but it can help us understand the economic conditions that give rise to personal welfare
(dis)satisfaction underpinning political attitudes (Tilley, Neundorf and Hobolt, 2018; Healy,
Persson and Snowberg, 2017), behavior and conflict (Gurr, 1970; Bernburg, 2015; Grasso
and Giugni, 2016).
Prior research shows that economic development and growth do not affect the distribution
of income in society (Dollar, Kleineberg and Kraay, 2016; Dollar and Kraay, 2002; Ravallion
and Chen, 1996; Bruno, Ravallion and Squire, 1998). However, existing inequalities perpet-
uate disproportionate growth benefits for the rich and overall neutral effects can potentially
mask the fact that people are differently affected by economic development (Ravallion, 2001).
But if we understand economic development as a means to improve people’s livelihoods, we
should clarify its repercussions for the subjective well-being of people and not only test its
effect on objective indicators. Particularly since research shows that the two can differ sub-
stantially (Graham, 2005). Paradoxically, studies show a missing long-term link between
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economic growth and overall happiness, but find that the rich are nevertheless happier than
the poor (Easterlin et al., 2010; Easterlin, 2005, 1995; Sacks, Stevenson and Wolfers, 2013;
Stevenson and Wolfers, 2008). While explicitly focusing on the subjective effects of economic
development, this literature analyzes happiness with life more generally and only a handful
of studies focus on developing and emerging countries (Graham and Pettinato, 2002).
In addition, the majority of research analyzing the effects of development have neglected
the large variation in economic development within countries (Burgess and Venables, 2004).
Growth and economic development cluster (Porter, 2000; Venables, 2005) and are often
confined to urban and coastal areas (Annez and Buckley, 2009; Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger,
1999). In turn, regions within countries are very differently developed and individuals within
the same country are exposed to disparate economic conditions (Kanbur and Venables, 2005).
My focus on local development also echoes recent developments in the political behavior
literature that pay attention to local economic conditions in developed democracies (Larsen
et al., 2019; Healy and Lenz, 2017; Enos, 2016; Reeves and Gimpel, 2012; Hopkins and King,
2010; Johnston and Pattie, 2001). Taking spatial disparities and local economic conditions
into account is especially important in developing and emerging nations as variation in
economic conditions is much more pronounced compared to developed economies (Kim,
2008).
Therefore, this chapter focuses on local development and how it affects the structure of
the economy and labor market demand in people’s local communities. At low development
levels, the economy is characterized by small-scale agriculture and uncompetitive manufac-
turing, predominantly requiring low-skilled labor input (Cypher and Dietz, 2009). With
higher economic development, the structure of the economy changes, manufacturing and
services become more important and the demand for labor shifts to more skilled workers.
The increased demand for skilled labor should also result in a more pronounced wage gap
between high- and low-skilled labor.
Therefore, we see a mismatch of relative demand for labor in less developed areas and
the skills of the well-educated. For this cohort it is much more difficult or nearly impossible
to generate the same income compared to highly-skilled individuals in thriving areas, where
skilled labor is in greater demand. Therefore, the economic outlook of this group should be
higher the more developed the area they live in. For people with low educational attainments
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this mismatch occurs in more developed economic environments. While more educated
people can benefit, the demand for less skilled workers does not increase proportionately.
Their perceived welfare should thus be less pronounced at higher development levels. Less-
skilled workers living in thriving areas, with larger wage gaps, feel left behind.
The empirical analysis tests how the local economic development level affects two central
aspects of subjective economic welfare, perceived employment insecurity and living condi-
tions in conjunction with individual skill sets. It is possible to analyze the impact of the
development level of people’s immediate environments by newly combining geolocated sur-
vey data and night lights, a highly disaggregated and reliable proxy for economic conditions
(Weidmann and Schutte, 2017; Mellander et al., 2015). The geocoded survey data allows
for the identification of the precise locations of respondents and approximate the economic
environment in which they generate their income. The development level of these individu-
alized environments is measured by extracting the nighttime illumination of each individual
economic context. This original combination of data sources provides the unique opportu-
nity to assess how the specific local economic context shapes individual welfare perceptions.
The results show, as expected, that only highly-skilled people benefit from thriving economic
environments - they feel economically secure and are satisfied with their welfare. In contrast,
job insecurity and lower perceptions of economic well-being hit low-skilled workers in more
developed surroundings.
Overall, the results presented here show the diverse effects of local economic conditions
on individuals and how certain groups in society feel left behind when the economy thrives.
They also warrant additional scrutiny when assessing the relationship between the economy
and political phenomena such as political stability, turnout (Lehoucq and Wall, 2004; Stock-
emer, 2015), protest (Bussmann, Scheuthle and Schneider, 2006; Robertson and Teitelbaum,
2011), or even civil war (Bussmann and Schneider, 2007; Hegre, Gissinger and Gleditsch,
2003; Elbadawi and Hegre, 2008). When the link between economy and politics relies on
individual level effects of economic development, trade, or investment we need to account
for the potentially uneven distribution of gains and how these might affect our assumptions
about the aggregate relationship. My findings reiterate the importance of local conditions
and should caution us against simply linking national economic conditions to individual
perceptions and behavior without accounting for the conditions people experience directly
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(Larsen et al., 2019). With huge within-country differences, we need to understand more
thoroughly which economic conditions really affect individuals and asses their specific effects
on people’s attitudes.
2.2 The Distributive Effects of Economic Development
My argument suggests that economic development affects subjective economic welfare through
its impact on labor market dynamics. Welfare perceptions are in turn dependent on the
match of labor market demands and individual skills: when people participate in labor mar-
kets that value and reward their skill set, they rate their welfare higher than when they live
in areas where the labor market demand differs from the skills they posses. In essence, it is
the relative demand for skilled labor in local labor markets that affects perceptions of eco-
nomic well-being. This emphasizes the importance of local economic conditions rather than
more distant, aggregate economic conditions. I first describe how economic development and
structural transformation go together and how they affect the relative demand for skilled
labor. In a second step, I lay out how the subjective welfare of individuals is affected by
labor market dynamics that result from different development stages.
2.2.1 Economic Development, Structural Transformation, and Demand for Labor
In general, economic activities comprise the production and transaction of goods and ser-
vices. When the economic activity of developing countries grows, this process coincides with
the structural transformation of the economy, meaning the reallocation of economic activ-
ity away from agriculture to manufacturing and services (Kuznets, 1973; Chenery, 1960).
The shift away from agriculture is accompanied by the introduction of new technologies in
manufacturing and services. This transformation process is often accompanied by further
international integration, the facilitation of technology transfer, foreign direct investment,
and international trade (McMillan, Rodrik and Verduzco-Gallo, 2014; Goldberg and Pavcnik,
2007). The level of economic development is thus directly linked to the stage of structural
transformation of the economy as well as its interconnectedness with other regions and coun-
tries.
At low levels of development, agriculture is often the dominant sector with the largest
employment share. However, it also tends to be a comparably low productive sector and
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income from agriculture remains small (Gollin, Lagakos and Waugh, 2014; Restuccia, Yang
and Zhu, 2008). Earning opportunities do not require extensive skill sets and the agricul-
tural sector does not reward or employ highly educated workers. Thus, demand for labor
is skewed toward low-skilled, less educated individuals. Skills acquired through education
are an essential determinant for the productivity of workers. In other words, different lev-
els of education convey different skill levels and indicate worker productivity (Jones, 2001;
Spitz‐Oener, 2006). This entails that economies at low development levels largely require
low-skilled workers; these are workers without significant educational achievements. These
economies, dominated by agriculture and uncompetitive manufacturing, generally provide
unfavorable environments for generating generous income and securing economic well-being.
More educated individuals, in particular, are likely to find it hard to receive adequate returns
on their labor given the lack of demanding, high-skilled jobs.
With rising levels of development, the agricultural employment share decreases and the
ratio of workers in the manufacturing and service sector increases (Herrendorf, Rogerson and
Valentinyi, 2014). The expansion of the manufacturing and service sector depends on tech-
nological innovations, which changes the demand for labor and its allocation across the three
broad sectors (Lee and Wolpin, 2006). Both manufacturing and services are more technology
intensive compared to agriculture and require more skilled labor input. In addition, produc-
tive sectors and firms are more prevalent at higher levels of development. They replace less
productive and unprofitable firms that are not fit to compete, especially when markets open
up to international competition (Melitz, 2003; Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding, 2010). Over-
all, the output of the economy grows, technology advances and more goods and services with
higher value are produced and traded. The production of these goods and services requires
highly-skilled workers. Thus, the demand for labor shifts toward more skilled workers who
are, on average, more educated (Topel, 1999; Krueger and Lindahl, 2001).
2.2.2 Labor Market Dynamics, Economic Concerns and Subjective Welfare
Economic development affects labor market dynamics and the relative demand for skilled
labor. I argue that people’s economic welfare perceptions are dependent on the fit of their
individual skills and the local demand for labor. When individual skill levels match the
type of labor that is relatively more demanded, people should feel less concerned about their
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economic situation. A relative mismatch indicates inadequate or comparably low returns to
labor and adverse results in comparison to others in the local labor market. This is impor-
tant as research shows that social comparison, performed consciously or unconsciously, plays
a vital role for perceptions of well-being (Reyes-Garcia et al., 2016; Wolbring, Keuschnigg
and Negele, 2013; Knight, 2012). While people can compare their own welfare to differ-
ent benchmarks (Festinger, 1954), and it is not possible to clearly identify these reference
point(s), we know that comparison to others plays a central role in the assessment of income
(Ferrer-i-Carbonell, Ada, 2005; Clark and Senik, 2010). Therefore, discrepancies between
their own skill level and demand for labor should adversely affect individuals’ views of their
own welfare.
As pointed out, the economic opportunities in less developed environments are limited:
subsistence and smallholder farming or jobs in low productivity manufacturing do not require
skilled, educated labor input. Labor market demand is therefore skewed toward low-skilled
labor. The wage premium for educated workers is negligible and returns to labor are low
across the board. Even well-educated people who could take on more demanding jobs are
confined to the limited opportunities provided by these environments. In contrast, labor
markets in more developed regions favor well-educated workers with higher productivity.
With the shift to manufacturing and services and the increasing use of technology that
accompanies this transformation, relative demand for educated labor increases. In econom-
ically thriving areas, the wage premium of educated workers increases disproportionately to
those of the less educated.
The diverging demand for labor in differently developed environments entails a clear mis-
match of relative demand for skilled labor and individuals with high educational achievements
in less developed areas. This misfit results in a lack of skill-adequate income opportunities.
While it does not preclude highly educated workers from gaining employment, their income
opportunities remain limited and it is unlikely that they will earn significantly more than
those with low educational attainments in their community. Concerns about appropriate
wages and employment opportunities more generally should therefore prevail amongst the
highly educated in these environments. In contrast, educated workers in well-developed envi-
ronments benefit from the higher demand for skilled labor and related income opportunities.
Meeting the skill requirements of the labor market they are able to secure employment and
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appropriate income. Therefore, they should be less concerned about their economic situation
than their counterparts in less developed areas. With more favorable employment opportu-
nities and higher income in thriving environments that allow this group to reap the benefits
of their investment in education, they should also be more satisfied with their economic
welfare in general.
People with low educational attainment, on the other hand, should be favored by the
demand for labor in less developed environments. Income might be difficult to sustain overall,
but these less developed labor markets predominantly offer employment opportunities that
fit the skill level of less educated people. In turn, economic insecurity for this group should
be lower in less developed areas than in booming environments. Here, the relative demand
for labor does not comply with skill level. The disproportionate demand for educated labor
results in a bigger wage gap between the high- and low-skilled compared to less developed
labor markets. Living in these more developed environments might not directly deteriorate
the economic situation of low-skilled labor, however, the relative demand for skilled labor
and resulting wage gap changes the benchmark for assessing their economic welfare. Despite
living in thriving environments, they are not able to benefit to the same extent as other,
more educated, people. Welfare perceptions of the less educated should therefore be less
favorable the greater the economic development level of their environment. While living in
more developed environments might not directly worsen their economic situation, they are
left behind compared to better educated people in these areas.
Overall, this suggests that the level of development and corresponding labor market de-
mand should affect perceived economic welfare differently depending on people’s educational
achievements. The economic development level of people’s environments determines whose
labor is valued and who is relatively more rewarded for their work. Less developed areas only
require low-skilled workers and returns to labor are generally low. Here, economic concerns
should be widespread but especially pronounced amongst well-educated people and their
subjective economic welfare should be lower compared to when living in more developed
areas. In these booming environments income trajectories diverge based on skill, as demand
for educated labor increases. With this disparate development the less educated fall behind
compared to others in their direct environment. Thus, they should be less satisfied with
their economic welfare the higher the development level of their surroundings.
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2.3 Research Design
2.3.1 Local Economic Development
My argument suggests that changes in the level of economic development are accompanied
by alterations to the economic structure and labor markets. However, the economic devel-
opment is ‘lumpy’ and economic conditions do not change uniformly but vary substantially
not only across, but within, countries (Kanbur and Venables, 2005; Venables, 2005; Kim,
2008). Similarly, structural transformation is often clustered in certain regions (Burgess
and Venables, 2004). Therefore, people in the same country often live in very differently
developed areas. While some might still be living in environments dominated by small-scale
agriculture, others may reside in industrialized, highly developed areas.
Even though perceptions of welfare are not independent of aggregate economic develop-
ment levels, I argue that we need to focus on the economic conditions and labor markets
in more restricted areas around people’s place of residence. People usually live at a specific
location and while they can commute to engage in economic activities, their daily mobility
is limited. ‘Marchetti’s constant’ states that the standard commute across time periods and
countries is roughly one hour (Kung et al., 2014; Marchetti, 1994). Thus, the local economic
conditions to which people are exposed and the labor market they participate in are limited
by the time and corresponding distance they are willing and able to commute.
Figure 2.1 visualizes the concept of local economic environments. First, local environ-
ments are dependent on the residential location and encompass the area people are able
to commute to on a daily basis. Second, these local environments are not restricted by
subnational boundaries, as crossing provincial borders is not costly. People can reside in
an economically weak region but might be able to commute to more prosperous areas to
earn money. Thus, subnational administrative borders are unsuitable to capture the specific
economic environments of individuals. Third, crossing national borders often imposes costs
or is sometimes even impossible. Therefore, local environments are confined within national
boundaries. The conceptualization of local economic environments takes persistent and sub-
stantial within-country variation in economic conditions into account. Thereby, it captures
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Figure 2.1: Local economic environments and varying regional development levels. Circles are
Afrobarometer survey clusters with 30 km buffer zones (BenYishay, Rotberg, Wells, Lv, Goodman,
Kovacevic and Runfola, 2017), regional development levels based on average night light emissions in
these regions (National Geophysical Data Center, 2012).
While economic development levels of advanced industrialized countries also vary within
and over time, shifts in the importance of sectors and related demand for labor are far less
pronounced than in developing and emerging countries. Therefore, my empirical analysis
focuses on 36 African countries characterized by high levels of within-country variation in
economic development. Africa is the continent with the largest share of developing, least de-
veloped and low-income countries (United Nations/DESA, 2014). While the level of economic
development still varies widely between and within the analyzed countries, the overwhelm-
ing majority pursues policies to enhance their economic development (Fosu and Ogunleye,
2015). However, a comprehensive analysis of the subjective, individual-level effects of differ-
ent stages of development is still missing (Diao, Harttgen and McMillan, 2017). Also in light
of the unanimous goal of economic development, it is vital to understand the individual-level
effects of economic development and analyze whether everyone feels that they can benefit
when the economy is better developed or if there is a cohort that feels left behind.
To test the effect of economic development on individual welfare perceptions, I use
geocoded individual survey data and combine it with information on local economic con-
ditions. This linkage of individual-level and contextual economic data, tailored to the lo-
cation of survey respondents, allows for a new and more fine-grained assessment of the
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effects of varying economic development levels on perceived individual well-being. I use
geocoded survey data from the Afrobarometer between 2002 and 2014 (2nd to 6th wave)1.
The Afrobarometer data is one of very few high quality individual survey data sources from
developing and emerging countries, extending over several waves and countries, with readily
available and reliable geocoding. It provides a representative cross-section of citizens aged
18 and older for up to 36 African countries.2 The survey data was geocoded by assigning
longitude and latitude to the survey clusters of respondents (BenYishay, Rotberg, Wells,
Lv, Goodman, Kovacevic and Runfola, 2017). Each survey cluster represents the smallest
geographical census unit from which respondents are sampled. Respondents were assigned
longitude and latitude from the centers of their respective cluster.3 Overall, 182,937 respon-
dents are clustered in 13,156 survey clusters, with on average 113 clusters per country and
year.
2.3.2 Outcome Variables: Employment Insecurity and Living Conditions
Local development levels and perceived economic welfare are linked via the (mis)match of
local labor market dynamics and respondents’ skill sets. It suggests that concerns about
people’s economic situation depend on the interaction of individual skill or education and
the local development level. While subjective economic welfare is not directly measurable, I
analyze how economic development affects two core aspects of economic welfare: employment
insecurity and reported living conditions of respondents.
The employment insecurity measure captures concerns about either unemployment or
labor wage. My argument suggests that these worries should vary depending on the extent
of a mismatch of labor market demand and individual skill in differently developed environ-
ments. Employment insecurity is measured with an item asking respondents about the most
pressing problem that should be addressed. Respondents can list up to three problems and
are not limited to prescribed issues. Answers are categorized into overarching issue areas
such as ‘Health’, ‘War’, or ‘Loans/Credit’. Overall, respondents’ answers are categorized into
1The first wave of the Afrobarometer is excluded as central items are not included or the wording is not
comparable.
2The 36 African countries included in the survey are Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi,
Cameroon, Cape Verde, Ivory Coast, Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
3I exclude 818 respondents whose survey cluster could not be precisely geocoded. The detailed procedure
of geocoding the survey data is documented by the AidData Research and Evaluation Unit (2017).
37
more than 50 issue areas. Respondents who mention either ‘Wages, income and salaries’,
or ‘Unemployment’ as their most severe concerns experience employment insecurity (1). All
other answer categories are not primarily concerned with job security (0). Roughly 26% of
respondents report being concerned about wages or unemployment while the remainder are
not predominantly worried about employment insecurity. This operationalization of employ-
ment insecurity only captures income or job-related worries. Other economic concerns such
as ‘Poverty’, ‘Food shortage’, or ‘Social Welfare’ are excluded from the employment insecurity
measure. While employment insecurity is arguably closely related to other economic worries,
this conservative operationalization captures people who clearly prioritize this problem. For
perceived economic insecurity, I expect a negative interaction effect: respondents should feel
less insecure the higher their skill level and the more developed the local environment.
The second outcome variable measures perceived economic welfare more generally. Here,
I operationalize perceived welfare with an item on self-reported living conditions, asking
respondents ‘to describe their own present living conditions’. The answer scale ranges from
‘Very Bad’ (1) to ‘Very Good’ (5). In contrast to generic satisfaction with life or happiness
questions, reported living conditions should capture the perceived economic or material
well-being of respondents more specifically. Around 20% of respondents reported ‘Very Bad’
present living conditions, another 29% state that their living conditions are ‘Bad’. 21% of
answers fall into the undecided category of ‘Neither Good nor Bad’, 26% report that their
living conditions are ‘Good’, while only 4% perceive their living condition as ‘Very Good’.
The distribution of reported living conditions is a little skewed with slightly more negative
assessments of living conditions in the least developed quarter of environments than in the
most developed. While over half of respondents rate their living conditions as ‘Very Bad’
or ‘Bad’ in the former, only 44% of answers from the latter areas are in those categories.
Roughly 29% of respondents living in these most developed areas report ‘Very Good’ or
‘Good’ living conditions, while only a quarter place themselves in these two answer categories
when living in the least developed local environments. According to the theoretical argument,
higher economic development should ameliorate perceived living conditions of highly-skilled
individuals but have a negative effect on the assessments of low-skilled respondents. This
implies the positive interaction effect of skills and local development on perceived living
conditions.
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2.3.3 Explanatory Variables: Measuring Local Economic Development and Individual Ed-
ucation
To test how the subjective welfare is affected by local development levels in conjunction with
individual education, I measure both the economic development level of the environment in
which the individual is living and their education or skill level. To measure the local economic
development level it is necessary to approximate people’s specific economic environment.
The size of these local economic environments is constrained by people’s (daily) mobility.
Research on commuting patterns in African countries shows that mobility is limited and
commuting is relatively time-consuming. While average commuting distances vary, they
rarely exceed 30 km (Bryceson, Mbara and Maunder, 2003; Moselakgomo, Mokonyama and
Okonta, 2017). Therefore, I calculate a 30 km buffer zone around the location of each
respondent. For robustness checks, I also use 10 and 50 km buffer zones, as well as dynamic
buffers.4 All local environments are clipped at national borders to account for the costs
associated with crossing these boundaries.
Official national or subnational economic data is not sufficiently disaggregated and flex-
ible to measure the development levels of these customized local environments. Therefore, I
use night light emissions, the illumination recorded during nighttime, as a proxy for economic
development. There are two main advantages to this proxy: First, night lights have a very
high resolution and can be used to measure the economic development of customized areas
or environments. Second, using night lights avoids relying on national statistics with limited
data quality. Particularly in developing countries, differing methodologies and motivations
to collect official economic data, such as national GDP, lead to serious measurement dis-
crepancies and unreliable data accounts (Proville, Zavala-Araiza and Wagner, 2017; Jerven,
2013). Night lights have been used and validated as a proxy for economic activity and de-
velopment in the conflict literature (Kuhn and Weidmann, 2015; Cederman, Weidmann and
Bormann, 2015; Weidmann and Schutte, 2017). However, the use of this fine-grained data
source is to my knowledge new to the research on individual-level perceptions and attitudes.
Using this type of proxy might be an avenue to reconcile the concept and measurement of
individual-level research interested in the consequences of economic conditions.
4Dynamic buffer zones are calculated using information on the accessibility of respondents’ location. Weiss
et al. (2018) provide global accessibility raster data with information on travel time to cities. Buffer zones
were scaled from 10 to 100 km based on the accessibility values of the raster of the enumeration area.
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Night lights are a powerful proxy for economic activity: They are highly correlated
to countries’ economic output in GDP (Elvidge et al., 1997; Chen and Nordhaus, 2011;
Proville, Zavala-Araiza and Wagner, 2017) and capture economic activity and the develop-
ment of subnational units (Lessmann and Seidel, 2017; Henderson, Storeygard and Weil,
2011; Sutton, Elvidge and Ghosh, 2007; Doll, Muller and Morley, 2006; Ebener et al., 2005).
Even at neighborhood level, they are a reliable predictor of economic wealth (Weidmann
and Schutte, 2017). Night lights are especially useful in developing and emerging countries,
where measurement problems of this proxy are limited (Mellander et al., 2015).5
The US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration provides a time-series of
worldwide annual composites of night light emissions by the Defense Meteorological Satellite
Program’s Operational Linescan System (DMSP-OLS) from 1992 to 2013 (National Geo-
physical Data Center, 2012). I draw on the ‘stable lights’ version, which is adjusted for the
average amount of time the illumination is detectable and excludes non-stable light sources.6
The annual raster data has a resolution of 30 arc-seconds, which is approximately one square
kilometer at the equator. Values for raster cells range between 0 and 63 ‘digital number’
(DN), a measure for the level of illumination, where 0 DN means that no light was detected
in a raster cell and 63 DN is the maximum illumination that can be registered for a raster
cell.
Local economic development levels are measured by extracting average emission values
for all environments. I use the average emission of night light in the year before the sur-
vey was conducted: Average night light is the sum of night light values of all raster cells
within the area divided by the number of cells from each environment. The results are vi-
sualized in Figure 2.2 for respondents of the 5th wave, showing differently illuminated local
environments. For the analysis all light measures are log-transformed, this corresponds to
the transformation of ‘traditional’ GDP measures. In addition, it accounts for their heavily
left-skewed distribution and the expectation that the effect of local economic development
on perceived well-being decreases with higher values.
5A major constraint of night lights, the problem of ‘top-coding’, is less common in developing countries
(Mellander et al., 2015). Top-coding refers to the restricted range of values (0 to 63 DN) for recording
nighttime illumination. Lights much brighter than 63 DN are lumped together with those only reaching
the threshold. Differentiation at very high levels of illumination, corresponding to high levels of economic
development, is therefore problematic. As the number of areas with very high illumination is lower in
developing countries, night lights remain a valuable proxy despite this caveat.




Figure 2.2: Night lights for local economic environments. Circles are 30 km buffer zones around
Afrobarometer survey clusters filled with average night lights in these areas in 2010 (night light
data from National Geophysical Data Center (2012), Afrobarometer survey cluster data from
BenYishay, Rotberg, Wells, Lv, Goodman, Kovacevic and Runfola (2017)).
Overall, the average night light illumination for 30 km buffer zones ranges between 0
and 59.88 DN. Zero values are an indicator of areas where no nighttime illumination was
detected, e.g. areas without any electrification or deserts. The highest levels of illumination
are recorded for environments that encompass large cities. The average variance of lights
within countries across all years is roughly 21 DN. The substantial variation of night lights
within countries points to the salience of this measure for assessing the effect of spatial vari-
ation in economic development. When levels of light emission are split into quartiles, 37% of
respondents with no formal schooling live in environments which fall into the first quartile,
while only 12% live in the most illuminated quartile of local environments. The distribution
of low educated respondents per illumination quartile is comparable, with roughly a third
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of respondents in the first two illumination quartiles and approximately 17% in the fourth.
Secondary education is most prevalent in the most illuminated environments, 33% of re-
spondents with intermediary education categories reside in these areas. Their share in the
first and second quartile is roughly 40% and thus still quite substantial. Having received a
university education makes living in highly developed areas more likely; 52% of university-
educated respondents live in environments that are part of the most illuminated quartile.
Still, 9% of this educational group live in the least developed quartile of environments, while
a further 12% reside in the second quartile.
To test the hypothesis of a conditional effect of skill and local development on perceived
well-being, individual skill is operationalized with a question asking respondents about ‘the
highest level of education’ they have completed. A number of studies suggest that an in-
crease in years of schooling increases the skills of workers and thus their productivity and
related output (Jones, 2001; Krueger and Lindahl, 2001; Topel, 1999). Education is a very
general measure of skill and cannot count for sector or task specific skills, as well as on
the job training. However, skill specificity is less pronounced in my sample of developing
and emerging countries, thus education levels should still adequately measure the skill set
of respondents.
The education item has 9 answer categories ranging from ‘No formal schooling’ (0) to
‘Post-graduate’ (9). Lower education levels, 1 - 3, encompass ‘Informal Schooling’, ‘Some
or Completed Primary School’, followed by education levels 4 and 5, referring to some ‘Sec-
ondary School’ and ‘Completed High School’. Higher education is depicted with values 6
to 9: ‘Post-secondary Qualification’, ‘Some University Education’, ‘Completed University’,
and ‘Post-graduate’ level. The median education level across countries pertains to those
who have completed primary education, but 15% of respondents have not received formal
schooling. Over a third of respondents reported low levels of education (1-3). However, the
share of people with intermediate education levels (4 and 5) is equally high. Another 14%
of respondents have received some sort of university education.
For the analysis, I include individual controls for age, gender, employment status, type of
residence (urban or rural), ethnic grievances and the consumption of media in all models. I
also control for incidents of lethal violence taking place within the local community in the year
before the respondent is interviewed. For this purpose, I use the UCDP Georeferenced Event
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Dataset and overlap conflict sites with local environments of Afrobarometer respondents
(Sundberg and Melander, 2013). In addition, I control for characteristics of the enumeration
areas: Afrobarometer interviewers report available services and the quality of infrastructure
of enumeration areas. From items asking about the presence of a post office, public school,
police station, a clinic and an official market I construct a services index that ranges from 0
(none of these services are present in the enumeration area) to 5 (all of the services are present
in the enumeration area). An infrastructure index is constructed by combining information
on whether an electricity grid, piped water system, and sewage system are present in the
enumeration area. Additionally, information on the road quality in the enumeration area is
included in the infrastructure index. The infrastructure variable ranges from 0 (no electricity
grid, piped water and sewage system, and non-tarred roads) to 4 (enumeration area with
electricity, piped water, sewage system, and tarred roads).
2.3.4 Estimation Method
Due to the clustered nature of the data, I estimate hierarchical models with random inter-
cepts, with individuals nested in enumeration areas . This entails that a unique intercept
parameter is used for each enumeration area, accounting for the diversity of enumeration
areas (McElreath, 2016). I use a logit model for the employment insecurity variable and
an ordered logit specification for the living conditions variable. The models are defined as
follows:
∗
= + ⋅ educ ∗ ⋅ localdev +
⋅ age + ⋅ female + ⋅ empl +
⋅ urban + ⋅ eth + ⋅media +
⋅ +
⋅ service + ⋅ infra + ⋅ conflict +
(2.1)







0 (no employment insecurity) if ∗ < 0






1 (very bad) if −∞ < ∗ <
2 (fairly bad) if < ∗ <
3 (neither good nor bad) if < ∗ <
4 (fairly good) if < ∗ <
5 (very good) if < ∗ < ∞
All models include the cross-level interaction between education and local development,
as well as the above-described individual and context-level explanatory factors. The variable
matrix is an array of dummies for each country-year. All models are estimated in
STAN with the No-U-Turn Sampler (NUTS) (Hoffman and Gelman, 2014) via the brms
package for R (Bürkner, 2017).7 Convergence of the four chains is assessed with ˆ diagnos-
tics, which should be close to 1 and never exceed 1.03 in all models across all parameters
(Gelman and Rubin, 1992). The results presented below are robust to alternative modeling
strategies (non-hierarchical, linear specifications with country-year fixed effects and spatial
fixed effects for raster cells, see Table 2.D.15 in the Appendix).
2.4 Results
My argument suggests that subjective well-being is dependent on the (mis)match of local
labor market demands that are dependent on the specific development level and individual
education levels. In line with this conditional argument, I expect the highly educated to be
most satisfied with their material welfare when living in well-developed areas. On the other
hand, individuals with low education are likely to feel more insecure and be less satisfied
7I run four chains with 1,000 warm-up and 1,000 sampling iterations. By default, brms uses improper flat
priors over the reals for all population (individual) level parameters.
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the higher the development level of their local environment. To show the diverse effects of
local development, I first present how employment insecurity is affected by the conjunction of
individual education and local development levels. In a second step, I present the analysis for
reported living conditions. Overall, the results confirm that the effect of local development
on employment security and living conditions is, in fact, conditional on individual education
levels. They highlight that when living in less developed areas, highly educated people
are more economically insecure and dissatisfied than in more developed areas. For the less
educated, the relationship is inverse, they experience more economic insecurity and are less
satisfied the higher the development level of their surroundings.
2.4.1 Employment Insecurity
Table 2.1 shows the results for perceived employment insecurity and how they depend on
education and local development, proxied with night lights. I report the point estimates as
well as the lower and upper bound of the 95% credible interval. In addition, I include the
number of effective sample size (NEFF) that indicates how the chains mixed. To support
readability of the results I report which credible intervals exclude zero.8
Table 2.1: Estimation results for employment insecurity.
Posterior 95% CI CI NEFF
Mean exludes 0
Education 0.14 [0.12,0.15] ✓ 4 000
Local Development 0.33 [0.28,0.38] ✓ 3 558
Education ∗Local Development -0.07 [-0.08,-0.06] ✓ 4 000
Age -0.01 [-0.01,-0.01] ✓ 4 000
Female -0.07 [-0.10,-0.03] ✓ 4 000
Urban -0.13 [-0.18,-0.07] ✓ 4 000
Unemployment 0.01 [-0.03,0.05] 4 000
Ethnic Grievances 0.03 [-0.01,0.08] 4 000
Media Consumption 0.03 [0.02,0.04] ✓ 4 000
Services (EA) 0.02 [0.01,0.04] ✓ 4 000
Infrastructure (EA) 0.09 [0.06,0.11] ✓ 4 000
Conflict (EA) -0.15 [-0.26,-0.03] ✓ 4 000
Observations 94,888
Max. ˆ < 1.01
As pointed out, my argument suggests a negative interaction effect of local development
and education. This would support the hypothesis that education is a necessary condition
8This can be interpreted as an indication of statistical significance in the traditional, frequentist sense.
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for respondents to be unconcerned about job security in a well-developed environment. The
coefficient for local development in this model is positive (0.33) and the 95% credibility
interval ranges from 0.28 to 0.38.9 This means that higher local development levels coincide
with more concerns about unemployment and wages for the least educated respondents.
The coefficient estimate for the education variable is positive (0.16, 95% : [0.14,0.17]),
suggesting that insecurity increases in the least developed areas the higher the educational
attainment. The estimate for the interaction of individual education and local development
is negative and its density interval clearly excludes 0. ˆ values for economic insecurity
models are all below 1.01, indicating convergence of the four chains. The effective number of
samples (NEFF) is never far below the number of iteration (4 chains with 1,000 iterations)
indicating that the chains are efficient and show convergence.
In order to understand the impact of the interaction of education and night lights, the
predicted probabilities are visualized for three different education levels in Figure 2.3. Indi-
vidual controls (male, urban, employed, no ethnic grievances, average media consumption),
enumeration area controls (average services and infrastructure and no conflict in the local en-
vironment) and country-year (country-year = South Africa 2008) are held constant. The first
panel shows the effect of differently developed areas on employment insecurity for respon-
dents who have no formal schooling, the second relates to those who completed secondary
school, and the third panel for respondents who were awarded a university degree.
The predicted probabilities clearly show diverging concerns about employment and wages
for these three education groups. In more developed areas, respondents without any formal
education are far more concerned about employment insecurity than their well educated
counterparts. While the probability of reporting concerns about employment of wages is
below 25% in the least developed areas, it is twice as high when living in the most thriving
areas, which corresponds to my theoretical expectations. Employment insecurities of people
with secondary degrees are not affected by the level of economic development. Yet, when
having received a university degree the trajectory is inversed: the probability of being con-
cerned about employment is highest in the least developed areas and constantly decreases
with higher economic development. University graduates living in the most illuminated,
9In comparison, estimates for education and local development in a model without an interaction are also
positive and their 95% credibility intervals exclude 0 (see Table 2.A.1 in the Appendix).
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Local Development (Logged Night Light)
Figure 2.3: Predicted probabilities for employment insecurity.
respectively developed areas are least concerned about wages and unemployment compared
to others in their education group.
These results show the complex relationship between economic development levels and
subjective economic welfare. Not all respondents perceive that their circumstances have
improved when the economic conditions are better. At least concerns about employment
security are not fewer but more pronounced for large parts of the population when living
in thriving areas. Importantly, employment insecurity for the least educated is more severe
the higher the development level of their local environment. University educated individuals
in comparison, are most concerned in the least illuminated areas, where they cannot find
suitable employment and income does not reflect investment in education. Their worry
decreases when living in more developed environments.
This trajectory is in line with the argument about the importance of diverging demand for
skilled labor for economic well-being: while demand for skilled labor is relatively low in less
developed areas, it is substantially more requested by employers in prosperous environments.
Therefore, the highly-skilled are more economically secure in well-developed environments,
while those with fewer skills feel left behind. For them, it remains difficult to benefit from
a thriving economy and their concerns about employment insecurity do not vanish in more
developed areas.
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2.4.2 Perceived Living Conditions
In the next step, I show posteriors for the perceived living conditions variable (Table 2.2). I
expect a positive interaction of local development and education, indicating that perceived
living conditions improve above all for well-educated people in thriving economic environ-
ments. The results show that respondents with higher education are generally more satisfied
with their living conditions (0.06, 95% : [0.05,0.07]). However, the estimate for local devel-
opment is negative, indicating that living in economic environments with higher development
levels negatively affects the least educated (-0.17, 95% : [-0.18,-0.10]). This supports the
hypothesis that low-skilled people in thriving environments feel worse off than when living
in less developed areas. The positive interaction estimate (0.3, 95% : [0.02,0.03]) suggests
that the negative effect of higher development levels is moderated by education: Only the
highly educated feel that their living conditions are better in prosperous areas.10
Table 2.2: Estimation results for living conditions.
Posterior 95% CI CI NEFF
Mean exludes 0
Education 0.06 [0.05,0.07] ✓ 4 000
Local Development -0.17 [-0.21,-0.13] ✓ 2 164
Education ∗Local Development 0.03 [0.02,0.04] ✓ 3 336
Age -0.01 [-0.01,-0.01] ✓ 4 000
Female 0.08 [0.05,0.11] ✓ 4 000
Urban 0.05 [0.00,0.10] 2 974
Unemployment -0.09 [-0.12,-0.06] ✓ 4 000
Media Consumption 0.07 [0.07,0.08] ✓ 4 000
Ethnic Grievances -0.28 [-0.31,-0.25] ✓ 4 000
Service (EA) -0.01 [-0.03,0.00] 4 000
Infrastructure (EA) 0.04 [0.02,0.06] ✓ 3 204






Max. ˆ < 1.02
The results show that with age, respondents are less concerned about their living condi-
tions, with women tending to view them more favorably than men. People living in urban
10The results of the non-interacted model (see Table 2.A.2 in the Appendix) show a positive effect of
education (0.08) and a negative effect for local development (-0.06) on perceived living conditions.
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L o c al  D e v el o p m e nt ( L o g g e d  Ni g ht  Li g ht)
Fi g u r e 2. 4: P r e di ct e d p r o b a biliti e s f o r li vi n g c o n diti o n s.
a r e a s r e p o rt s u b st a nti all y l o w e r l e v el s of c o nt e nt m e nt  wit h t h ei r li vi n g c o n diti o n s t h a n t h o s e
r e si di n g i n r u r al a r e a s.  A s c a n b e e x p e ct e d, t h o s e  w h o a r e u n e m pl o y e d a n d p e r c ei v e t h at
t h e y a r e t r e at e d u nf ai rl y d u e t o t h ei r et h ni cit y r e p o rt l o w e r s ati sf a cti o n  wit h t h ei r li vi n g
c o n diti o n s.  C o n v e r g e n c e i s a s s e s s e d vi a ˆ w hi c h d o e s n ot e x c e e d 1. 0 4 i n all  m o d el s a n d
w hil e t h e n u m b e r of e fi e cti v e s a m pl e s d r a w n v a ri e s, it i s s u fi ci e ntl y hi g h f o r all i n di vi d u al
v a ri a bl e s t o e n s u r e c o n v e r g e n c e.
Fi g u r e 2. 4 vi s u ali z e s p r e di ct e d p r o b a biliti e s f o r r e p o rt e d li vi n g c o n diti o n s. 1 1 T h e t r a-
j e ct o ri e s cl e a rl y di v e r g e d e p e n d e nt o n t h e l e v el of e d u c ati o n.  N o f o r m al s c h o oli n g l e a d s
t o g e n e r all y  w o r s e p e r c e pti o n s of li vi n g c o n diti o n s c o m p a r e d t o all ot h e r e d u c ati o n g r o u p s.
T h e s e p e r c e pti o n s a r e e v e n  m o r e n e g ati v e t h e  m o r e ill u mi n at e d t h e a r e a a n d t h u s t h e  m o r e
d e v el o p e d t h e l o c al e n vi r o n m e nt.  H a vi n g c o m pl et e d s e c o n d a r y e d u c ati o n i m p r o v e s p e r c e p-
ti o n s of li vi n g c o n diti o n s c o m p a r e d t o t h o s e  wit h l o w e r l e v el s of s c h o oli n g.  Al s o, t h e n e g ati v e
e ff e ct of hi g h e r e c o n o mi c d e v el o p m e nt l e v el s v a ni s h e s.  H o w e v e r, a p o siti v e i m p a ct of t h ri vi n g
e n vi r o n m e nt s i s o nl y vi si bl e at v e r y hi g h e d u c ati o n l e v el s.  F o r p e o pl e  wit h a u ni v e r sit y d e-
g r e e, t h e p r o b a bilit y of r e p o rti n g g o o d li vi n g c o n diti o n s i s s u b st a nti all y hi g h e r  w h e n r e si di n g
i n p r o s p e r o u s l o c al e n vi r o n m e nt s.
W hil e t h e r e s ult s s h o w h o w c o n c e r n s a b o ut e m pl o y m e nt s e c u rit y a r e i n v e r s e,  wit h t h e
hi g hl y e d u c at e d  m o st c o n c e r n e d i n t h e l e a st d e v el o p e d a r e a s a n d t h e l e s s e d u c at e d  m o r e
1 1 I n di vi d u al c o nt r ol s:  m al e, u r b a n, e m pl o y e d, n o e t h ni c g ri e v a n c e s, a v e r a g e  m e di a c o n s u m p ti o n; e n u m e r a-
ti o n a r e a c o nt r ol s: a v e r a g e s e r vi c e a n d i nf r a s t r u c t u r e, n o c o n fli c t i n t h e p r e vi o u s y e a r; c o u nt r y- y e a r: S o u t h
Af ri c a, 2 0 0 8.
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prone to reporting employment insecurity in the most developed areas, perceived living
conditions of differently educated groups are mainly diverging. This resonates with the
importance of comparison and expectations for subjective well-being. In the least developed
areas employment opportunities are limited regardless of the individual’s education level.
People living in these least illuminated areas do not expect to attain a high level of economic
welfare given their lagging environment. In these areas, the reported living conditions of
differently educated respondents are most alike. In line with the theoretical argument, they
start diverging with higher local development levels. Living in these more prosperous areas
can give rise to higher expectations regarding economic well-being. If these expectations
are not met, subjective well-being stagnates while living in thriving economic areas. For
those who cannot live up to their expectations perceived well-being is even worse in these
environments, as discrepancies between aspiration and actual living conditions widen. The
less educated are also worse off in comparison to others around them when living in thriving
environments, which is reflected by their reported low living conditions. In contrast, highly-
skilled people do not seem to lag behind their expectations in surroundings with higher
economic development. Their perceived living conditions clearly show that they are the
beneficiaries of higher economic development.
Overall, concerns about employment and patterns of reported living conditions are de-
pendent on the combination of local development levels and individual productivity. Re-
ported living conditions in the least developed areas are lower and economic insecurity is
higher across the education groups. Yet, trajectories diverge the more prosperous the local
environment. The more developed the local environment and the higher the individual pro-
ductivity, the lower the probability of being concerned about employment security and the
more positive the perceived living conditions. In contrast, individuals with lower productiv-
ity levels are far more likely to report that wages and unemployment are major problems
and their perception of living conditions is substantially worse when living in economically
thriving environments. Economic development levels clearly exert heterogeneous effects on
individuals and higher economic development even impacts some people negatively.
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2.4.3 Comparison to National Development and Changes in Local Development
The argument of this paper suggests that the immediate economic environment of people,
local labor markets, and the relative demand for skilled labor in these locations affects
subjective economic well-being. This bears the question if and to what extent the national
development level might still impact people’s welfare perceptions. To account for any shifts at
country level, the main analysis includes country-year fixed effects. To assess the importance
of national economic development further I use the difference between local and national
development levels as explanatory variable for both employment insecurity and perceived
living conditions. The difference in mean night light emissions between the local and national
level captures the importance of relative development levels of local communities within a
country.
The results for employment insecurity using the difference between the national level
of light emission rather than the local level do not change compared to the main results
(presented in Table 2.B.6 in the Appendix). However, the magnitude in the impact of the
difference between local and national development levels on employment insecurity is far less
pronounced. For perceived living conditions (Table 2.C.12 in the Appendix) the disparity
between local and national development is also negative and well-educated people perceive
their living conditions more favorably. However, the interaction estimate is not significant
anymore. These findings underline the importance of the absolute level of development for
people’s perceived welfare and emphasize the need to focus on the local economic conditions
that directly affect them. The welfare perceptions of differently educated people are only
marginally affected by the development level of their communities compared to national
development levels.
While these results confirm the importance of local development levels in absolute, an-
other question asks whether people’s perceptions are influenced by the level or change in
local economic development. The main models presented in the analysis use the economic
development level in the year before the respondent was interviewed. However, the argument
made about the link between local development levels, respective labor market demand and
subjective well-being could also be applied to local changes in economic development. In
areas that have grown more rapidly, we would expect a similarly swift upward trend in de-
mand for skilled labor. Therefore, higher economic growth (measured as the change in night
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Change in Local Development (Logged Night Light)
Figure 2.5: Predicted probabilities for economic growth and employment insecurity.
lights) should negatively affect the perceived employment security of the low skilled and al-
leviate concerns about wages and unemployment for those who are well educated. Similarly,
perceived living conditions should be lower for less educated individuals living in areas where
the economic performance has improved substantially, whereas the highly educated should
feel the benefits of that change and rate their living conditions more positively.
The results for the change in local economic development in the three year period before
the respondent was interviewed are shown in Tables 2.B.7 and 2.C.13 in the Appendix. To
illustrate the effect on employment insecurity, the predicted probabilities are shown analo-
gously to the main results. Overall, they confirm the results of the main analysis, showing
that insecurities of people without formal education surge the higher the economic growth
in the three years before the interview. We see the inverse relationship between economic
growth and concerns about employment for the most educated respondents, with these con-
cerns mentioned less often the higher the growth rate in their local environment.
For perceived living conditions the pattern also corresponds to the analysis, using devel-
opment levels instead of change in development. The higher the local economic growth the
more dissatisfied are those with no educational attainments (-1.0, 95% : [-1.44,-0.57]), and
more highly educated respondents have a worse perception of their living conditions when
their local economies are stagnating (-.42, 95% : [-0.62,-0.27]). The interaction estimate
is positive, showing that the negative effect of economic growth is reversed for well educated
people. These results confirm the findings about the importance of local development levels,
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showing that where the economy is growing swiftly the well-educated labor force, increasingly
in demand, has a better perception of its economic welfare; conversely, the less educated are
less satisfied with their economic situation.
2.4.4 Varying Sizes of Local Economic Environments
The results presented above show that local development has diverse effects on concerns
about job security and perceived well-being. Importantly, the effect of different develop-
ment levels on both employment insecurity and living conditions is clearly contingent on
individual education. Economic welfare is only higher for the most educated people in thriv-
ing environments. Those with no or low schooling miss out on this positive effect of higher
development. In contrast, they feel more insecure and have a worse perception of their living
conditions the higher their local development level. To underpin these heterogeneous effects
of local economic conditions, I perform a series of robustness tests. Therefore, I re-estimate
the models for employment insecurity and perceived living conditions with differently sized
local environments.
First, I measure local development with average night light emissions in zones within
10 and 50 km radii around respondents’ locations. Second, I use a dynamic buffer which
ranges between 10 and 100 km depending on the accessibility of the location. The results
for concerns about employment security are shown in Tables 2.B.3, 2.B.4, and 2.B.5 in the
Appendix. The main findings of the analysis based on the 30 km buffer zones are robust
to all three different specifications. In areas with higher economic development concerns
about employment (dynamic estimate: 0.35; 10 km estimate: 0.24, 50 km estimate: 0.42)
for the least educated are always more pronounced. The interaction estimates show that
this trajectory is inverted for all three sizes of local environments for people with high
educational attainments (dynamic estimate: -0.07; 10 km estimate: -0.05, 50 km estimate:
-0.09). Similarly, the results for reported living conditions do not change substantially with
different specifications of local economic environments. For 10 km, 50 km and dynamic local
environments, higher economic development levels coincide with the least educated reporting
negative perceptions about their living conditions. This negative impact is always reversed
for more skilled, educated people. The estimates for the interaction for the different buffer
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sizes, shown in Tables 2.C.9, 2.C.10, and 2.C.11 in the Appendix, range from 0.02 to 0.04
and all 95% posterior density intervals exclude 0.
Different sizes for local economic environments only slightly change the estimates of the
main model, based on 30 km buffer zones. The effects are a bit weaker for the 10 km zones
and somewhat stronger for the environments with a 50 km radius. Relying on dynamic
buffers, which take into account how easy it is to reach the location of the respondent,
produces almost identical estimates. This corroborates the main findings and the theoretical
argument that local economic conditions in conjunction with educational attainments impact
how people perceive their welfare.
2.4.5 Light Emissions from Natural Resource Extraction
An important caveat of my findings is related to the use of night lights as a proxy for economic
development and the question as to what type of economic activity actually causes nighttime
illumination. The argument made here is that night lights are well suited to capture different
economic development levels and the accompanying structural transformation state of the
economy. However, the danger is that night lights might over or underestimate economic
activity in certain areas. The proxy could overestimate economic development levels where
disproportionate amounts of light are emitted. This should apply particularly to light inten-
sive extraction of natural resources. The problematic feature of natural resource extraction,
especially oil and gas extraction, is that these economic activities generally provide few and
mostly low-skilled employment opportunities (McMillan, Rodrik and Verduzco-Gallo, 2014).
In contrast, the production processes of these industries constantly produce substantial illu-
mination, which I use as an indicator for thriving environments in my analysis.
To account for this problem, I exclude all respondents living in environments with active
onshore oil and gas deposits.12 The results based on this restricted sample corroborate
the findings from the full sample (see Tables 2.B.8 and 2.C.14 in the Appendix). Again,
higher local development levels lead to more economic insecurities and exert a negative
effect on perceived living conditions for people with low education. Both effects turn for
highly educated individuals who feel less insecure and are more satisfied with their living
conditions when living in thriving environments.
12Data on the location of onshore oil and gas deposits is taken from the Petroleum Dataset provided by
PRIO (Lujala, Rod and Thieme, 2007).
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The robustness checks performed here in terms of model specification, differently sized
local economic environments and the exclusion of respondents living in proximity to light
intensive but low-employment economic activities, all confirm the main findings: the effect
of higher economic development is conditional on people’s educational achievements. There
is no parallel trend in perceived economic well-being and local development for everyone.
The winners in economic development are the highly educated who can profit in terms of
less insecurity concerning their employment situation and more favorable perceptions of their
living conditions. The least and less educated are decoupled from high economic development
levels in their immediate surroundings. To the contrary, they feel more insecure and report
lower satisfaction with their living conditions the more developed their local environment.
2.5 Conclusion
Countries worldwide pursue economic growth as a means to improve the lives of citizens.
And yet, our understanding of the effects of economic development on people’s welfare per-
ceptions - fundamental for both their subjective well-being, but especially for their political
attitudes and behavior - is still limited. Testing whether, and in particular for whom eco-
nomic development improves perceived welfare thus helps us to gain a more comprehensive
understanding of the effects of development. This is not only an important question for
supplementing the evaluation of economic development; answering it might help us to better
understand patterns of perceived inequality in living standards and economic concerns, but
also resulting political attitudes and behavior in the face of disparate economic development
across and within countries. Assessing the effect of vastly different local economic conditions
on people’s attitudes is not only important and feasible for research focusing on developed
democracies (Larsen et al., 2019; Healy and Lenz, 2017), but also for analyses focusing on
developing and emerging countries.
The evidence from a large number of African countries over more than a decade presented
here clearly shows the diverse effects of local economic development on perceived economic
welfare. While the well-educated feel more secure and have a more positive perception of
their welfare the higher the development level of their local community, the opposite is true
for those with no or low educational achievements. For the low-skilled, higher economic
development gives rise to employment insecurities and their perceived welfare is generally
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lower in thriving economic environments. These results are in line with the argument that
a mismatch in local demand for skilled labor and and the individual’s own educational
attainment results in an adverse welfare perception, which applies to the highly-educated
in less developed environments and the low-skilled in booming areas. In essence, higher
economic development drives a wedge between high- and low-skilled people in terms of their
perceived welfare and leaves behind the less-educated.
The results presented here underline the importance of local economic conditions for
people’s welfare perceptions. Local development levels are vital as they determine the eco-
nomic conditions to which people are directly exposed. With prevailing spatial variation in
economic development, people in the same country live in vastly differently developed local
communities. To gain a nuanced understanding of the effects of economic development we
therefore need to zoom into these local areas that center around people’s site of residence
and are confined by the extent of individual mobility. To measure these local economic
conditions we cannot rely on often inexistent and unreliable regional data accounts. How-
ever, disaggregated geographically referenced proxies for economic activity, i.e. nighttime
illumination as used here, are available and can help us to more accurately approximate the
economic conditions encountered by people.
In this paper I have combined disaggregated raster data on night lights with precise in-
formation on respondents’ location. Thereby, it has been possible to measure the economic
development level of people’s local communities. This approach makes use of detailed geo-
graphic information recently made available by some large cross-country household surveys
and attempts to substantially refine our understanding of the economic conditions to which
people are exposed. In addition, it showcases the potential for further political economy
research interested in concisely combining individual and contextual data, as well as the
potential of high-resolution proxies such as night lights in individual level analyses. The
results are in line with recent findings on the importance of local economies from developed
countries and show that these confined local areas have a strong impact on the perceived
welfare and economic security of people.
However, the results also emphasize the importance of scrutinizing how individual charac-
teristics, such as education, interact with economic conditions when analyzing their individual-
level effects. They show that higher economic development profits some people but seems
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to hurt others, depending on individual characteristics that determine the individual’s fit
to local labor market demands. Heterogeneous individual-level effects may also be able to
reconcile mixed findings in the literature, connecting economic conditions with political out-
comes. When some people win and others lose out from the same situation, it might help
to make sense of findings that connect the economy and political behavior and find differing
effects, e.g. a protest-deterring or -enhancing effect of economic openness (Dodson, 2015;
Robertson and Teitelbaum, 2011). And they might also help to explain the null findings in
the literature, as these positive and negative effects can cancel each other out (Bussmann,
Scheuthle and Schneider, 2006; Karakaya, 2016).
The paper also reveals a potentially problematic trajectory when rising economic devel-
opment does not improve the economic welfare perception for everyone. This is especially
the case in terms of the negative trajectory of employment security and perceived living
conditions on the part of poorly educated people who reside in areas that are more highly
developed, which runs counter to the aim of developing countries to improve the livelihood or
citizens, the poor in particular. At minimum, the less educated, who are often also the poor-
est citizens, do not feel the benefits of higher economic development. While we might value
economic growth and higher development levels, these positive trajectories do not automat-
ically trickle down to everyone’s subjective welfare. In contrast, some people feel worse off
when living in thriving environments than in less developed areas. Clearly, higher economic
development levels increase the gaps in perceived well-being with potential repercussions for




Table 2.A.1: Estimation results for employment insecurity.
Non-Interacted Model with local development based on night lights in 30km buffer zones.
Posterior 95% CI CI NEFF
Mean exludes 0
Education 0.07 [0.06,0.09] ✓ 4 000
Local Development 0.06 [0.03,0.09] ✓ 4 000
Age -0.01 [-0.01,-0.01] ✓ 4 000
Female -0.06 [-0.10,-0.03] ✓ 4 000
Urban -0.13 [-0.19,-0.07] ✓ 4 000
Unemployment 0.00 [-0.04,0.04] 4 000
Ethnic Grievances 0.03 [-0.01,0.08] 4 000
Media Consumption 0.03 [0.02,0.04] ✓ 4 000
Services (EA) 0.02 [0.01,0.04] ✓ 4 000
Infrastructure (EA) 0.09 [0.07,0.11] ✓ 4 000
Conflict (EA) -0.14 [-0.25,-0.03] ✓ 4 000
Observations 94,053
Max. ˆ 1.02
Table 2.A.2: Estimation results for living conditions.
Non-Interacted Model with local development based on night lights in 30km buffer zones.
Posterior 95% CI CI NEFF
Mean exludes 0
Education 0.08 [0.07,0.09] ✓ 4 000
Local Development -0.06 [-0.09,-0.03] ✓ 2 374
Age -0.01 [-0.01,-0.01] ✓ 4 000
Female 0.08 [0.05,0.11] ✓ 4 000
Urban 0.05 [0.00,0.10] 3 053
Unemployment -0.09 [-0.12,-0.05] ✓ 4 000
Ethnic Grievances -0.28 [-0.31,-0.25] ✓ 4 000
Media Consumption 0.07 [0.07,0.08] ✓ 4 000
Services (EA) -0.01 [-0.03,0.00] 4 000
Infrastructure (EA) 0.04 [0.02,0.05] ✓ 3 269








2.B Robustness Tests for Employment Insecurity
Table 2.B.3: Estimation results for employment insecurity.
Local development based on night lights in dynamic buffer zones.
Posterior 95% CI CI NEFF
Mean exludes 0
Education 0.14 [0.12,0.15] ✓ 4 000
Local Development 0.35 [0.30,0.41] ✓ 4 000
Education ∗Local Development -0.07 [-0.08,-0.06] ✓ 4 000
Age -0.01 [-0.01,-0.01] ✓ 4 000
Female -0.07 [-0.10,-0.03] ✓ 4 000
Urban -0.13 [-0.19,-0.07] ✓ 4 000
Unemployment 0.01 [-0.03,0.05] 4 000
Ethnic Grievances 0.03 [-0.01,0.08] 4 000
Media Consumption 0.03 [0.02,0.04] ✓ 4 000
Services (EA) 0.02 [0.01,0.04] ✓ 4 000
Infrastructure (EA) 0.09 [0.06,0.11] ✓ 4 000
Conflict (EA) -0.14 [-0.26,-0.04] ✓ 4 000
Observations 94,053
Max. ˆ 1.03
Table 2.B.4: Estimation results for employment insecurity.
Local development based on night lights in 10km buffer zones.
Posterior 95% CI CI NEFF
Mean exludes 0
Education 0.14 [0.12,0.15] ✓ 4 000
Local Development 0.24 [0.20,0.28] ✓ 3 323
Education ∗Local Development -0.05 [-0.06,-0.04] ✓ 4 000
Age -0.01 [-0.01,-0.01] ✓ 4 000
Female -0.07 [-0.10,-0.03] ✓ 4 000
Urban -0.10 [-0.17,-0.04] ✓ 3 612
Unemployment 0.01 [-0.03,0.05] 4 000
Ethnic Grievances 0.03 [-0.01,0.08] 4 000
Media Consumption 0.03 [0.02,0.04] ✓ 4 000
Services (EA) 0.02 [0.01,0.04] ✓ 4 000
Infrastructure (EA) 0.09 [0.06,0.11] ✓ 4 000




Table 2.B.5: Estimation results for employment insecurity.
Local development based on night lights in 50km buffer zones.
Posterior 95% CI CI NEFF
Mean exludes 0
Education 0.14 [0.13,0.16] ✓ 4 000
Local Development 0.42 [0.36,0.49] ✓ 4 000
Education ∗Local Development -0.09 [-0.10,-0.07] ✓ 4 000
Age -0.01 [-0.01,-0.01] ✓ 4 000
Female -0.07 [-0.10,-0.03] ✓ 4 000
Urban -0.13 [-0.19,-0.07] ✓ 4 000
Unemployment 0.01 [-0.03,0.05] 4 000
Ethnic Grievances 0.04 [-0.01,0.08] 4 000
Media Consumption 0.03 [0.02,0.04] ✓ 4 000
Services (EA) 0.02 [0.01,0.04] ✓ 4 000
Infrastructure (EA) 0.09 [0.06,0.11] ✓ 4 000
Conflict (EA) -0.14 [-0.25,-0.03] ✓ 4 000
Observations 94,053
Max. ˆ 1.02
Table 2.B.6: Estimation results for employment insecurity.
Difference between mean night light in 30km buffer zones and country mean.
Posterior 95% CI CI NEFF
Mean exludes 0
Education 0.10 [0.09,0.11] ✓ 4 000
Diff. to Nat. Development 0.03 [0.02,0.03] ✓ 4 000
Education ∗Diff. to Nat. Development -0.01 [-0.01,-0.01] ✓ 4 000
Age -0.01 [-0.01,-0.01] ✓ 4 000
Female -0.06 [-0.10,-0.03] ✓ 4 000
Urban -0.17 [-0.23,-0.12] ✓ 4 000
Unemployment 0.00 [-0.04,0.05] 4 000
Ethnic Grievances 0.03 [-0.01,0.08] 4 000
Media Consumption 0.03 [0.02,0.04] ✓ 4 000
Services (EA) 0.02 [0.00,0.04] 4 000
Infrastructure (EA) 0.10 [0.07,0.12] ✓ 4 000




Table 2.B.7: Estimation results for employment insecurity.
Local growth based on 3 year change of night lights in 30km buffer zones.
Posterior 95% CI CI NEFF
Mean exludes 0
Education 0.75 [0.49,0.99] ✓ 1 451
Local Economic Growth 1.46 [0.94,1.95] ✓ 1 420
Education ∗Local Economic Growth -0.27 [-0.36,-0.17] ✓ 1 448
Age -0.01 [-0.01,-0.01] ✓ 4 000
Female -0.06 [-0.10,-0.02] ✓ 4 000
Urban -0.16 [-0.22,-0.09] ✓ 2 635
Unemployment 0.00 [-0.05,0.04] 4 000
Ethnic Grievances 0.03 [-0.01,0.08] 4 000
Media Consumption 0.03 [0.02,0.04] ✓ 4 000
Services (EA) 0.02 [0.00,0.04] 4 000
Infrastructure (EA) 0.10 [0.08,0.12] ✓ 2 601
Conflict (EA) -0.15 [-0.27,-0.03] ✓ 4 000
Observations 87,710
Max. ˆ 1.03
Table 2.B.8: Estimation results for employment insecurity.
Excluding respondents from enumeration areas intersecting with onshore petroleum fields.
Posterior 95% CI CI NEFF
Mean exludes 0
Education 0.14 [0.12,0.16] ✓ 4 000
Local Development 0.35 [0.30,0.40] ✓ 3 398
Education ∗Local Development -0.08 [-0.09,-0.07] v 3 514
Age -0.01 [-0.01,-0.01] ✓ 4 000
Female -0.06 [-0.10,-0.02] ✓ 4 000
Urban -0.14 [-0.20,-0.08] ✓ 4 000
Unemployment 0.02 [-0.03,0.06] 4 000
Ethnic Grievances 0.04 [-0.01,0.08] 4 000
Media Consumption 0.03 [0.02,0.04] ✓ 4 000
Services (EA) 0.02 [0.00,0.03] 4 000
Infrastructure (EA) 0.09 [0.07,0.11] ✓ 4 000




2.C Robustness Tests for Living Conditions
Table 2.C.9: Estimation restults for living conditions.
Local Development based on night lights in dynamic buffer zones.
Posterior 95% CI CI NEFF
Mean exludes 0
Education 0.06 [0.05,0.07] ✓ 4 000
Local Development -0.20 [-0.24,-0.16] ✓ 2 173
Education ∗Local Development 0.03 [0.03,0.04] ✓ 2 910
Age -0.01 [-0.01,-0.01] ✓ 4 000
Female 0.08 [0.05,0.11] ✓ 4 000
Urban 0.05 [0.00,0.10] 2 798
Unemployment -0.09 [-0.12,-0.06] ✓ 4 000
Ethnic Grievances -0.28 [-0.31,-0.25] ✓ 4 000
Media Consumption 0.07 [0.07,0.08] ✓ 4 000
Services (EA) -0.01 [-0.02,0.00] 3 474
Infrastructure (EA) 0.04 [0.02,0.05] ✓ 3 251







Table 2.C.10: Estimation results for living conditions.
Local development based on night lights in 10km buffer zones.
Posterior 95% CI CI NEFF
Mean exludes 0
Education 0.06 [0.05,0.07] ✓ 4 000
Local Development -0.11 [-0.14,-0.08] ✓ 2 205
Education ∗Local Development 0.02 [0.01,0.03] ✓ 4 000
Age -0.01 [-0.01,-0.01] ✓ 3 627
Female 0.08 [0.05,0.10] ✓ 4 000
Urban 0.04 [-0.01,0.09] 2 944
Unemployment -0.09 [-0.12,-0.06] ✓ 4 000
Ethnic Grievances -0.28 [-0.31,-0.25] ✓ 4 000
Media Consumption 0.07 [0.07,0.08] ✓ 4 000
Services (EA) -0.01 [-0.02,0.00] 3 167
Infrastructure (EA) 0.04 [0.02,0.06] ✓ 3 034








Table 2.C.11: Estimation results for living conditions.
Local development based on night lights in 50km buffer zones.
Posterior 95% CI CI NEFF
Mean exludes 0
Education 0.06 [0.05,0.07] ✓ 4 000
Local Development -0.23 [-0.29,-0.18] ✓ 2 312
Education ∗Local Development 0.04 [0.03,0.05] ✓ 3 158
Age -0.01 [-0.01,-0.01] ✓ 4 000
Female 0.08 [0.05,0.11] ✓ 4 000
Urban 0.05 [0.00,0.10] 2 615
Unemployment -0.09 [-0.12,-0.06] ✓ 4 000
Ethnic Grievances -0.28 [-0.31,-0.25] ✓ 4 000
Media Consumption 0.07 [0.07,0.08] ✓ 4 000
Services (EA) -0.01 [-0.03,0.00] 4 000
Infrastructure (EA) 0.04 [0.02,0.06] ✓ 3 149







Table 2.C.12: Estimation results for living conditions.
Difference between mean night light in 30km buffer zones and country mean.
Posterior 95% CI CI NEFF
Mean exludes 0
Education 0.07 [0.06,0.08] ✓ 4 000
Diff. to Nat. Development -0.02 [-0.03,-0.01] ✓ 4 000
Education ∗Diff. to Nat. Development 0.00 [0.00,0.01] 4 000
Age -0.01 [-0.01,-0.01] ✓ 4 000
Female 0.08 [0.05,0.11] ✓ 4 000
Urban 0.07 [0.02,0.12] ✓ 4 000
Unemployment -0.09 [-0.12,-0.06] ✓ 4 000
Ethnic Grievances -0.28 [-0.31,-0.25] ✓ 4 000
Media Consumption 0.07 [0.07,0.08] ✓ 4 000
Services (EA) -0.01 [-0.02,0.00] 4 000
Infrastructure (EA) 0.03 [0.02,0.05] ✓ 4 000








Table 2.C.13: Estimation results for living conditions.
Local growth based on 3 year change of night lights in 30km buffer zones.
Posterior 95% CI CI NEFF
Mean exludes 0
Education -0.42 [-0.62,-0.20] ✓ 4 000
Local Economic Growth -1.00 [-1.44,-0.57] ✓ 4 000
Education ∗Local Economic Growth 0.20 [0.11,0.28] ✓ 4 000
Age -0.01 [-0.01,-0.01] ✓ 4 000
Female 0.07 [0.05,0.10] ✓ 4 000
Urban 0.08 [0.03,0.13] ✓ 4 000
Unemployment -0.09 [-0.12,-0.06] ✓ 4 000
Ethnic Grievances -0.29 [-0.32,-0.26] ✓ 4 000
Media Consumption 0.07 [0.07,0.08] ✓ 4 000
Services (EA) -0.01 [-0.02,0.00] 4 000
Infrastructure (EA) 0.03 [0.02,0.05] ✓ 4 000
Conflict (EA) -0.05 [-0.14,0.04] 4 000
-2.80 [-3.89,-1.72] 4 000
-1.19 [-2.27,-0.11] 4 000
-0.19 [-1.28,0.88] 4 000
2.25 [1.15,3.33] 4 000
Observations 88,122
Max. ˆ 1.01
Table 2.C.14: Estimation results for living conditions.
Excluding respondents from enumeration areas intersecting with onshore petroleum fields.
Posterior 95% CI CI NEFF
Mean exludes 0
Education 0.06 [0.04,0.07] ✓ 4 000
Local Development -0.21 [-0.25,-0.16] ✓ 2 580
Education ∗Local Development 0.04 [0.03,0.05] ✓ 4 000
Age -0.01 [-0.01,-0.01] ✓ 4 000
Female 0.08 [0.05,0.11] ✓ 4 000
Urban 0.06 [0.01,0.10] ✓ 2 323
Unemployment -0.09 [-0.13,-0.06] ✓ 4 000
Ethnic Grievances -0.29 [-0.32,-0.26] ✓ 4 000
Media Consumption 0.07 [0.07,0.08] ✓ 4 000
Service (EA) -0.01 [-0.02,0.01] 4 000
Infrastructure (EA) 0.03 [0.01,0.05] ✓ 2 282











Economic Insecurity Living Conditions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Education 0.02∗ 0.02∗ 0.03∗ 0.03∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.01) (0.003)
Local Development 0.05∗ 0.04∗ −0.13∗ −0.09∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.02) (0.01)
Education * Local Development −0.01∗ −0.01∗ 0.02∗ 0.02∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002)
Age −0.001∗ −0.001∗ −0.004∗ −0.004∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Female −0.01∗ −0.01∗ 0.05∗ 0.05∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.01) (0.01)
Urban −0.02∗ −0.02∗ 0.04† 0.04∗
(0.01) (0.004) (0.02) (0.01)
Unemployed 0.01† 0.01∗ −0.05∗ −0.05∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.01) (0.01)
Ethnic Grievance 0.004 0.002 −0.20∗ −0.19∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.02) (0.01)
Media Consumption 0.005∗ 0.005∗ 0.05∗ 0.05∗
(0.001) (0.0005) (0.003) (0.001)
Service (EA) 0.003∗ 0.004∗ −0.005 −0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.01) (0.003)
Infrastructure (EA) 0.02∗ 0.01∗ 0.03∗ 0.02∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.01) (0.005)
Conflict (EA) −0.02∗ −0.02∗ −0.02 −0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Raster FE Yes Yes
Observations 117,941 117,941 118,575 118,575
R 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.14
Note: Standard errors clustered on survey cluster; † < 0.1, ∗ < 0.05.
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2.E Posterior Distributions Main Models
Education
Local Development
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The Effects of FDI on Protest Participation
Abstract
Research on the effect of economic globalization on political stability is divided and
largely focuses on the link between national FDI inflows and protest. Yet, the distribu-
tional effects of FDI - the decisive link to political behavior - mainly affect people who
live close to FDI projects. Therefore, I assess the relationship between FDI projects and
individual protest participation in local communities. I argue that FDI projects improve
the employment situation of well-educated workers in host communities, reducing their
economic grievances and the motivation to protest. Less-educated people, on the other
hand, cannot profit economically. However, they do not protest more as they lack the op-
portunities to join protests normally organized by the well-educated. I test my argument
by newly matching geolocated FDI project data and individual survey data from African
countries. Using a difference-in-difference design, the results confirm that well-educated
people in particular are less likely to report protest participation after FDI projects are
implemented in their communities. My results suggest that overall FDI improves social
stability despite its heterogeneous distributional effects.
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3.1 Motivation
Foreign direct investment has become a major component of economic globalization in Africa
over the past few decades and FDI inflows are now even exceeding official aid flows (Pandya,
2016; OECD, 2018; UNCTAD, 2017). Host countries are often eager to attract foreign
investors in the hope of promoting economic growth and the transfer of technology.1 How-
ever, early on globalization critics pointed out that economic liberalization in developing
countries is accompanied by increasing political instability (Bussmann and Schneider, 2007).
Similarly, research suggests that FDI might have other negative effects like increasing com-
petition, threatening labor rights and deepening existing inequalities (Mosley, 2007), which
ultimately fuels social conflict (Christensen, 2019; Robertson and Teitelbaum, 2011). Indeed,
political instability in the form of protest has become more and more prevalent through-
out the continent (Branch and Mampilly, 2015; Mueller, 2018). However, evidence as to
whether economic globalization and FDI is to blame for this recent trend remains scarce,
largely relying on aggregate, national FDI inflows (Robertson and Teitelbaum, 2011; Buss-
mann, Scheuthle and Schneider, 2006) or specific types of investment (Christensen, 2019).
To address the still hotly debated question that asks whether and how economic globaliza-
tion affects political instability, I turn to the micro-level and assess how exposure to foreign
investment projects affect individual protest participation.
Foreign investment exerts significant distributional consequences in host societies (Gold-
berg and Pavcnik, 2007; Scheve and Slaughter, 2004). Researchers have linked rising income
inequality (Li and Reuveny, 2003; Basu and Guariglia, 2007; Choi, 2006; Herzer, Hühne and
Nunnenkamp, 2014) and stagnating human development to foreign investments (Kosack and
Tobin, 2006). Still, other scholars emphasize that the effects of foreign investment are more
complex and heavily depend on the type of investment (Mihalache-O’Keef and Li, 2011;
Pandya, 2010). Overall, the majority of studies agree that the distributional consequences of
FDI mainly benefit high-skilled workers (Feenstra and Hanson, 1997; Pandya, 2010), which
reflects theoretical advances emphasizing that winners and losers of globalization are deter-
mined by both exposure to economic openness and skill (Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding,
2010; Akerman et al., 2013).
1For an overview of the literature on the determinants of FDI flows, see Pandya (2016).
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While the evidence on the heterogeneous distributional effects of FDI dominates, the link
to political stability and protest remains far more contested: Linking national FDI inflows
and individual protest participation, Dodson (2015) finds that higher FDI inflows result in
a lower likelihood of people participating in demonstration. Yet, Robertson and Teitelbaum
(2011) provide evidence for a link between national FDI inflows and more labor protest in
developing countries. At the local level, Christensen (2019) shows that foreign investment
in mining projects increases the likelihood of riots and demonstrations. Still, other studies
contest that there is any relationship between economic openness on domestic social unrest
(Bussmann and Schneider, 2007; Karakaya, 2016).
Considering the rising economic importance of FDI, its significant and heterogeneous
distributional effects and contradicting evidence regarding the link to social unrest, it is
important to re-assess the political reactions of people living in the communities directly
targeted by foreign investment projects. Drawing on models and research on the distribu-
tional consequences of globalization, I argue that FDI affects protest participation differently
depending on individual exposure and education levels. In contrast to existing theories I
conceptualize exposure geographically - people are exposed to FDI when they live in a com-
munity where a foreign firm invests. In these communities, the highly educated profit from
FDI in terms of better employment conditions, while the less-educated are left out of this
positive development. Fewer economic grievances and generally higher economic security
also cushions other reasons for taking to the streets, thus well-educated people become less
active. The less-educated, on the other hand, could voice their (still existing) grievances
through protest; however, with fewer opportunities to join demonstrations - predominantly
organized by the more educated cohort - their participation rate stagnates as well. FDI,
economically profiting the group that is generally more active in demonstrations, reduces
protest participation both particularly for this group but also in the entire host community.
By combining geolocated FDI project data and individual survey data, I am able to test
the impact of FDI on protest participation in the local communities where investment takes
place. To identify the effect of FDI projects, I leverage both spatial and temporal variation
in my sample consisting of respondents from 36 African countries over six waves of the
Afrobarometer survey. My estimation strategy references the impact of FDI on participation
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in communities with existing projects to those where FDI projects had not yet started when
the survey was fielded.
The results show that FDI is not a threat to social stability, as other scholars have
pointed out (Robertson and Teitelbaum, 2011; Christensen, 2019). In contrast, living close
to an ongoing FDI project significantly decreases people’s likelihood to demonstrate. The
well-educated, in particular, are less prone to voice their concerns through protesting when
they live in proximity to a foreign investment project. In line with the argument that
FDI and protest participation are linked via people’s economic grievances, I also show how
employment related concerns become less prevalent for the well-educated in communities
with FDI projects, while they remain relevant for those with lower educational attainment.
With rising foreign investment flows into African countries all involved actors face certain
challenges. Investors have to decide on where to invest and which conditions are conducive
to generating profit with their investment. After all, protest and social instability potentially
threaten smooth operation and can jeopardize the success of foreign investments. Govern-
ments have to weigh the economic and social costs and benefits of creating an investor-friendly
environment or restricting economic openness. In order to make informed decisions about
how to tailor policies governing economic globalization, we need to understand the extent
of potential social costs of these international capital flows, especially in the form of social
unrest and demonstrations. Overall, the findings presented here support the theory that
FDI furthers social stability in the communities where it is implemented, notwithstanding
its heterogeneous distributional effects.
3.2 FDI Projects and Protest
FDI projects affect protest participation through their sizable distributional effects impacting
people’s employment situation. In essence, the argument proceeds in two steps: First, it
builds on empirical evidence and theoretical models showing that foreign investment projects
predominantly provide employment opportunities for high-skilled people. Thereby, FDI
favors a particular group in society that profits materially when investments flow in. This is
especially the case in the immediate surroundings of the investment project, where the people
are directly exposed to the distributional effects of the investment. Therefore, I introduce in
a second step the concept of ‘geographical exposure’ to foreign direct investment.
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The following section connects these distributive effects with individual protest behavior
taking into account both the importance of motivation and opportunity to demonstrate.
The argument suggests that improved employment opportunities of the high-skilled result
in less grievances and thus motivation to protest. In turn the share of high-skilled people
participating in demonstrations declines when an FDI project is implemented in the area.
Although the less-educated are not able to share in the positive effects of FDI on their income
opportunities they do not become more likely to join protest, as the organizing group, i.e.
well-educated people, are appeased (Pearlman, 2018; Mueller, 2018).
3.2.1 The Distributional Effects of FDI Projects
In general, scholars agree that international capital flows in the form of foreign investments
can create overall welfare gains (Hansen and Rand, 2006). Notwithstanding the positive
aggregate impact, the majority of empirical research on the distributive effects of foreign in-
vestment concludes that it affects people differently. The combined evidence of these studies
suggests that FDI in emerging and developing countries increases several dimensions of in-
equality. First, it increases domestic inequality (Choi, 2006), regional inequality (Lessmann,
2013), and most importantly the wage gap between high- and low-skilled workers (Feen-
stra and Hanson, 1997; te Velde and Morrissey, 2003a; Chen, Ge and Lai, 2011; Lipsey and
Sjöholm, 2004; Hijzen et al., 2013; Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007).
Foreign multinational firms are internationally competitive and dominate domestic and
international markets (Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple, 2004; Osgood, 2016). They profit from
international openness, because they are able to expand their business and lower their costs of
production. Research shows that these competitive firms employ on average more productive
and skilled workers that ensure the success of their firms (Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding,
2010). Firms that want to thrive depend on a high-skilled workforce and are therefore willing
to pay higher wages to keep these highly productive workers. Both foreign multinational
firms and domestic firms that become part of the supply-chain of the multinationals pay on
average higher wages to highly-skilled, productive workers who ensure the firms are successful
and able to compete internationally (Görg and Seric, 2013; te Velde and Morrissey, 2003a).
High-skilled workers can therefore bargain for higher wages when foreign investors arrive
compared to other workers who are not exposed to this type of international competition;
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this is also the case for the less skilled but also FDI-exposed workforce (Feenstra and Hanson,
1997). For the latter, FDI even increases the risk of unemployment (Osgood, 2016).
FDI not only establishes new firms and increases supply to local markets, it also creates
competition between foreign and domestic firms and between domestic firms that compete
to become part of the supply chain of the foreign investor. While FDI increases the number
of firms that are able to engage in international trade, it also threatens the survival of
unsuccessful competitors (Helpman, 2014). Domestic firms with lower productivity-levels
face increasing competition and lose parts of their business. These less productive, struggling
firms employ on average less productive, meaning less-skilled workers. These workers face
downward pressure on their wages and increasing risk of unemployment due to the difficult
situation of their employers (Chen, Ge and Lai, 2011). However, their skill set is too limited
to be attractive for foreign multinationals or thriving domestic firms, which additionally
lowers their chances to find a suitable replacement in the case that they are laid off. Less-
educated workers are the main economic losers of foreign investment when they are exposed
to this force of globalization.
While highly-skilled workers are the winners of international competition and provide
the type of labor that is heavily demanded by foreign multinationals, the low-skilled lose
out (Baccini, Pinto and Weymouth, 2017; Pandya, 2010). Thus, winners and losers are not
only divided along the lines of who is exposed to economic globalization and who remains
sheltered, but on the conditional effect of exposure and skill (Walter, 2010, 2017; Rommel
and Walter, 2018).
3.2.2 Exposure to FDI Projects
Foreign direct investment exerts distributional effects at the individual level, which are ad-
vantageous for high-skilled people who are able to find secure and well-paying jobs in these
multinational firms (Rommel, 2018). Yet, I argue that the distributional consequences of
foreign direct investment are spatially confined. While these firms mainly employ people
with better skills, this effect should be restricted to the workforce that lives in close prox-
imity to the project or firm.2 Therefore, a single FDI project will not significantly affect the
2This does not therefore preclude the possibility that people are moving to areas where foreign investment
projects are implemented, as the distributive consequences will still occur around the site of the project.
72
national wage gap between high- and low-skilled people, but will most likely have an effect
on income inequality in the local community that hosts the multinational firm.
While the contributions on the distributional effects of FDI and economic globalization
introduced in the section above suggest that people working in ‘exposed sectors’ that face
international competition, are either harmed or profit from foreign investment, I introduce
another dimension of ‘exposure’. I argue that we need to account for the spatial aspect
of ‘exposure’, meaning that only people who live and work in a community where an FDI
project is implemented are directly impacted by its distributive effects.
An FDI project increases employment opportunities for the high-skilled living in proxim-
ity to the site of implementation, as employees need to be able to commute to their workplace
on a daily basis. FDI skews the demand of local labor markets toward more skilled work-
ers, thus these people profit economically from the higher wages paid for their skills, and
they should thus be less concerned with their employment situation. Low-skilled people in
communities that host FDI projects are also exposed to the distributive impact of foreign
investments, however, they are on the losing side. Their skill set does not fit the employ-
ment requirements of multinational firms. The best case scenario for these workers is that
their employment situation remains stable. Yet, the firms employing low-skilled workers
are threatened by increasing competition from multinationals. This puts pressure on the
wages and might even result in more lay-offs for this group of workers. Even if the employ-
ment situation of low-skilled workers does not deteriorate directly, they are faced with an
increasing wage gap compared to their high-skilled counterparts that should instill worries
and dissatisfaction with their own wages and employment opportunities.
People living further away from the project site or even in an entirely different region of
the host country, both high- and low-skilled, are not directly impacted. If the distance to
the multinational firm is too large, these firms cannot serve as potential employers of high-
skilled workers. Even if these people have the skills demanded by foreign multinationals
they are located too far away to gain employment with the FDI project and cannot profit.
Likewise, distant low-skilled workers are not impacted but also not threatened by the im-
mediate competition of the foreign investor. Whereas each individual project contributes to
regional or national wage gaps, its main effect will be spatially constricted around the site
of implementation.
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The aspect of spatial confinement is also important with regard to the argument that
domestic firms that become part of the multinational supply chain can also profit, similarly
employing a relatively high-skilled workforce that is able to negotiate higher wages. Findings
in the literature on economic agglomeration effects and the spatial clustering of economic
activity suggest that the majority of firms that supply intermediate goods to foreign multi-
nationals are located in close proximity to the foreign investment project (Krugman, 1991,
1996). Not only does the foreign multinational increase the demand and subsequently the
employment chances and wages of high-skilled workers in the affected community, domestic
firms from which the foreign firm sources parts of its production reinforce these distributive
effects. This entails that the high-skilled in exposed communities - meaning those that host
a multinational firm - will benefit disproportionately compared to less-skilled individuals in
the same community.
3.2.3 Distributive Effects, Grievances and Protest
For people to engage in protest they need both reasons and opportunity to become active.
I argue that FDI affects both grievances and the opportunity to join protest in the exposed
local communities and generally decrease the likelihood of people participating in demon-
strations and strikes.
Existing research on individual participation in political protest and demonstrations
clearly shows an over-representation of those with higher than average educational qualifi-
cations (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005; Norris, Walgrave and Van Aelst, 2005;
Norris, Walgrave and van Aelst, 2006; Dalton, Van Sickle and Weldon, 2010). Resource mo-
bilization theories (McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995) argue that
these people have the knowledge, and therefore, the resources to formulate their concerns and
organize with similarly affected or like-minded people to join their cause (Norris, Walgrave
and Van Aelst, 2005). Education is at the same time the means by which people can acquire
the skills demanded by foreign investors (Jones, 2001). Therefore, high-skilled workers are
on average also highly educated and low-skilled people are often less educated. According
to existing findings in the protest literature we would expect people with high educational
attainments to participate most often and take over leading roles in the mobilization pro-
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cesses and organization of demonstrations. While less-educated people participate as well,
they are on average less likely to turn out on the streets.
However, the economic gains of FDI are unevenly distributed. While the highly-skilled,
well-educated benefit economically, which alleviates their economic grievances, the employ-
ment opportunities for less-educated workers stagnate or deteriorate. This creates concerns
and grievances for this group, especially when they compare their economic situation to
that of their more educated counterparts. Such economic grievances play a central role in
both theories of social unrest as well as explanations for civil war (Cederman, Gleditsch and
Buhaug, 2013). Classical grievance theorists such as Davies (1962) and Gurr (1970) have
argued that gaps between aspiration and outcome in relation to power or wealth can be im-
portant motivations for revolutions and collective violence. These theories propose that the
relative deprivation of certain societal groups fuels violent conflict. Yet, relative deprivation
theory and grievance approaches more generally have been confronted with heavy criticism,
and a number of empirical findings clearly refute the link between being relatively worse off
and participation in protest or civil war (Oberschall, 1978; Brush, 1996; Lichbach, 1989).
Critics have emphasized that the most important factor for protest is not people’s personal
motivation, e.g. grievances, but rather the opportunity to participate or mobilization efforts
which are determined by other factors such as the extent of repression by the government or
the presence of entrepreneurs who are willing to organize collective action (Tilly, 1977; Opp,
2009; Tarrow, 2011).
My argument about the protest-deterring effect of FDI projects combines insights from
both theoretical approaches. It acknowledges that without the potential to be translated into
political action, grievances cannot account for protest participation. On the other hand, it
seems unlikely that people without any motivation to protest spend both time and resources
to take to the streets, only because they have the opportunity to do so. The distributional
effects of foreign investment projects affect both of these aspects - who wants and who is able
to protest - in a particular way. First, FDI alleviates economic grievances for the high-skilled,
by securing well-paying jobs for this group of workers, reducing their motivations to organize
and join protest. Second, other grievances, which might not be directly related to people’s
employment situation or material welfare, can be cushioned by greater financial stability and
tone down reasons to engage in protest. This does not mean that well-educated workers are
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suddenly absent from every demonstration, but are on average less likely to turn out when
they are satisfied with their economic well-being and refrain from starting to mobilize others
for protest activities.
However, the uneven distribution of gains from foreign investment disadvantage low-
skilled workers (Rommel, 2018). Their economic grievances are not alleviated and can even
increase from foreign investment projects in their community, especially, when they compare
their economic well-being to that of the highly educated. However, the protest literature
suggests that the less-educated are generally more passive in terms of political participation
and protesting is also a demanding form of expressing grievance. It requires knowledge to
organize protest and mobilize others to join, which is mostly done by more educated people
(Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005; Mueller, 2018). Yet, this cohort is appeased
by the distributive effects of FDI, resulting in fewer protests being organized. This in turn
means that other groups within the workforce have no outlet for their own grievances. While
this does not entirely preclude that FDI projects might increase the likelihood of those not
sharing the benefits of the investment to protest or demonstrate, the disadvantaged group
is prone to silence and will rather withdraw from political participation than raise their
concerns on the streets.
According to the uneven distributional consequences of FDI and the importance of both
motivation and resources for participation in protest, I expect that employment opportunities
and higher income from FDI projects generally work against protest participation in host
communities. FDI projects eliminate or reduce material grievances and restrain protest
activity by the social group that is normally most likely to demonstrate, the well-educated.
Protest participation should generally decline in communities that host FDI projects as even
economically disadvantaged and aggrieved societal groups, such as the low-skilled, lack the
possibility to join a demonstration if groups that traditionally mobilize remain inactive.
By affecting both grievances and opportunities to join protest, FDI has an overall protest-
reducing effect in host communities despite its heterogeneous distributional consequences.
3.3 Research Design
To assess the effect of foreign direct investment on protest participation in host communi-
ties, I match geocoded survey data from the Afrobarometer with FDI project data. The
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African countries covered by the Afrobarometer are diverse in their economic development
and political situation. The sample covers upper middle income countries such as South
Africa and Namibia but also some of the poorest countries worldwide such as Burundi or
Malawi. In terms of political systems, the covered countries encompass relatively stable
democracies such as Botswana but also longstanding autocracies like Zimbabwe. The results
from such diverse settings should point to more generalizable patterns for both emerging and
developing economies.
The next sections describe first the dependent variables, economic insecurity and sub-
sequent protest participation, and then the independent variables: living in an FDI host
community in conjunction with the individual education level. The FDI project dataset
used for identifying local communities hosting FDI projects will be described in more detail,
as well as the matching process of survey and FDI project data. For both steps of the follow-
ing analysis, first the link between exposure to FDI projects and employment related worries
and subsequently to protest participation, I use an estimation strategy that leverages both
temporal and spatial variation in the data. This allows me to identify the effect of a project
being implemented in a local community.
3.3.1 Outcome Variables
The mechanism of my theoretical argument connects foreign direct investment projects and
protest participation via its distributional effects. In line with this two-step argument I test
both the (perceived) distributional effects of FDI projects and how they impact individual
propensity to participate in demonstrations with individual survey data from the Afrobarom-
eter. Waves 2 to 6 of the survey cover a total of 36 African countries over the time period
2002-2015.3 The survey aims for a representative cross-section of adults for the countries
it covers. The entire survey data has been geocoded, meaning that survey clusters were
assigned their unique longitude and latitude values.4 The opportunity to geolocate survey
3The 36 African countries included in the survey are Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi,
Cameroon, Cape Verde, Ivory Coast, Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
4Survey clusters are the smallest sampling units of the Afrobarometer, the size of neighborhoods in cities
or smaller villages in rural areas (BenYishay, Rotberg, Wells, Lv, Goodman, Kovacevic and Runfola, 2017).
For the analysis I exclude all respondents whose survey clusters could not be clearly geolocated, which results
in 182,937 respondents in 13,156 survey clusters across 36 countries.
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clusters and respondents living in these clusters is vital for matching the individual data to
the FDI data described in the next section.
To test the first step of the argument, the heterogeneous distributional effects of FDI
projects, I analyze how living in a community with an FDI project affects people’s worries
about employment security. Worries about getting laid of, unemployment or earnings all
capture such employment related insecurities that are driven by the distributional conse-
quences of FDI. To test the impact of FDI on these insecurities, I use a question that asks
people to name the most pressing problem they face. Answers are categorized into overarch-
ing issue areas and I code all respondents whose first response falls either under the header
of ‘Wages, income and salaries’ or ‘Unemployment’ as experiencing employment insecurity
(1). All other answer categories are coded as not primarily worried about their employment
situation (0).
The main question of this paper is, however, whether FDI projects affect people’s likeli-
hood to protest. To analyze the relationship between FDI and individual protest participa-
tion, I use a survey item that asks respondents whether they have attended a demonstration
or protest march during the past 12 months. The answers range from ‘No, would never do
this, ‘No, but would do if had the chance to ‘Yes, once or twice’, ‘Yes, several times’ and ‘Yes,
often. I recode the answer categories to distinguish between people who have participated
(1) and those respondents who have not taken part in a demonstration during the last year
(0). Slightly over 40% of respondents had taken to the streets in the previous year, while
roughly 60% had not participated in either demonstration. Figure 3.1 shows the share of
respondents who had protested during the past 12 months over the entire time period for
all surveyed countries. There is substantial variation across countries with regard to protest
activities of citizens, but at least one fifth of respondents of each country had demonstrated
in the year before they were interviewed.
3.3.2 Explanatory Variables
In line with my theoretical argument, I expect that protest propensity in communities with an
FDI project is generally lower than in non-exposed communities. Yet, the protest-depressing







Figure 3.1: Share of Afrobarometer respondents who participated in protest (2002-2015).
test this expectation I use both exposure to FDI and the interaction between respondents’
skill levels and living in a community where a project is implemented as explanatory variables.
To identify local communities that host FDI projects I use FDI project data from the ‘fDi-
Markets’ database maintained by the Financial Times. The database records FDI projects
on an ongoing basis starting in 2003. Except for an analysis by Owen (2019), which assesses
the effect of FDI projects on electoral success on the communal level in Brazil, it has to my
knowledge not been used for political science research. Nonetheless, the dataset is poten-
tially interesting for a wide range of research as it allows for the study of not only aggregate
national FDI in- and outflows but precise information on individual projects. Only this
detailed information on individual project sites and investment dates allows me to test my
argument about the importance of being ‘geographically exposed’ to FDI.
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To maintain the database, the Financial Times collects information on new FDI projects,
as well as expanding investments. A team of analysts uses multiple sources, news wires,
various media sources, and information from industry organizations to collect information
on each project. The database records project related information such as the home country
of the investor, the investing company and the industry and activity of the respective project.
In addition, it also registers the date of the investment, its (estimated) investment size and
the number of jobs created.
For my analysis I use FDI projects implemented from 2003 to 2017 in countries covered
by the Afrobarometer survey, which provides individual level data. The dataset records a
total of 10,002 projects in these 36 countries throughout the entire time period. 84% of
FDI projects recorded by the database are greenfield investments, where investors build new
operations that can encompass new production facilities, offices and other facilities necessary
for production and distribution. Another 16% of investment records refer to expansions of
already existing FDI projects or co-locations. To identify the effect on protest propensity
in local communities, it is vital that the database also includes detailed information on the
location of the project: the host country, region and city. I use all projects that have an
exact city location and geocode these cities to obtain latitude and longitude coordinates for
each project. Restricting the sample to projects with precise geocodes at city level results in
6,206 greenfield projects in African countries from 2003-2017.5
Graph 3.2 shows the locations of all recorded FDI projects on the African continent for
the entire time period. The projects are spread across 53 African countries with substantial
variation in the recorded number of projects between these countries. While South Africa
received 1,181 projects from 2003 to 2017 according to the fDiMarkets data, the country with
the second highest number of projects, Morocco, attracted only about half of that number.
Kenya, Nigeria and Egypt are also ranked in the top five FDI host countries. On the other
hand, a large number of countries only host very few projects; 13 receive fewer than 10
projects during the whole period covered by my data. Amongst these countries that seem
5By excluding projects without city location, I lose roughly one third of projects in the 36 African countries.
On average these projects are smaller in terms of capital expenditure (average CAPEX of excluded projects is
70.63183$, geocoded projects 132.98729$). The average GDP per capita of host countries of excluded projects
is slightly lower than the average in countries with geocoded projects. The host countries of excluded projects

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fi g u r e 3. 2: L o c ati o n s of F DI p r oj e ct s r e c o r d e d b y t h e f Di M a r k et s d at a b et w e e n 2 0 0 3 a n d 2 0 1 7.
t o b e l e s s att r a cti v e f o r F DI a r e s m all i sl a n d st at e s s u c h a s t h e S e y c h ell e s, R e u ni o n o r C a p e
Ve r d e, b ut al s o l a r g e r c o u nt ri e s s u c h a s Ni g e r, E rit r e a a n d t h e C e nt r al Af ri c a n R e p u bli c.
O v e r t h e 1 5 y e a r s t h at t h e d at a b a s e r e c o r d s p r oj e ct s t h e r e i s a cl e a r u p w a r d t r e n d
r e g a r di n g f o r ei g n i n v e st m e nt p r oj e ct s l o c ati n g i n Af ri c a n c o u nt ri e s ( s e e Fi g u r e 3. 3 ). W hil e
t h e r e i s a s m all d r o p i n t h e o v e r all g r o wi n g n u m b e r of F DI p r oj e ct s i n 2 0 0 8, m o st li k el y a s a
r e p e r c u s si o n of t h e gl o b al fi n a n ci al c ri si s, t h e a m o u nt of n e w p r oj e ct s pi c k s u p a g ai n i n 2 0 1 0
b ut t a k e s a n ot h e r s m all sl u m p i n 2 0 1 3. N o n et h el e s s, t h e r e i s a n o v e r all p o siti v e t r aj e ct o r y
s h o wi n g g r o wi n g n u m b e r s of f o r ei g n i n v e st m e nt p r oj e ct s a c r o s s t h e Af ri c a n c o nti n e nt. Wit h
3, 6 2 8 r e c o r d e d p r oj e ct s o v e r all, m o st f o r ei g n i n v e st m e nt w e nt t o t h e t e rti a r y s e ct o r, t h e
m aj o rit y of t h e s e b ei n g p r oj e ct s i n t h e fi n a n c e a n d i n s u r a n c e s u b- s e ct o r s. I n s e c o n d pl a c e a r e
i n v e st m e nt s g oi n g t o m a n uf a ct u ri n g, t h e s e c o n d a r y s e ct o r. T h e bi g g e st s h a r e of p r oj e ct s a r e
i n v e st m e nt s i n t h e m a n uf a ct u ri n g of c o m p ut e r s a n d el e ct r o ni c s. T h e d at a b a s e o nl y r e c o r d s
2 1 5 p r oj e ct s i n t h e p ri m a r y s e ct o r o v e r t h e w h ol e ti m e p e ri o d. Wit hi n t hi s l a r g e r s e ct o r t h e
bi g g e st s h a r e of p r oj e ct s ( 7 7) g o e s t o mi ni n g p r oj e ct s ( n ot i n cl u di n g oil a n d g a s e xt r a cti o n
o p e r ati o n s). O v e r all, a l a r g e m aj o rit y of p r oj e ct s i s i m pl e m e nt e d b y p a r e nt c o m p a ni e s l o c at e d
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in the United States (977 projects) and the United Kingdom (663), however projects stem


























Figure 3.3: Number of FDI projects over time (different sectors).
The main explanatory variable of my analysis is the indicator for living in a community
with an active FDI project. To identify the communities and respondents that host FDI
projects, I identify all survey clusters that are within a certain cut-off distance to an FDI
project. For this purpose, I draw circular buffer zones with a 25 km radius around each
survey cluster location and measure whether at least one FDI project falls within this circle.
As a robustness test I vary the core treatment area, the cut-off distance between respondents
and projects to 10 and 50 km. For the main specification of the treatment area with the 25
km distance, overlaying survey clusters and FDI locations results in 4,246 matches. Figure
3.4 visualizes this process for 10 randomly selected survey clusters in Botswana. In some
cases there is no match and all recorded FDI projects are further away from the survey
cluster than 25 kilometers. In other cases FDI projects are within the cut-off distance of
one or even several survey clusters, if buffer zones around survey locations overlap. The
matching process results in a simple binary indicator for either living in a community with
an ongoing investment project (1) or not being exposed (community with no project - 0).
The theoretical argument suggests a conditional effect of ‘geographic exposure’ and indi-










Fi g u r e 3. 4: E x a m pl e f o r a r a n d o m s a m pl e of s u r v e y cl u st e r s a n d F DI l o c ati o n s i n B ot s w a n a.
d at a t h at a s k s r e s p o n d e nt s a b o ut ‘t h e hi g h e st l e v el of e d u c ati o n’ t h e y h a v e c o m pl et e d. A s
p oi nt e d o ut i n t h e t h e o r eti c al s e cti o n, r e s e a r c h o n w o r k e r s’ s kill s a n d p r o d u cti vit y s u g g e st s
t h at b ot h of t h e s e f a ct o r s i n c r e a s e wit h y e a r s of s c h o oli n g a n d t h at e d u c ati o n c a n b e u s e d a s
a g e n e r al p r o x y f o r s kill ( J o n e s , 2 0 0 1 ; K r u e g e r a n d Li n d a hl , 2 0 0 1 ; T o p el , 1 9 9 9 ). W hil e t h e
p r o x y i s l e s s u s ef ul f o r s p e ci fi c s kill s, f o r e x a m pl e t h o s e a c q ui r e d t h r o u g h o n t h e j o b t r ai ni n g,
s kill s p e ci fi cit y s h o ul d b e l e s s p r o n o u n c e d i n m y s a m pl e of c o u nt ri e s, m a ki n g e d u c ati o n al
att ai n m e nt a r eli a bl e m e a s u r e of r e s p o n d e nt s’ i n di vi d u al s kill. I n a d diti o n, u si n g t h e e d u-
c ati o n it e m c o r r e s p o n d s t o t h e t h e o r eti c al e x p e ct ati o n t h at hi g hl y e d u c at e d p e o pl e s h o ul d
g e n e r all y b e m o r e li k el y t o p a rti ci p at e i n d e m o n st r ati o n s a c c o r di n g t o r e s o u r c e m o bili z ati o n
t h e o ri e s. T h e e d u c ati o n it e m r a n g e s f r o m ‘ N o f o r m al s c h o oli n g’ ( 0) t o ‘ P o st- g r a d u at e’ ( 9).
1 5 % of r e s p o n d e nt s r e p o rt l o w l e v el s of e d u c ati o n, y et t h e m e di a n r e s p o n d e nt h a s r e c ei v e d
p ri m a r y e d u c ati o n a n d a n ot h e r 1 4 % of s u r v e y e d i n di vi d u al s r e c ei v e d a u ni v e r sit y e d u c ati o n.
3. 3. 3 E sti m ati o n St r at e g y
P r o bi n g t h e c a u s al e ff e ct of F DI o n i n di vi d u al p r ot e st i s c h all e n gi n g a s p r oj e ct sit e s a r e
n ot r a n d o ml y di st ri b ut e d wit hi n c o u nt ri e s. T o t h e c o nt r a r y, e xi sti n g r e s e a r c h o n F DI l o-
c ati o n s s u g g e st s t h at i n v e st o r s p r ef e r l o c ati o n s wit h a w ell- d e v el o p e d i nf r a st r u ct u r e, a r e a s
wit h g r o wi n g l o c al m a r k et s, citi e s a n d vill a g e s wit h r eli a bl e p oliti c al st r u ct u r e s a n d s o ci al
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stability (Nielsen, Asmussen and Weatherall, 2017). In essence, FDI projects are more likely
to locate in places where firms expect the highest and safest returns on investments. This
means that some local areas and respondents living in these places are more likely to be
exposed to foreign investment projects than others. For the analysis of protest behavior it
is especially important that investors might on the one hand be more prone to locate their
projects in more peaceful areas, where less people participate in demonstrations and strikes.
On the other hand, it could be the case that other positive aspects for investors such as
growing markets or well-developed infrastructure are systematically linked to higher protest
activity in the community. By only comparing respondents living within the cut-off distance
to projects to those outside of this area, we cannot make any causal claims about the effect
of FDI projects on protest participation.
To address this challenge, I rely on a geographical difference-in-difference design that
leverages spatial-temporal variation to estimate the effect of FDI projects on individual
protest participation. This strategy has been used in several studies assessing the effect of
economic projects on individual attitudes and behavior (Kotsadam and Tolonen, 2016; Knut-
sen et al., 2017; Isaksson and Kotsadam, 2018b,a). In essence, this geographical difference-
in-difference design makes use of the fact that there are not only treated and untreated
respondent but rather three different types of respondents in the sample: those who live
further than 25 kilometers away from a project site (not treated), the ones who live in a
community where a project is implemented before they are interviewed (treated), and oth-
ers where the project is not yet implemented but will be after they are interviewed (future
treated).
By referencing the effect of living in a community with an ongoing FDI project against the
impact of living in a community selected as a future site of FDI, but where the respondent
is interviewed before the investment actually flows in, I am able to address the challenge
of non-random selection of FDI locations. Interpreting the coefficient for an ongoing FDI
project in isolation assumes that the site of a project is uncorrelated with the characteristics
of this location before investment begins. As argued, this is an unlikely assumption due
to the likely preference of investors for more stable and developed areas, amongst other
factors that are potentially correlated with FDI project locations. Including the future FDI
coefficient offers the opportunity to compare respondents’ inclination to protest before and
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after a project has been initiated in their environment and not only the likelihood to protest
by respondents close to and far away from an FDI project.
Comparing protest participation for respondents who live in local communities with an
ongoing FDI project to others where a project is implemented after they are interviewed
also helps to circumvent the problem that the cross-sectional nature of the Afrobarometer
data does not enable the study of the same individual before and after an FDI project is
implemented in the local environment. By referencing those exposed to an FDI project to
future FDI-treated respondents, we can still compare individuals before and during an FDI
project is implemented, leveraging the temporal and spatial variation of the Afrobarometer.
The regression for the analysis then looks like follows:
= ∗ active FDI + ∗ future FDI + + + ∗ +
The dependent variable is , the reported protest participation of a respondent i in
a survey cluster v in the 12 month period before the interview takes place. The estimation
strategy relies on the difference between the estimate for the binary independent variable for
an active FDI project in the respondent’s surrounding and a similarly binary independent
variable for a future FDI project; - . While my theoretical argument suggests that
protest propensity in FDI host communities is generally lower, it builds on heterogeneous
distributive effects and suggests that we should see a more pronounced effect for high-skilled
respondents. To test this conditional effect of FDI on employment insecurities and subsequent
protest behavior, I therefore include an interaction between the variable for an active FDI
project and respondents’ education level, as well as and interaction for living in a community
with a future project and individual education. For this version of my analysis, I receive a
difference-in-difference estimate for each educational group in the sample.
To account for unobserved time-specific trends affecting protest in all units equally, I
include year fixed effects ( ). I also add spatial fixed effects on the regional level ( ), con-
trolling for region-specific unobserved characteristics affecting protest participation. Second,
I run additional models that include region-specific linear time trends, accounting for varying
trajectories regarding protest in different regions over time. Finally, I run models that ex-
clude all future project sites where the date of the interview is more than five years ahead of
project implementation. Restricting the sample in this way strengthens the assumption that
host and future host locations are comparable and limits the potential of a time trend that
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could account for the protest participation patterns. At the individual level the regression
includes age, gender, whether the respondent is unemployed, lives in an urban or rural area
and experiences ethnic discrimination as controls ( ∗ ). Standard errors are clustered at
the survey cluster level to account for correlated errors.
An alternative strategy is to only include respondents from survey clusters that have
been interviewed before and after the implementation of an FDI project in the respective
area. This approach limits the sample size significantly, as it requires observations of the
same Afrobarometer cluster in different survey waves. Furthermore, this produces a specific
subsample of respondents that is clearly skewed to more rural areas, where the likelihood of
the same survey cluster appearing in two different waves is substantially higher than in more
urban areas. In this reduced sample, that only includes areas where respondents have been
interviewed before and after the implementation of an FDI project, 74% of respondents live
in a rural setting, whereas only 40% in the original sample live in rural areas. Therefore,
it is difficult to compare the results of the analysis based on the two different samples.
However, in this specification the coefficient for the effect of an ongoing FDI project is
directly interpretable and does not need to be referenced to the effect of future investments.
The next section shows the main results of the analysis; it starts by shedding light on
how people perceive their employment situation when FDI projects are implemented in their
communities. In the second step I show the findings for the effect of FDI on protest par-
ticipation. For both analyses I show the non-interacted and interacted model to illustrate
the importance of accounting for diverse effects of investments conditional on people’s skills.
In the Appendix, I also present the results from the subsample which only relies on respon-
dents from survey clusters where interviews were conducted both before and after project
implementation.
3.4 Results
To scrutinize the mechanism that connects FDI projects and protest, the first section of the
results displays the impact of living in an FDI host community on employment insecurities.
It shows that, in line with the argument, FDI projects mainly profit the high-skilled, who
are less concerned about employment and wages. The following section shows the impact
of FDI on respondents’ protest behavior and reveals the protest-deterring effect of foreign
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investment projects. It also traces the heterogeneous effects depending on individual skill,
showing that FDI mainly affects the protest participation of the highly educated.
3.4.1 Employment Insecurity Results
My theoretical argument suggests that FDI projects predominantly employ high-skilled work-
ers. Thus, these are the workers who profit from FDI and should be less worried about their
employment situation and salaries. Table 3.1 shows the results for reporting concerns about
employment security, respectively reports of respondents who are mainly worried about ei-
ther wages or jobs.
Column 1 displays a non-interacted model, showing that people in communities with an
ongoing FDI project are less likely to name their employment status as the most important
problem. However, using only this estimate could over- or underestimate the effect of FDI
on employment insecurities due to the potentially endogenous location decision of investors.
The spatial difference-in-difference setup solves this issue by referencing the effect of living
near an already existing, active project on people’s employment situation to the effect of
living in a community where an FDI project will be implemented only after the respondent
has been interviewed (future project).
The difference-in-difference estimate obtained by subtracting the coefficient for a future
FDI project from that of an ongoing, active one ( - ), is negative and significant: People
in communities that receive FDI are about 4% less likely to name either wages or unem-
ployment as their major concerns. Yet, this specification still overlooks the argument about
the heterogeneous distributive effects of FDI and subsequent differences in job related wor-
ries for high- and low-skilled people when FDI projects are implemented. The interacted
model reflects the expectations of the theoretical argument that only worries of the high-
skilled should decrease substantially when FDI projects are located in their community. The
results highlight that only using a non-interacted model would conceal the heterogeneous
effects of FDI on people with different educational backgrounds.
In the model that includes the interactions with respondents’ education, an ongoing
FDI project in a local community does not have an independent effect on being concerned
about jobs or wages. The interaction effect of an active FDI project and education, however,
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Active FDI Project −0.01∗∗ 0.004
(0.01) (0.01)


















Year FE ✓ ✓
Region FE ✓ ✓
Difference-in-difference -0.04 see Figure 3.5
p Value of F test 0.00 see Figure 3.5
Observations 137,799 137,799
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Standard errors clustered on survey cluster.
suggests a decrease in employment related worries in communities with an active FDI project
the higher the educational attainment of the respondent.
88
T h e c o e fi ci e n t f o r a p r oj e ct t h at will b e i m pl e m e nt e d aft e r t h e i nt e r vi e w i s al s o si g ni fi c a nt
b ut p o siti v e. T hi s s h o w s t h at w e w o ul d u n d e r e sti m at e t h e e ff e ct of a n F DI p r oj e ct wit h o ut
a c c o u nti n g f o r t h e s el e cti o n bi a s of i n v e st o r s, w h o s e e m t o c h o o s e pl a c e s w h e r e p e o pl e a r e
m o r e p r o n e t o r e p o rt e m pl o y m e nt r el at e d p r o bl e m s. I n c o m m u niti e s w h e r e a n F DI p r oj e ct
will b e i m pl e m e nt e d i n t h e f ut u r e, t h e hi g h- s kill e d a r e m o r e li k el y t o r e p o rt c o n c e r n s a b o ut
w a g e s a n d e m pl o y m e nt t h a n p e o pl e wit h l o w e r s kill s. T o g et at t h e c a u s al e ff e ct of F DI, w e
n e e d t o l o o k at t h e di ff e r e n c e b et w e e n t h e i m p a ct of a n o n g oi n g a n d f ut u r e p r oj e ct. Wit h
t h e i nt e r a cti o n b et w e e n e x p o s u r e a n d e d u c ati o n w e r e c ei v e n ot o nl y o n e e sti m at e a n y m o r e
b ut e s s e nti all y g et a di ff e r e n c e-i n- di ff e r e n c e e sti m at e f o r e a c h e d u c ati o n g r o u p.
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Fi g u r e 3. 5: E ff e ct of F DI o n e m pl o y m e nt i n s e c u rit y, e sti m at e s d e p e n di n g o n e d u c ati o n l e v el.
Fi g u r e 3. 5 s h o w s t h e di ff e r e n c e-i n- di ff e r e n c e e sti m at e s a n d t h e 9 5 % c o n fi d e n c e i nt e r v al s
f o r all e d u c ati o n l e v el s i n t h e s a m pl e. Hi g hl y e d u c at e d r e s p o n d e nt s a r e f a r l e s s li k el y t o
n a m e w a g e s a n d e m pl o y m e nt a s d o mi n a nt c o n c e r n s w h e n F DI p r oj e ct s a r e i m pl e m e nt e d i n
t h ei r c o m m u niti e s. T hi s p o siti v e e ff e ct o n e m pl o y m e nt i n s e c u rit y i s f a r l e s s p r o n o u n c e d o r
e v e n n o n- e xi st e nt f o r l o w- s kill e d r e s p o n d e nt s w h o s e w o r ri e s a r e n ot eli mi n at e d t h r o u g h t h e s e
i n v e st m e nt p r oj e ct s. T h e s e r e s ult s s u p p o rt t h e p r o p o s e d m e c h a ni s m li n ki n g F DI p r oj e ct s
a n d p r ot e st p a rti ci p ati o n vi a t h e p e r c ei v e d di st ri b uti v e e ff e ct s of F DI. W hil e a n al y zi n g p e o-
pl e’ s p e r c e pti o n s r e g a r di n g p r o bl e m s wit h w a g e s o r e m pl o y m e nt i n r e s p o n s e t o F DI p r oj e ct s
d o e s n ot r e v e al t h e o bj e cti v e di st ri b uti v e c o n s e q u e n c e s of F DI, it c a pt u r e s p e o pl e’ s e c o n o mi c
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grievances more directly. Testing the theoretical mechanism with this indicator for employ-
ment insecurities is therefore suitable to capture the type of worries or concerns that FDI
can alleviate for the group of well-educated respondents and who report, in line with my
argument, significantly fewer grievances related to wages or jobs when they live in proximity
to an FDI project.
3.4.2 Protest Results
The next step of the analysis tests the impact of FDI projects on protest participation.
Column 1 of Table 3.2 first shows the result for a non-interacted model. It shows that FDI
projects tend to decrease the inclination to participate in protest for respondents living in
communities with FDI projects. Importantly, the coefficient for an active FDI project within
25 km of an interviewed person is significantly linked to a 3 percentage point reduction in
likelihood of engaging in protest.
Focusing on the coefficient for an active project alone is, however, problematic. As
discussed in the estimation strategy section we cannot expect that the allocation of FDI
projects is uncorrelated with the already existing propensity to engage in protest. The
coefficient for living in a community where a project will be implemented in the future,
shows that FDI projects are indeed more often located in areas where we observe a higher
probability of people engaging in demonstrations. Thus, we would underestimate the protest
decreasing effect of FDI if we did not reference it against the estimate for future projects.
This underlines the necessity to account for systematic differences of FDI project locations
from other areas with regard to factors that impact protest behavior.
According to the difference-in-difference estimate, people in communities that receive an
FDI project are six percent less likely to participate in demonstrations; the implementation
of an FDI project clearly exerts a protest-deterring effect. It is important to note that this
protest decreasing result appears in a relatively conservative setup, controlling spatially for
regional variation as well as including year fixed effects. Column 1 of Table 3.A.1 in the
Appendix shows the main specification with a less restrictive setting using only country
and year fixed effects. In this case the estimate for future projects alone is a bit weaker
and the active FDI coefficient is stronger and still significant. The resulting difference-in-
difference estimate is almost identical to that of the more restrictive setup (- 0.05 compared
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to - 0.06). Protest participation in FDI communities is roughly five percentage points less
likely compared to communities not chosen by investors for their projects. The results from
an even more conservative specification, including linear regional time trends that control
for varying developments over time in different regions, are encouraging (see column 2 of
Table 3.A.1 in the Appendix). In this model people in communities that receive an FDI
project are 4 percentage points less likely to participate in protest than in communities with
no projects.
While the year fixed effects control for general differences across years in protest par-
ticipation, one concern is that there might be timing effects related to a potential change
in the type and impact of FDI projects over time. The procedure of coding respondents as
living nearby an active or future project depending on the interview date ensures variation
in project status for all investments. Yet, the divergence in covered time periods of the
Afrobarometer (2002-2015) and fDi market data (2003-2017) results in more respondents
living close to an ongoing project over time. Over 55% of respondents who are coded as
living in a community with an active project are interviewed in 2013, 2014 and 2015. Only
about eight percent of people interviewed between 2004 and 2006 lived near an ongoing FDI
project. To address this issue, I run a model excluding all respondents interviewed before
2004, the first year when a respondent can potentially be living close to an ongoing project,
and all respondents who are coded as living near a future FDI project site based on projects
implemented in either 2016 or 2017. Results based on this sample are comparable to the
results from the full sample. People in communities where a foreign firm invests are still
about 6 percent less likely to participate in demonstrations than those unexposed to such
investment (see column 3 of Table 3.A.1 in the Appendix).
Column 4 of Table 3.A.1 in the Appendix shows the results for the subsample of survey
clusters where interviews have taken place both before and after the implementation of
an FDI project. While the sample is systematically different from the original used for
the difference-in-difference strategy, the results are still interesting, bearing in mind that
the results are now based to a much larger extent on interviews from rural settings. In
this scenario the negative effect of living near an FDI project site (active FDI project) can
be interpreted on its own, as the subsample allows us to leverage the variation over time
within the same survey locations. The protest-deterring effect also holds when using this
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Active FDI Project −0.03∗∗∗ 0.003
(0.01) (0.01)


















Year FE ✓ ✓
Region FE ✓ ✓
Difference-in-difference -0.06 see Figure 3.6
p Value of F test 0.00 see Figure 3.6
Observations 138,827 138,827
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Standard errors clustered on survey cluster.
subsample of respondents in survey clusters that have been sampled both before a project
was implemented in the local community and after it had started. People were about 7
percentage points less likely to take to the street when living in an FDI host community.
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L a st, c ol u m n 5 of T a bl e 3. A. 1 e x cl u d e s all r e s p o n d e nt s li vi n g a r o u n d f ut u r e p r oj e ct sit e s
w h e r e t h e d at e of t h e i nt e r vi e w i s m o r e t h a n fi v e y e a r s a h e a d of t h e i m pl e m e nt ati o n of t h e
p r oj e ct. T h e r e s ult s f r o m t h e a n al y si s u si n g o nl y r e s p o n d e nt s i n l o c aliti e s w h e r e p r oj e ct
i m pl e m e nt ati o n h a p p e n e d wit hi n t h e n e xt fi v e y e a r s c o r r o b o r at e s t h e m ai n p r ot e st- d et e r ri n g
ff n di n g s.
T h e r e s ult s s u b st a nti at e t h e t h e o r eti c al e x p e ct ati o n t h at t h e g e n e r al p r ot e st p r o p e n sit y
i n c o m m u niti e s t h at r e c ei v e F DI p r oj e ct s s h o ul d d e c r e a s e. Yet, m y a r g u m e nt r eli e s o n t h e
u n e v e n m at e ri al b e n e fft s of f o r ei g n di r e ct i n v e st m e nt w hi c h s h o ul d a ff e ct p r ot e st p a rti ci p ati o n
di ff e r e ntl y. T h e r e s ult s f o r t h e i m p a ct of F DI o n e m pl o y m e nt i n s e c u riti e s s h o w t h at F DI
m ai nl y p r o fft s t h e hi g h- s kill e d, r e d u ci n g t h ei r e c o n o mi c w o r ri e s a n d g ri e v a n c e s. I n li n e wit h
t hi s a r g u m e nt, t h e hi g h- s kill e d a r e t h e g r o u p w h o s e p r ot e st a cti vit y i s m o st d e p r e s s e d b y
f o r ei g n i n v e st m e nt. T h e r ef o r e, c ol u m n 2 of T a bl e 3. 2 di s pl a y s t h e r e s ult s f o r t h e m o d el t h at
i nt e r a ct s b ot h t h e p r e s e n c e of a n a cti v e a n d f ut u r e p r oj e ct i n a l o c al c o m m u nit y wit h t h e
e d u c ati o n al a c hi e v e m e nt of t h e r e s p o n d e nt.
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Fi g u r e 3. 6: E ff e ct of F DI o n p r ot e st p a rti ci p ati o n, e sti m at e s d e p e n di n g o n e d u c ati o n l e v el.
Li vi n g cl o s e t o a n a cti v e F DI p r oj e ct still si g ni ff c a ntl y d e c r e a s e s t h e li k eli h o o d of p e o-
pl e p a rti ci p ati n g i n p r ot e st t h e hi g h e r t h e r e s p o n d e nt’ s e d u c ati o n l e v el. I nt e r a cti n g f ut u r e
p r oj e ct s a n d e d u c ati o n d o e s n ot yi el d a si g ni ff c a nt e fi e ct. W hil e a cti v e p r oj e ct s h a v e h et-
e r o g e n e o u s di st ri b uti o n al c o n s e q u e n c e s t h at a ff e ct p r ot e st p a rti ci p ati o n d e p e n di n g o n e d u-
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cational backgrounds, future projects do not yet have these effects. The lack of a significant
interaction of education and future FDI projects suggests that this estimate does not pick
up future or expected distributional consequences, but rather controls for the selection bias
of investors. However, we still need the difference-in-difference estimate to assess the effect
of FDI on protest participation and with the interaction, we receive again a difference-in-
difference estimate for each education group. The different estimates are visualized in Figure
3.6 and show that the protest decreasing effect of FDI projects is stronger the more educated
the respondent.
In line with the argument, FDI projects affect the protest propensity of highly-skilled
people negatively - they turn out less often. People with lower skills are not affected in
their protest participation. Yet, given the heterogeneous distributive effects of FDI analyzed
above, we would expect low-skilled people to protest more. The finding that the economically
disenfranchised remain inactive, and refrain from voicing their concerns publicly, points to the
lack of opportunity and resources to engage in protest. One important explanation for their
inertness when it comes to voicing their grievances through collective action is the impact
of FDI projects on educated people who normally organize protest: when they are appeased
and become less active so do those who rely on their work in creating the opportunities to
demonstrate.
Table 3.B.2 in the Appendix shows first the results of the interacted model for the less
conservative setting using only country and year fixed effects (column 1). In this specification
the constituent term for future projects has no significant effect on protest participation
anymore. All other coefficients are largely similar. Importantly, the interaction still points
in the same direction, showing that the more educated people are in communities that receive
FDI projects, the less likely they are to participate in demonstrations (see also Figure 3.B.1 in
the Appendix). The differences regarding the effect of investment by foreign firms on protest
participation, depending on people’s education, are somewhat weaker when controlling for
region-specific linear time trends (results reported in column 2 of Table 3.B.2 and Figure
3.B.2 in the Appendix). However, they reiterate that the protest-reducing effect is most
pronounced for educated people.
The third column of Table 3.B.2 displays the result for the sample excluding both re-
spondents interviewed before 2004 and those respondents living in communities where an
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FDI project would be implemented in 2016 or 2017. Again, even though the overall finding
is corroborated, the differences between differently educated people are slightly less pro-
nounced for this specific sub-set. Column 4 of Table 3.B.2 shows the results for the sample
of respondents from survey clusters that were interviewed before and after the implementa-
tion of an FDI project. The results of this predominantly rural sample still show the same
direction of influence for FDI projects with the highly educated participating less than the
less-educated in host communities; however, the interaction is not significant. This could,
on the one hand, be the result of the substantial difference in terms of rural-urban divide
regarding the two samples or stem from the larger uncertainty resulting from a substantially
smaller sample.
To further scrutinize the robustness of the results, I also vary the cut-off distance between
FDI projects and survey respondents to 10 and 50 kilometers. Results for these two different
core treatment areas are presented in Table 3.C.3 of the Appendix. The findings all reiterate
the overall protest-decreasing effect of FDI projects in host communities. The results from
the model relying on a 10 km treatment area are weaker. This can be explained by the
lower number of matching survey clusters and project locations, resulting in significantly
fewer respondents coded as living in an area where an FDI project is implemented (roughly
42,000 compared to 6̃4,000 with a core treatment area of 25 km). Additionally, a 25 km
cut-off distance reflects more adequately the distance people are able to cover to go to work
in the surveyed countries (Bryceson, Mbara and Maunder, 2003; Moselakgomo, Mokonyama
and Okonta, 2017). Changing the cut-off distance to 50 km creates stronger results, which
could be due to a correspondingly higher number of respondents that live in a community
with an FDI project (9̃5,000). However, research suggests that commuting 50 km to work is
too demanding in most of the countries and regions analyzed here. Yet, the robustness and
significance of the protest-deterring effect of FDI, in a radius 10 or 50 km around the site of
implementation, reinforce the results of the main findings.
Overall, the findings of this analysis show a clear protest-deterring effect of FDI projects.
They particularly suggest that people whose employment situation is improved by foreign
investments, the highly-skilled, become engaged in collective action. The economically dis-
advantaged, less-skilled inhabitants of communities where foreign firms invest also remain
inactive and do not choose to express potential grievances through protest. This could be
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due to the lack of opportunities to join protests organized by the high-skilled or their stag-
nating economic situation. Despite the uneven distributive effects of FDI we do not have to
fear more instable communities that have to deal with demonstrations from the aggrieved
losers of foreign investments.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper shows how foreign direct investment projects, which are a major component
of economic globalization, have important effects on political stability and impact people’s
political behavior. In many developing countries these capital flows have exceeded official
development aid and we need to understand better how this impacts the societies that host
foreign multinationals. People who are exposed to this type of international capital flow react
differently depending on the distributional effects of FDI. Being exposed to FDI, which means
living in a community that has attracted an FDI project, reduces the perceived labor market
risks of highly-skilled people. These are the workers demanded by foreign firms, improving
their job opportunities and wages. Accordingly, this group has less economic grievances when
exposed to FDI projects. In contrast, the low-skilled lose out when they live in a community
that hosts a project. In contrast to the high-skilled, they are not employable for thriving
foreign firms or their equally successful suppliers. Facing downward pressure on their wages
and a greater risk of unemployment, in addition to a rising gap to others with more skills,
should increase the potential for economic grievances felt by this group.
These distributional effects result in high-skilled, well-educated workers having less mo-
tivation to protest - they participate less when FDI projects are located in their community.
According to this logic, we would first expect that the less-skilled voice their increasing con-
cerns on the streets and therefore protest more. However, for people to participate in protest
they not only need a motivation but also the opportunity to do so. The finding that the
protest behavior of the less-educated is not affected by FDI can be explained by the fact
that there are fewer opportunities to join a demonstration, which is due to the fact that FDI
appeases the group most prone to organize protest, the well-educated.
The paper assesses the link between foreign direct investment projects and protest par-
ticipation in African communities over almost 15 years. While the importance of FDI as
driver of economic development for both emerging and developing countries is increasing,
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this source of international capital is still very volatile and its individual distributive effects
and political consequences need further scrutinizing (UNCTAD, 2017). The sample encom-
passes FDI projects in countries at different development stages and allows us to analyze
the impact of foreign investment in both very poor settings and more developed regions.
This set-up shows that in spite of the different development levels and economic trajectories
throughout the surveyed countries, education remains the most important determinant to
be able to profit from economic globalization and ensure political stability.
The results contribute more broadly to our understanding of the link between economic
globalization and public protest in two different ways. First, they account for the hetero-
geneous distributional consequences of FDI and show that the political behavior of people
follows these material effects. It builds on empirical findings and theoretical contributions
that suggest that globalization affects people differently, depending on both exposure and
skill level, and offers a new theoretical understanding of and empirical approach to the con-
cept of being exposed to foreign investment. While it does not neglect the importance of
distinguishing between sectors that are exposed to global competition from foreign firms
and those sheltered from this type of pressure, it proposes that there is also an important
geographical aspect to exposure. FDI projects are not equally distributed across the entire
country and their distributive consequences do not affect everyone. In contrast, the impact
of FDI is felt predominantly in the local communities and labor markets onsite where people
are directly ‘exposed’ to the particular distributive impacts of a foreign firm locating in their
city.
Research on the political effects of FDI so far has often focused on the national level, link-
ing national averages of FDI inflow and political phenomena such as protest events (Robert-
son and Teitelbaum, 2011) or regime stability (Rommel, 2018).6 Yet, this chapter aims to
advance our understanding of the effect of economic globalization on the micro-level, linking
specific FDI projects and individual political behavior and assesses how FDI affects political
stability and individuals living in the communities that host these projects. Empirically this
is possible due to information on the location of individual FDI projects and geocoded survey
data that asks respondents whether they have participated in demonstrations. By linking
these two data sources and leveraging both spatial and temporal variation in exposure to
6An example using the same disaggregated FDI project data is the study on electoral success of mayors
in Brazil by Owen (2019).
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FDI projects, I am able to assess the effect of FDI on protest participation. By referencing
the impact of ongoing FDI projects to that of future projects not yet implemented at the
time of the survey taking place, the geographical difference-in-difference strategy accounts
for the non-random selection of FDI locations by investors and circumvents the problem that
we cannot draw on panel data from communities with FDI projects.
The results confirm that it is indeed necessary to account for the selection biases of
investors regarding the location of projects, as they often choose communities with an a
priori higher protest participation rate. The analysis also clearly shows that people are
affected differently both in terms of their perceived employment security as well protest
participation, depending on their education level. The high-skilled winners of FDI who are
less preoccupied with job loss or low wages become more inactive and refrain from protesting,
most probably lacking the motivation to invest time and effort in this endeavor. With fewer
opportunities to join a demonstration, that is normally organized by the more educated, the
participation rate amongst less-educated workers stagnates as well.
While the survey data does not ask why people decide to protest, the link proposed here is
that FDI eases economic grievances for a particularly active group in society, the high-skilled.
To specify the mechanism more precisely and tease out whether reduced economic grievances
account for the drop in participation by well-educated, we would need more detailed data
on protest participants regarding both their motivation as well as questions pertaining to
whether they only joined or actively organized a demonstration. Yet, the results presented
here reflect findings from the conflict literature that uncover a ‘peace dividend’ of globaliza-
tion (Bussmann, Scheuthle and Schneider, 2006) and show that FDI in general, in contrast




3.A Non-interacted Protest Models
Table 3.A.1: Effect of FDI projects on the protest participation.
Dependent variable:
Participated in Protest
(Country+Year FE) (Region∗Year FE) (Subsample A) (Subsample B) (Subsample C)
Active FDI Project −0.03∗∗∗ −0.01 −0.02∗∗ −0.06∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
Future FDI Project 0.02∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Education 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Age −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Female −0.07∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.01) (0.002)
Urban 0.01 0.001 0.001 −0.01 −0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.01) (0.004)
Unemployed 0.04∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.01) (0.003)
Ethnic Grievance 0.05∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.01) (0.003)
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Country FE ✓
Region FE ✓ ✓ ✓
Region*Year FE ✓
Difference-in-difference -0.05 -0.04 -0.06 -0.06
p Value of F test 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Observations 139,167 138,827 120,638 27,376 136,544
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Standard errors clustered on survey cluster.
- Model with Subsample A excludes all respondents interviewed before 2004, and all respondents who were coded as
living near a future FDI project site based on projects implemented either in 2016 or 2017.
- Model with Subsample B only includes survey clusters that have been interviewed before and after the implemen-
tation of an FDI project.
- Model with Subsample C excludes all future project sites where the date of the interview is more than five years
ahead of the implementation of the project.
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3.B Interacted Protest Models
Table 3.B.2: Effect of FDI projects on the protest participation.
Dependent variable:
Participated in Protest
(Country+Year FE) (Region∗Year FE) (Subsample A) (Subsample B) (Subsample C)
Active FDI Project 0.004 0.02∗ 0.005 −0.03 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
Future FDI Project 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Education 0.03∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.03∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Age −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Female −0.07∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.01) (0.002)
Urban 0.01∗ 0.002 0.002 −0.004 −0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.01) (0.004)
Unemployed 0.04∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.01) (0.003)
Ethnic Grievance 0.05∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.01) (0.003)
Active FDI*Education −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Future FDI*Education −0.002 −0.001 −0.004 0.0001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Country FE ✓
Region FE ✓ ✓ ✓
Region*Year FE ✓
Difference-in-difference see Figure 3.B.1 see Figure 3.B.2 see Figure 3.B.3 see Figure 3.B.4
Observations 139,167 138,827 120,638 27,376 136,544
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Standard errors clustered on survey cluster.
- Model with Subsample A excludes all respondents interviewed before 2004, and all respondents who were coded as
living near a future FDI project site based on projects implemented either in 2016 or 2017.
- Model with Subsample B only includes respondents from survey clusters that have been interviewed before and after
the implementation of an FDI project.
- Model with Subsample C excludes all future project sites where the date of the interview is more than five years ahead
of the implementation of the project.
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Fi g u r e 3. B. 1: E fi e ct of F DI o n p r ot e st p a rti ci p ati o n d e p e n di n g o n e d u c ati o n ( c o u nt r y a n d y e a r
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Fi g u r e 3. B. 3: E fi e ct of F DI o n p r ot e st p a rti ci p ati o n, e sti m at e s d e p e n di n g o n e d u c ati o n l e v el
( s u b s a m pl e A).
− 0. 1 0
− 0. 0 5
0. 0 0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9






















Fi g u r e 3. B. 4: E fi e ct of F DI o n p r ot e st p a rti ci p ati o n, e sti m at e s d e p e n di n g o n e d u c ati o n l e v el
( s u b s a m pl e C).
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3.C Robustness Different Cut-off Distances
Table 3.C.3: Effect of FDI Projects on protest participation.
Dependent variable:
Participated in Protest
(1) (2) (3) (4)
10km 10km 50km 50km
Active FDI Project −0.01 0.02 −0.03∗∗∗ −0.005
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Future FDI Project 0.02∗∗ 0.02 0.02∗ 0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Education 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Female −0.07∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Urban −0.001 0.0001 −0.002 −0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Unemployed 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Ethnic Grievance 0.05∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Active FDI*Education −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Future FDI*Education 0.001 0.002
(0.003) (0.002)
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Region FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Difference-in-difference -0.04 see Figure 3.C.5 -0.05 see Figure 3.C.6
p Value of F test 0.00 0.00
Observations 139,640 139,640 137,392 137,392
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Standard errors clustered on survey cluster.
- Models 1 and 2 are based on 10km cut-off distances between survey respondents
and FDI projects.
- Models 3 and 4 are based on 50km cut-off distances between survey respondents
and FDI projects.
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Chapter 4
International Trade and Public Protest
Evidence from Russian Regions
with Tobias Rommel and Stefanie Walter
Abstract
How does economic globalization influence domestic political stability? Building on
innovations in modern trade theory, we argue that international trade amplifies political
discontent and protest in regions in which trade losers concentrate, but has a pacifying
effect in regions dominated by beneficiaries of free trade. We examine this argument
focusing on variation in Russian regions. Using negative binomial regression models on
data from 2007-2012, we show that regional education levels condition the effect of trade
intensity on protest frequency. High exposure to trade leads to more protests in regions
with low average education levels, but less protests in regions in which residents are well-
educated. Probing the underlying mechanism, we find that the effect of trade on regional
economic welfare is conditioned by education levels and that poorly educated Russians
face more economic difficulties when they live in regions exposed to trade, whereas the
opposite holds for well-educated individuals.
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4.1 Introduction
The question what economic globalization means for a society and whether it enhances or
endangers domestic political stability is hotly debated. As globalization has spread world-
wide and discontent has grown in tandem, research on this topic has become increasingly
important. Existing studies provide ambiguous answers, however. Some scholars argue that
economic globalization increases domestic political stability because it raises domestic wel-
fare. Others contend that because it only benefits some, it fosters instability. With regard
to one important aspect of domestic political instability – public protest – some studies find
that economic openness reduces protest activities (Dodson, 2015). Others find a destabilizing
effect. Foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows (Robertson and Teitelbaum, 2011) and in-
vestment in mining activities (Christensen, 2019) have been found to instigate labor protests
in developing countries. In a similar vein, changes in international food prices increase the
likelihood of protests (Hendrix and Haggard, 2015). Yet, a number of studies suggest that
economic openness does not have any effect on domestic social unrest at all (Bussmann,
Scheuthle and Schneider, 2006; Karakaya, 2016).1
We identify two problems that may have contributed to the inconclusiveness of existing
research. First, most studies either focus on the macro-level, which prevents them from
adequately modeling the distributive consequences of international trade (Dodson, 2015;
Karakaya, 2016), or concentrate on micro-level effects with less attention paid to whether and
how individual grievances aggregate to group actions (Dalton, Van Sickle and Weldon, 2010).
Second, existing work largely builds on established but outdated trade models (Bussmann,
Scheuthle and Schneider, 2006; Bussmann and Schneider, 2007), which predict crude lines of
distributive conflict. In contrast, newer models of trade suggest that the distributive effects
of trade are more diverse than classical models assume (Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding,
2010; Melitz, 2003).
Our paper addresses both shortcomings by focusing on how the sub-national context in-
fluences protest behavior. Based on the insights of new new trade theory, we argue that the
effect of international trade on political protest varies among individuals and across contexts.
1A similar debate about the effect of economic globalization with equally mixed results evolved in the civil
war literature: Some studies find no effect (Christensen, 2019; Magee and Massoud, 2011; Sorens and Ruger,
2014), others detect a pacifying-effect (Barbieri and Reuveny, 2005; Blanton and Apodaca, 2007; Flaten and
de Soysa, 2012; Hegre, Gissinger and Gleditsch, 2003), and a third group of scholars finds a conflict-enhancing
effect (Hartzell, Hoddie and Bauer, 2010; Nieman, 2011).
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Although some groups of individuals remain rather sheltered from the effects of trade, for
those who are exposed, this new generation of trade models suggests that the effect of trade
on individuals varies according to their employment opportunities. Well-educated individuals
benefit much more than the less educated, because they are more likely to work in productive
firms that benefit most from international trade (Jensen, Quinn and Weymouth, 2017; Wal-
ter, 2017). In contrast, poorly educated individuals who are exposed to international trade,
face higher labor market risks and develop economic grievances. Such grievances translate
into protest behavior in contexts in which many aggrieved people concentrate. International
trade thus increases protest activities in environments, in which a poorly educated work-
force is highly exposed to international competition. In contrast, trade has a pacifying effect
in trade-intensive contexts with a well-educated workforce. Rather than the unconditional
pacifying effect of education that factoral models predict or the protest-enhancing uncondi-
tional effect of trade exposure that sectoral models predict, our model thus suggests that the
effect of international trade on protests depends on both the regional level of trade exposure
and the average regional education level.
We test our predictions leveraging regional variation in trade exposure in Russia. As
one of the BRIC countries, Russia is an emerging market economy that has opened up
significantly in recent decades. It is not just an important case in and of itself, but also rep-
resentative of many similarly emerging market economies, with limited democratic means for
the expression of grievances, but where discontent is frequently expressed through protests.
Russia’s 83 regions vary significantly with regard to trade exposure, education levels, as well
as protest prevalence. This allows us to explore the effect of international trade on protest
holding the national political, regulatory, and economic setting constant.
Our results show that although trade exposure by itself has no effect on protest incidents,
it significantly impacts protest once the moderating effect of regional education levels is
taken into account. International trade increases protests in regions with a poorly educated
workforce, but decreases protests in regions with high average levels of education. Exploring
the mechanism of our argument, we further explore the heterogeneous effect of trade exposure
on regional economic prosperity. Trade increases wage levels, consumption and employment
in regions with high average education levels, but has a negative effect on economic welfare
in regions characterized by a poorly educated workforce. Our argument also finds empirical
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support on the individual level: people living in regions with higher levels of trade exposure
report heightened economic grievances when they are poorly educated, whereas exposure to
trade reduces grievances among the well-educated.
These results help to reconcile the mixed findings of previous studies. They show that
globalization has both negative and positive effects on domestic stability, depending on the
context and the prevailing distributive consequences of globalization. Furthermore, they can
explain the null findings in the previous literature, as these positive and negative effects cancel
each other out when the specific distributive effects are not properly modeled. Overall, our
paper demonstrates that globalization has significant societal consequences – both positive
and negative – that affect the domestic political stability of countries in a globalized world.
4.2 Theoretical Argument
To understand how international trade affects protest, we begin with a discussion of its
distributional effects. Trade creates winners and losers within societies, even if it stimulates
aggregate welfare (Hiscox, 2002; Rogowski, 1989). One set of trade models identifies winners
and losers based on the sector of employment’s exposure to trade or comparative advantage
(sectoral models), and a second set based on whether they own a scarce or abundant factor
of production (factoral models). Unfortunately, these models fail to explain a number of
empirical regularities, such as heterogeneity in trade exposure within sectors of production
(Wagner, 2007) or that workers with similar skills receive higher wages when they work in
exporting firms (Munch and Skaksen, 2008).
In response to these shortcomings, a new generation of trade models – the socalled ‘new
new trade theory’ – has emerged to explain these heterogeneous effects (Helpman, Itskhoki
and Redding, 2010; Melitz, 2003). These models focus on differences among firms and argue
that firm productivity is key to understand the effects of international trade. Whereas
unproductive firms cannot survive in the face of global competition, productive firms thrive,
as they are able to expand and gain market shares both domestically and internationally.
Rather than uniformly benefiting or hurting firms in the same industry, trade liberalization
rather brings significant gains to some firms and substantial losses to others (Baccini, Pinto
and Weymouth, 2017; Osgood et al., 2017).
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While new new trade theory takes a firm-level focus, it has significant individual-level
implications. Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding (2010) show that international trade predom-
inantly benefits workers in productive, internationally exposed firms that tend to employ
workers with better qualifications. Because the international competitiveness of these firms
depends on the availability of high-quality workers, international trade increases the de-
mand for well-educated employees. This bolsters their workers’ bargaining power resulting
in higher wages and lower employment risks (Bernard et al., 2007; Osgood, 2016; Wagner,
2007). Well-educated individuals thus benefit from international trade the more exposed
they are to the global economy. Conversely, poorly educated workers who face interna-
tional competition lose out as they lack the skills required for employment in internationally
competitive firms (Walter, 2017). They are more likely to work for companies that cannot
compete with more productive, internationally active firms and their jobs pay lower wages.
Additionally, the risk of unemployment is higher as their employers are more likely to be
driven out of business, and they face a lower likelihood of reemployment because they do not
meet the recruitment prerequisites of thriving firms. As a consequence, their labor market
risks are much higher than those of workers with equally low education levels working in
non-tradable industries.
It is, thus, the combination of trade exposure and education level that influences how
globalization affects individual workers. Well-educated workers benefit most when they are
exposed to international trade, and much less when they work in sheltered sectors. In
contrast, less educated workers are more protected from the negative consequences of glob-
alization when they work in sheltered sectors, and fare worst when they are exposed to
international trade. Existing research has shown that these implications can be observed
empirically and are associated with differences in perceived labor market risk and policy
preferences (Walter, 2017).
Based on the insights of new new trade theory, we argue that the effect of trade on
political protest varies among individuals and across contexts. Although some groups of
individuals remain rather sheltered from trade, among those that are exposed, this new
generation of trade models suggests that the effect of trade on individual welfare varies
according to their employment opportunities. Well-educated individuals benefit much more
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than the less educated, because they are more likely to work in the productive firms that
benefit most from international trade (Jensen, Quinn and Weymouth, 2017; Walter, 2017).
These predictions diverge from classical trade models in three important ways: First,
the beneficial effect of trade on well-educated workers and the adverse effect on their poorly
educated counterparts only holds for those exposed to trade. Factoral models, in contrast,
would predict uniform effects for all workers with similar levels of education. Second, the
well-educated benefit from free trade, while the poorly educated lose out, irrespective of the
country’s relative comparative advantage and factor endowments. Trade does not hurt ev-
eryone working in import-competing sectors (Hays, Ehrlich and Peinhardt, 2005) or everyone
working in tradable sectors (Frieden and Rogowski, 1996), as the sectoral models would sug-
gest, rather only poorly educated workers exposed to trade. New new trade theory does not
distinguish between the effects of exports and imports, because the most productive firms
can both successfully compete with imports and export their own goods, whereas the least
productive firms do not benefit from exports, but also suffer from imports. Third, new new
trade theory applies to both developed and developing countries alike. This suggests that
in contrast to the predictions of the factoral model, well-educated workers exposed to the
global economy are also the main beneficiaries of free trade in emerging and developing coun-
tries, whereas poorly educated workers either do not benefit or even lose out. Although less
developed countries have a comparative advantage in less skill-intensive products, these low-
skill products tend to be produced by workers who are high-skilled relative to the country’s
workforce. As a result, just like in developed countries, trade is associated with skill premia
in developing countries as well (Acemoglu, 2003; Feenstra and Hanson, 1997).2 New new
trade theory thus helps explain why trade has increased income inequality within developed
countries (Anderson and Mendes, 2005; Lang and Mendes Tavares, 2018) and developing
countries alike (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007; Helpman et al., 2017; Rudra and Tobin, 2017).
Because we are ultimately interested in how these distributional effects impact protest
behavior of groups, the next step is to consider how these individual-level consequences accu-
mulate into wider societal effects and shape the context in which individuals act politically.
Individuals live in communities that vary in terms of the average education level and trade
2Applying new new trade theory to the individual level also helps explain why – contrary to the factoral
model’s predictions – the well-educated in emerging markets and developing countries view free trade and
investment significantly more favorably than the less-educated (Ardanaz, Murillo and Pinto, 2013; Beaulieu,
Yatawara and Wang, 2005; Mayda and Rodrik, 2005; Pandya, 2010; Urbatsch, 2013).
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exposure of the workforce (Jensen, Quinn and Weymouth, 2017). This context determines
how their individual experience compares to that of the average person in their commu-
nity. Figure 4.1 illustrates the resulting regional distributional effects, based on whether
a region is sheltered from or exposed to trade and whether its workforce is well or poorly
educated. Within these regions, the ratio of trade winners, trade losers, and those sheltered
from globalization varies considerably.
Regions 1 and 3 are relatively sheltered from globalization. Few people are exposed
to global competition and the share of both globalization winners and losers is small. In
contrast, regions 2 and 4 are exposed to international trade. Region 2 is a region with a
well-educated workforce and high trade exposure. It contains a high share of trade winners
relative to a much smaller group of trade losers. Here, average wages are likely to be higher
and unemployment lower. This leads to greater prosperity in the region, which can also create
positive spillover effects that benefit the small group of trade losers. In contrast, exposure
to trade is high in region 4 but the average worker is poorly educated and individuals hurt
by international trade abound. Here, international trade depresses wages, increases job loss,
and lowers prosperity more generally. This context is the breeding ground for widespread
economic grievances.
How do these grievances translate into public protest? Existing research has shown that
people are more likely to protest when they are dissatisfied with the economic or political
situation (Grasso and Giugni, 2016; Kern, Marien and Hooghe, 2015). Protest allows for
the public expression of economic grievances and potentially brings about change to an
undesirable situation. Yet, only a fraction of dissatisfied people become active. Protest
is costly; people have to mobilize, spend time protesting, and sometimes face punishment
for participation (Shadmehr, 2014). To understand if and when grievances turn into public
protest, we stress the role of the subnational context.
We argue that protest is more likely when people feel that their grievances are not just
their problem and thus their own fault, but when many share the same grievances. Under
such circumstances, economic grievances are more likely to be seen as a societal problem that
can only be changed through collective political action (Snow, 2013). Protest participation
is thus dependent on the pool of potential protesters that are affected by the same societal
issue (Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2013). The greater the number of similarly
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Figure 4.1: Share of Workers Affected by Trade in Different Contexts
aggrieved trade losers, the higher the actual turnout and the likelihood that protesting will
be effective (Klandermans, 1997; Van Zomeren et al., 2004). Given spatial constraints for
sharing grievances and protest mobilization (Sewell, 2001; Traag, Quax and Sloot, 2017),
we argue that it is the pool of potential protesters with similar concerns in (relatively)
close proximity that matters, turning subnational regions into important contexts to explain
protest occurrences. The higher the share of potential protesters in an area, the more likely
it is that protesters will turn out. This increases the incentive for each aggrieved individual
to participate. Overall, a higher number of people with shared grievances in a region results
in a bigger pool of potential protesters and a higher likelihood that a protest event will
eventually occur.3
As discussed above, there is significant regional variation in the ratio of winners and
aggrieved losers of globalization. In regions in which international trade plays only a small
role, the fraction of people with globalization-induced grievances and the pool of potential
3This does not mean that no protest events happen in regions with low numbers of aggrieved individuals,
but the pool of potential protesters is small, which should result in fewer protest events in contexts in which
the proportion of aggrieved individuals is low.
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protesters is small. In contrast, globalization plays a much more decisive role in regions
that are highly exposed to international trade, especially when the regional workforce is on
average poorly educated (region 4 in Figure 4.1). These regions are home to a large share of
trade losers experiencing economic grievances with a common motive for protesting and only
few winners. The overall welfare of these regions declines simultaneously with the economic
well-being of the majority of its citizens, making compensation unlikely at the regional level.
Whereas a small group of educated individuals gains from international trade, the masses
lose out. This is a hazardous situation, as comparison to a few who are better off tends to
increase economic grievances and instigate protest (Gurr, 1970). In this setting, we expect
international trade to increase both the likelihood and the number of protests. Finally,
protests should be least frequent in regions with large groups of trade beneficiaries, that is
regions with a highly educated workforce and high exposure to international trade (region 2
in Figure 4.1). As the group of trade losers is relatively small, the pool of potential fellow
protesters is finite. Thus, we expect protests to occur much more rarely in regions with a
high regional exposure to trade and a well-educated workforce.
4.3 Research Design
To test this argument empirically, we focus on protest behavior in the Russian Federation and
proceed in three steps. The first set of analyses examines the main research question of this
paper, focusing on the overall effect of trade on the likelihood of protest. Having established
that trade exposure increases protests in contexts with a poorly educated workforce, but
decreases protests in regions dominated by highly educated workers, it then moves on to
explore the mechanism underpinning our argument. We show that trade increases aggregate
economic welfare in regions with high education levels, but decreases it in regions with low
average education levels. To corroborate the mechanism at the individual level, we then show
that poorly educated individuals have more economic grievances if they live in contexts where
they are exposed to international trade, whereas trade exposure reduces such concerns among
the well-educated. Taken together, our results support both our main argument about the




Our analysis focuses on Russia between 2007 and 2012. We choose this single-case design for
three main reasons: First, Russia is a large country with 83 regions that vary widely both
with respect to the intensity of public protests and exposure to economic globalization, but
which are set within the same national political, regulatory, and economic context. Figure
4.2 shows that the total number of protests in Russia’s regions between 2007 and 2012 varied
considerably (darker shades imply a higher number of protests). There are regions where
protest is generally absent and others where demonstrations are more prevalent; and these
protests are not clustered in specific parts of Russia.
We observe a similarly high variation in regional exposure to international trade (see
Figure 4.2). Again, high exposure to international trade is dispersed across the country.4
In addition to this cross-regional variation, Russia also exhibits significant variation over
time.5 Since the turn of the century, the country has seen a tremendous rise in international
economic openness (Bayulgen, 2010). Yet, this increase in international trade has been
unevenly spread across regions.6
Thus, cross-regional and over-time variation within the Russian Federation allows us to
examine the effect of trade on protest behavior within the same national context. It also
allows us to rule out important alternative explanations for protest behavior that vary on the
country level, such as variation in repression, alternative means for expressing discontent,
legal regulations regarding economic openness, and opportunity structures or country-level
grievances (Robertson, 2007).
4Due to its status as an exclave, the Kaliningrad region is an outlier in terms of high international trade
exposure. The results are robust to excluding Kaliningrad.
5Variation over time comes from regional differences in main exports (fuel = 25%, metals = 18%) and
imports (machinery = 45%, food = 15%) that are unequally distributed over regions. Our investigation
period also includes the financial crisis of 2008. Overall, trade openness dropped from about 30% in 2007 to
25% in 2008; and rose to almost 30% in 2009.
6This may be especially pronounced in resource-rich regions. Here, firms rely on exporting oil and gas
to increase revenues, which implies that the workforce in these regions is heavily exposed to international
trade. Oil companies employ comparatively less-educated workers who are, in accordance with new new trade
theory, the losers of international trade. Regions with extractive industries and high trade volumes should,
thus, experience a high number of protests. A sizable number of low-skilled workers are confronted with a
few well-educated employees who earn disproportionately better due to trade exposure.
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Figure 4.2: Regional variation in grassroots protests and exposure to trade. Maps show the number of grassroots protests and exposure to international
trade; grouped into deciles. Darker shades imply a higher number of protests or more trade, respectively.
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Second, Russia has been a hybrid regime since the breakup of the Soviet Union, hanging
in the balance between autocracy and democracy.7 Although elections are held regularly,
electoral competition is plagued by an uneven playing field (Levitsky and Way, 2010). Op-
position parties are allowed to run, but media coverage is strongly biased in favor of the
ruling party, United Russia. Electoral fraud is widespread and distorts political competi-
tion. Freedom of assembly is oftentimes constrained and non-governmental organizations
face difficulties in communicating politically. Nevertheless, non-system opposition groups
are tolerated and active. Importantly, incentives to protest are higher in such contexts,
because other (especially electoral) means of expressing discontent are less effective, while
the costs of protesting are not intolerably high.8 This enables us to observe the effect of
globalization on social unrest, estimating an upper bound of this effect. Importantly, Russia
is representative of many emerging market economies that have recently become much more
economically open, but which are not fully democratic. As such, the results provide insights
into the dynamics globalization generates for political stability in these countries.
Third, Russia is an emerging market economy. This makes it an interesting case for our
analysis because the implications of the factoral and sectoral models and new new trade
theory differ most starkly in the context of emerging and developing countries. Whereas the
factoral model suggests that less-skilled individuals benefit most from trade and the sectoral
model focuses on those working in export-oriented industries, new new trade theory suggests
the more nuanced effects discussed above.9
7Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014) code Russia as an autocracy since 1993 when Yeltsin dissolved the
Congress of People’s Deputies with military power, enforced the establishment of the State Duma, and
banned parties from competing in subsequent elections. Freedom House (2015) reports that civil liberties and
political rights are severely curtailed. Although, Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) also code autocracy,
they indicate that Russia could be considered democratic if government turnover were to occur. Polity IV
paints the most optimistic picture emphasizing that there are some democratic principles in place. Its coding
alternates between democracy and anocracy (Marshall and Gurr, 2011).
8In closed autocracies, where repression is extraordinarily high, few people are likely to protest openly,
because engaging in protest almost always results in punishment and, as such, carries tremendous costs (Linz,
2000). In stable democracies on the other hand, the effectiveness of elections in transmitting political demands
and the responsiveness of governments to convert demands into policies is higher and may discourage people
from the use of protest (Robertson, 2010). Accordingly, incentives to engage in protest are lower in both
closed autocracies and in full democracies, compared to hybrid regimes.
9Russia is also a suitable case for a practical reason: the available data facilitates not only a close examina-
tion of the effect of globalization on protest behavior, but also an exploration of the mechanism underpinning
our argument on both the regional and individual level.
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4.3.2 Operationalization
The main goal of our analysis is to examine how trade affects the frequency of regional
protests. To measure the dependent variable, we focus on grassroots protests. We opera-
tionalize grassroots protests using regional data provided by Reuter and Robertson (2015),
who rely on weekly reports on the website of the Institute of Collective Action (IKD) to
count the number of protest events. In total, the IKD has reported 5,667 events between
2007 and 2012. We use the total number of protests in a given year in each region.10 These
grassroots protests are typically organized by non-system social groups without direct access
to Russia’s political institutions that have to appeal to shared grievances to incentivize par-
ticipation. Even if protesters do not share organizational or social ties, they have material
interests and preferences in common. Protesters are consequently motivated to join by their
grievances and the appearance of a sizable number of individuals with similar concerns.
In further analyses, we use the protest issues coded by Reuter and Robertson (2015) to
limit our analyses to protests about wages, labor rights, and policies to change the material
welfare distribution. Therefore, these protests focus on demands for the improvement of
challenging material situations. Involved workers oftentimes protest wage arrears or low
wages, they object to the difficulties of finding a new job when unemployed or they voice
their difficulties in earning a living (Robertson, 2010). Solely economically motivated protests
make up 37% of all grassroots protests.
To check whether our results are robust to different measures of grassroots protests, we
use data from two other sources. First, we use data provided by the Mass Mobilization in
Autocracies (MMA) Database (Weidmann and Rød, 2019). This project tracks incidents
of political protests in autocratic countries. Second, we draw on data provided by the
Integrated Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS) Program (Boschee et al., 2018). This
project monitors political events of various types that are reported in international news
outlets. We restrict the data to protest events. Furthermore, we exclude actions that are
initiated by the Russian government or forces close to the regime. Both datasets include
10Reuter and Robertson (2015) provide their data on a monthly basis. Information is available from January
2007 to March 2012. Because protest events from January to March make up about 25% of all protests in
2007 to 2011, we multiply the number of protests in 2012 by 4 to arrive at the yearly number of protests.
The results are robust to using only those years for which complete information is available.
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geographical information on the location of each event, allowing us to match protest activities
with regions.11
Apart from grassroots protest, we also examine the effect of trade on elite-led protest,
which tends to be pre-organized by Russia’s main opposition party, the Communist Party of
the Russian Federation (KPRF). Their non-parliamentary activities include strikes, marches,
and demonstrations (Reuter and Robertson, 2015).12 Elite-led protests depend much more
on the mobilization of pre-existing ties not necessarily connected with shared concerns em-
anating from regional trends in welfare (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2009; McCarthy and
Zald, 1977; Tarrow, 2011). Thus, we expect trade to only affect grassroots protest, but not
elite-led protest. Elite-led protests are operationalized as protests organized by the KPRF,
published in news reports on their website (Reuter and Robertson, 2015). Between 2007 and
2012, the KPRF initiated a total of 3,898 protests.
Our argument suggests that regional trade exposure in conjunction with regional edu-
cation levels should be associated with the variance in protest events over time and across
regions. We measure regional exposure to international trade with the sum of regional im-
ports and exports of goods, standardized by each region’s gross regional product. Data is
provided by the ICSID (2015) for about 80 regions, based on reports by Rosstat, the Russian
Federations Federal State Statistics Service. Furthermore, we take the natural logarithm.
In theoretical terms, a log-transformation corresponds to decreasing marginal returns; this
reflects our expectation that the effect of increased globalization exposure on protest should
decrease the higher the existing overall exposure. In methodological terms, taking a loga-
rithm is an efficient way to deal with highly skewed data, which is the case for regional trade
exposure.13
Average regional education levels are operationalized as the share of the labor force
with, at minimum, a secondary education degree (Mirkina, 2014). Because the dataset
unfortunately does not cover the time period from 2010 onwards, we take the average of
the share of people with secondary and tertiary education between 2007 and 2009, the years
for which data on grassroots protests is available, and extrapolate the missing years. We
11Our preferred measure of grassroots protest is highly correlated with the alternative measures 8r = .95
for economic protest; r = .78 for MMA protest; r = .49 for ICEWS protest.
12Information on elite-led protest is available from July 2007 to June 2012. In years with complete infor-
mation (2008 to 2011), around 50% of all protests take place in the first half of the year. Hence, we multiply
protest events in 2007 and 2012 by 2 to account for the missing months.
13See Table A1 in the Appendix for descriptive statistics of all variables.
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thus assume that the average regional education-level remains constant. As trends over time
suggest a rather steady and uniform picture, extrapolating over three years is a reasonable
approximation for regional education-levels.14 We subtract the minimum share of average
education levels, such that we can directly interpret the effect of international trade at the
minimum of the empirically observable regional education level.
Because our argument suggests that the effect of international trade on protest behavior
is conditional on the average education level of the regional workforce, we include a multi-
plicative interaction term (Brambor, Clark and Golder, 2006). Reflecting the expectation
that globalization exposure in regions with a poorly (well) educated workforce should de-
crease (increase) economic welfare in these regions and increase protest activity, we expect
a negative interaction term.
4.3.3 Model Specification
We employ count regression models to analyze the effect of international trade on regional
protests. These models are suitable for discrete, non-negative variables, such as the number
of protests. Due to the presence of overdispersion, we rely on negative binomial regression
instead of Poisson regression models (Hilbe, 2014) and include random effects dispersion
parameters on the regional level (Guimaraes, 2008). All explanatory variables are lagged by
one year.
In our preferred model specification, we control for other factors that affect political
protest (Chenoweth and Ulfelder, 2017; Kern, Marien and Hooghe, 2015; Reuter and Robert-
son, 2015; Robertson and Teitelbaum, 2011; Solt, 2015). Protest may be more likely in regions
with a large population and a higher mobilization capacity, operationalized as share of urban
residents. Per capita gross regional product proxies for the overall welfare of each region.
The growth rate of the gross regional product and the regional unemployment rate con-
trol for economic grievances. Furthermore, we control for foreign direct investment inflows,
representing another important component of economic globalization. Newspaper coverage
controls for the probability that people are informed about regional developments and the
level of transparency granted by local officials. Furthermore, we use the distance of the re-
14The results are robust to using averages over a longer time span to extrapolate education levels.
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gional capital to Moscow and the density of the road infrastructure. All data for the controls
is provided by the ICSID (2015).
In additional models, we further include controls from Reuter and Robertson (2015):
regional freedom of the press as a measure for repression and the mandate share of the Com-
munist Party of the Russian Federation in regional parliaments, which proxies for political
cooptation of the main opposition. Natural resource rents that emanate from oil and gas
extraction are included in the analysis to control for the influence of the oil sector. To con-
trol for the influence of ethnic diversity on the occurrence of protest, we include the share of
Russian population per region.
4.4 Trade and Protest in Russian Regions
How does international trade affect domestic social unrest? Our argument suggests that
the number of protest events should depend on exposure to globalization and the regional
education level. Grassroots protest should occur most frequently in poorly educated contexts
strongly exposed to globalization, and least often in heavily exposed regions characterized
by high average education.
Table 4.1 reports the findings of our analyses.15 Model 1 shows the unconditional effect
of trade exposure on grassroots protests. It suggests that international trade does not have
any substantial or statistically significant effect, echoing results from previous studies that
do not find any effect of economic openness on domestic social unrest (Bussmann, Scheuthle
and Schneider, 2006; Karakaya, 2016). Protests are much more frequent in regions with a
poorly educated workforce. Our argument, however, suggests that the effect of globalization
exposure on protest is not uniform, but the average level of education among the workforce
determines whether trade will predominantly create winners or losers in a certain region. To
test this argument, model 2 interacts international trade with the share of people that have
completed at least secondary education. This fundamentally changes the picture. Not only
does a likelihood-ratio test indicate that the interaction model performs significantly better
than the unconditional model, we find - in line with our expectations - that trade increases
the number of grassroots protests in contexts with low education levels, but reduces such
protests in regions with a largely well-educated workforce.
15See Table 4.B.2 in the Appendix for the full models.
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Table 4.1: International Trade and Regional Protest
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
IKD IKD IKD IKD, lagged IKD with- IKD econ. MMA ICEWS KPRF
protests conditional full controls protests out oil protests protests protests protests
Trade Exposure −0.055 0.514∗∗ 0.564∗∗ 0.571∗∗ 0.503∗∗ 0.700∗∗ 0.551∗∗ 0.619∗ −0.078
(0.11) (0.24) (0.24) (0.27) (0.30) (0.28) (0.28) (0.35) (0.18)
Trade * Education −0.046∗∗∗ −0.050∗∗ −0.043∗∗ −0.047∗∗ −0.050∗∗ −0.045∗∗ −0.045∗ 0.004
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
Secondary Education −0.075∗∗∗ 0.068 0.084 0.074 0.077 0.096 0.160∗∗∗ 0.141∗ −0.001
(0.02) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.04)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of observations 428 428 417 354 300 428 428 428 428
# of regions 75 75 74 74 53 75 75 75 75
Prob >Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log likelihood −1254.27 −1250.82 −1220.24 −1025.62 −833.07 −914.41 −747.70 −722.22 −1278.93
AIC 2536.54 2531.64 2478.49 2091.24 1696.13 1858.82 1525.40 1474.44 2587.85
Note: Negative binomial regression models with regional-level random effects; standard errors in parentheses; significance levels: *** <
0.01, ** < 0.05, * < 0.1.
- Model 1: unconditional model; DV: IKD protests; including baseline control variables.
- Model 3: conditional model; DV: IKD protests; including baseline and extended control variables.
- Model 4: conditional model; DV: IKD protests; including baseline and extended control variables and lagged protest events.
- Model 5: model 2; DV: IKD protests; excluding all regions with onshore oil and gas.
- Model 6: model 2; DV: IKD economic protests.
- Model 7: model 2; DV: MMA protests.
- Model 8: model 2; DV: ICEWS protests.
- Model 9: model 2; DV: KPRF protests.
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The interaction term between trade and education levels is negative and statistically
significant in all specifications examining grassroots protests. To facilitate the interpretation
of these results, we present a marginal effects plot of the interaction term in Figure 4.3, which
shows how the effect of trade exposure changes as the share of highly educated individuals
increases. Rising education levels reverse the relationship between exposure to trade and
grassroots protest. Whereas globalization increases protest incidence in regions with low
average education levels, it dampens protest activities in all regions where about half of the
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,Figure 4.3: Marginal effect of trade on regional protest. Marginal effect of regional trade
exposure, conditional on regional education levels. Results are based on model 2 in Table 4.1;
control variables held at their means; 95% confidence intervals.
We further restrict the dependent variable to those grassroots protests that concentrate
on economic issues. Once again, trade has no protest-facilitating or -discouraging effect on
its own (results not shown). Yet, as soon as the conditional effect of the regional education-
level is considered, trade matters in the predicted way (model 6). Protests regarding labor
rights, wages, or changes in the distribution of welfare are much more frequent in regions in
which a poorly educated workforce is exposed to globalization, whereas such protests rarely
occur in regions in which a highly educated workforce is exposed to trade. Furthermore, we
arrive at the same conclusion when using MMA (model 7) and ICEWS (model 8) protests
as the dependent variable.
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In contrast, model 9 shows that trade has no effect on the frequency of elite-led protests,
i.e. protests pre-organized by the communist party KPRF.16 These events are less driven
by material motives, but occur more frequently in more populated and richer regions that
are farther away from Moscow, provide a better infrastructure in terms of road density, and
where news coverage is high. This suggests that in contrast to grassroots protests, which
are clearly linked to globalization-related grievances, protests organized by elites who have
privileged access to political institutions are more strongly affected by mobilization capacity
rather than shared economic grievances.
In sum, these findings provide evidence in favor of our argument that exposure to trade
influences domestic protest levels, but that the effect depends on the educational context.
International trade feeds domestic conflict when labor is poorly educated, but mitigates such
conflicts in contexts in which a well-educated population benefits from trade openness. Our
analysis thus suggests that the effects of globalization on protest behavior are more nuanced
than previous studies have acknowledged.
4.5 Testing the Mechanism at the Regional and Individual Level
To complement the investigation of the main effect, this section presents analyses that ex-
amine the mechanism connecting economic globalization and public protest. Our argument
centers on the distributional effects of international openness. We argue that these benefit
highly educated individuals but hurt those who are less educated. These effects aggregate on
the regional level depending on the overall education level of the region’s workforce. We first
demonstrate that trade increases aggregate welfare in regions with high education levels, but
decreases economic welfare in regions in which poor education prevails. In a second step, we
show that the same pattern holds on the individual level: highly educated individuals gain
from international openness, while the less educated feel more insecure and threatened.
4.5.1 Trade and Regional Economic Welfare
As a first step to probe the mechanism, we investigate how international trade is related to
regional welfare. We use three different dependent variables to operationalize regional welfare
16The coefficient of trade is smaller and not statistically significant. There is also no statistically significant
difference in the log-likelihoods of the conditional and unconditional model, suggesting that contrary to
grassroots protests, the interaction does not add explanatory power.
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levels: wage levels, personal consumption expenditures, and employment rates. Regional
average wage levels are based on data provided by the ICSID (2015), covering the years 2004
to 2013, and are standardized with the gross regional product and log-transformed. Personal
consumption expenditures per capita (in 1,000 USD) and overall regional employment rates
(number of employed persons divided by population size) are taken from Mirkina (2014)
and are available from 2004 to 2009. If trade benefits a region, wages, consumption, and
employment should increase, implying an increase in regional economic welfare, and vice
versa.
Given the continuous nature of these dependent variables, we use OLS regression models
with panel-corrected standard errors (Beck and Katz, 1995). In light of the short time series
and in conjunction with a significantly higher number of units, fixed effects panel estimators
are rather inefficient. Besides our main variables, the models control for population size, the
share of people living in urban areas, GRP per capita, GRP growth, the rate of unemploy-
ment, newspaper coverage, distance to Moscow, and road density. All explanatory variables
are lagged by one year.
The results reported in Table 4.2 support our argument that trade exposure is associated
with variation in regional economic welfare, dependent on regional education levels.17 Inter-
national trade depresses wage levels (model 1), personal consumption expenditures (model
2), and employment shares (model 3) in regions in which only a small fraction of people hold
a secondary education degree. However, the positive and statistically significant interaction
terms show an increasingly positive effect of trade on regional welfare as the average educa-
tion of the regional workforce improves. Hence, regions with a highly educated labor force
prosper under trade.
Taken together, these results provide support for one important component of our theo-
retical argument. In regions that fare poorly under trade, the group of potentially aggrieved
individuals is likely to be much larger than in regions that benefit from economic openness,
contributing to the heterogeneous effect of globalization on protest behavior.
17Table 4.B.3 in the Appendix presents the full results.
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Table 4.2: International Trade and Regional Economic Welfare
Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3)
Wage Levels Personal Consumption Employment Share
Trade Exposure −0.363∗∗∗ −0.525∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.07) (0.00)
Trade * Education 0.024∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Secondary Education −0.049∗∗∗ −0.084∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.00)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes
# of Observations 995 690 770
# of Regions 80 80 80
R-squared 0.80 0.83 0.56
Prob >Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: Multilevel (ordered) probit regression models, where survey waves (2000-2013)
are clustered in individuals; standard errors in parentheses. Constants, cutoffs, and
year fixed effects not reported; significance levels: *** < 0.01, ** <0.05, * < 0.1.
4.5.2 Trade and Individual Economic Risk
In a final step, we investigate if variation in exposure to trade also influences individual
economic grievances, which motivate protest behavior. Our argument suggests that trade
benefits the highly educated but hurts poorly educated individuals. To examine this hy-
pothesis, we use data from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey administered by the
Higher School of Economics. This is a panel survey conducted in 33 Russian regions from
1994-2015. Focusing on the working-age population, we end up with a sample (depending on
the dependent variable) of about 22,000 individuals resulting in about 80,000 observations
over time.
We concentrate on four dependent variables that measure subjective and objective eco-
nomic grievances. First, we operationalize realized economic risk by using information on
whether a respondent is currently involuntarily unemployed (i.e. unemployed but wants
to find a new job). Second, we use a question asking respondents whether they are wor-
ried about not being able to afford necessary goods. This item directly measures economic
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grievances in the form of threats to respondents’ livelihoods. The answers on a 5-point scale
range from ‘not concerned at all’ to ‘very concerned’. Third, we measure perceived economic
insecurity with a question that asks respondents to evaluate the overall state of the econ-
omy. This question also allows us to examine whether trade-related personal risks translate
into more pessimistic sociotropic perceptions. Answers range from ‘fully satisfied’ to ‘not at
all satisfied’. Fourth, we operationalize perceived social status with the help of survey items
that encourage respondents to rank themselves on fictional 9-step ladders. The two questions
refer to respondents’ position in society with respect to economic and power considerations.
For our final measure we take the average of both items and reverse the scale, such that
higher values indicate a lower perceived social status.
To measure individual globalization exposure, we match the yearly data on regional trade
exposure introduced above to the region in which each respondent lives in.18 In addition,
we measure individual education levels by using respondents’ highest educational degrees.
This variable has six categories: less than primary, completed primary, lower secondary,
higher secondary, secondary vocational, and completed tertiary education. Our argument
implies that exposure to trade drives a wedge between educational groups. Individuals with
lower levels of education should be more likely to feel economically aggrieved when they are
exposed to economic globalization relative to individuals with similarly low education levels
who live in less economically open regions. In contrast, living in more economically open
regions should decrease economic grievances among highly educated individuals. This implies
an interaction term between individual education level and regional globalization exposure.
All dependent variables are coded such that we expect a negative interaction term.
We analyze this data with the help of multilevel regression models in which we nest
annual survey participation (evel 1) in individuals (level 2). We use a probit specification for
individual unemployment as the dependent variable, a linear specification for respondents’
ranks in society, and ordered probit specifications for the remaining two variables. We control
for gender, age, income in the previous year, relationship status, working in a second job,
is self-employment or working in the public sector, as well as regional exposure to foreign
direct investment. We also account for the place where respondents currently live: regional
18Ideally, we would have liked to match individuals’ personal exposure to trade in line with similar
individual-level studies (Jensen, Quinn and Weymouth, 2017; Walter, 2017), but the survey data does not
contain the necessary information about respondents’ industry or occupation.
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center, city, small town, or village. Each regression model also includes year fixed effects to
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xFigure 4.4: Marginal effect of trade on regional protest. Marginal effects of individual trade
exposure, conditional on individual education levels. Results are based on the models in Table
4.B.4; control variables held at their means; 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 4.4 presents the marginal effect of individual exposure to international trade,
conditional on individual education levels for all dependent variables.19 The interaction terms
are negative and statistically significant across the board, which means that the grievance-
inducing effect of trade on various dimensions of individual economic risk is reversed among
highly educated people. The results show that increasing international economic openness
only leads to involuntary unemployment, concerns about being able to afford necessary
goods, or dissatisfaction with the economy for people with primary or less than primary
education. Although the effect of trade is less strong when it comes to respondents’ perceived
rank on the social ladder, the statistically significant interaction term still points towards
heterogeneous effects of trade. Individuals holding at least a higher secondary degree report
fewer grievances related to unemployment and less concern about their ability to afford
necessary goods. Similarly, highly skilled individuals are much more satisfied with the overall
19Table 4.B.4 in the Appendix presents the full results.
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state of the economy when exposed to trade. For these respondents, international trade is
highly beneficial.
These individual-level results thus lend strong support to the argument that globaliza-
tion creates more grievances among poorly educated individuals than their well-educated
counterparts. Poorly educated individuals in trade-intensive regions are also more aggrieved
than equally poorly educated individuals in regions that are less open to trade. These find-
ings are in line with new new trade theory, but stand in contrast to the factoral and sectoral
models, which predict that the effects of globalization exposure and education should be
unconditional. Our findings thus corroborate our proposed mechanism that the distributive
effects of economic globalization generate grievances, which can result in protests when a
critical mass of trade losers is affected. 
4.6 Conclusion
How does globalization affect domestic political and social stability? This question has
become increasingly relevant as voters have turned against free trade and globalization in
Western countries and as developing countries across the globe have embraced economic
openness. Our paper provides new evidence in relation to this question, contributing to a
literature that has so far provided inconclusive evidence. Building on insights of modern
trade theory, our study focuses on the heterogeneous distributional consequences of eco-
nomic globalization and argues that the effect of trade on regional protest depends on the
qualification of the regional workforce. Because poorly educated individuals lose out from
trade, they develop economic grievances. When this pool is large and grievances prevail,
instances of public protest occur more often. In contexts in which more people benefit from
trade than are hurt by it, however, globalization has a pacifying effect. As less people lose
out and the overall regional economic situation improves, the likelihood of protest declines.
We demonstrate these dynamics by examining regional variation in the Russian Feder-
ation. Russia is an excellent case to test our argument, not just because it allows us to
keep key national parameters constant, but also because it represents the growing number of
emerging market economies that are not fully democratic but have opened their economies
over the last decades. Because democratic means for voicing economic grievances are often
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circumscribed in such hybrid regimes, studying public protests allows us to gauge the effect
of globalization on political stability in such countries.
Our results demonstrate that globalization can have both stabilizing and destabilizing
effects at the same time. Regions with a well-educated workforce see an improvement in
regional welfare and experience less protests when they are exposed to international trade,
but globalization exposure decreases economic welfare and increases protest activities in
regions with a poorly educated workforce. Additional analyses of survey data show support
for the individual-level mechanism suggested by our argument: Poorly educated respondents
report significantly more grievances than well-educated individuals when they live in regions
with high levels of trade.
Overall our study suggests that globalization’s effect is not uniform, but varies widely
among individuals, communities, and regions. It highlights the usefulness of taking seriously
new developments in trade theory and studying the effect of globalization in non-Western
emerging markets with less than fully democratic institutions. Our results demonstrate that
in such regimes, large-scale economic discontent travels to the political sphere. This may
destabilize regimes that are not able or willing to provide citizens with compensatory mea-
sures, but may also generate new support groups for non-democratic leaders. More research
is needed to examine the circumstances under which globalization-induced grievances and
protests cumulate enough to threaten the regime and what this implies for efforts to maintain




Table 4.A.1: Descriptive Statistics
N Mean SD Min Max
Grassroots (IKD) Protest 428 14,11 41,58 0,00 406,00
Economic Protest 428 5,34 16,21 0,00 173,00
MMA Protest 428 3,67 11,47 0,00 112,00
ICEWS Protest 428 3,36 10,56 0,00 111,00
Elite-led Protest 428 8,83 8,15 0,00 54,00
Regional Trade Exposure (ln) 422 3,19 0,78 0,65 5,10
Secondary Education Share 428 46,91 5,75 34,83 63,93
Regional FDI Exposure (ln) 424 0,66 0,58 0,00 3,55
Population Size 427 1,93 1,75 0,05 11,92
Urban Population Share 428 71,43 10,93 27,10 100,00
GRP per Capita (ln) 428 12,16 0,53 11,10 14,10
GRP Growth 427 0,14 0,20 -0,43 0,83
Unemployment Rate 428 7,07 2,55 0,80 21,70
Newspaper Coverage (ln) 428 6,63 0,73 4,58 8,94
Distance to Moscow (ln) 428 6,97 1,61 0,00 9,38
Road Density (ln) 428 4,50 1,32 -0,22 7,68
Natural Resource Rents 428 7,37 12,00 0,00 55,70
Press Freedom 426 2,05 0,66 1,00 3,00
KPRF Mandate Share 419 10,15 6,07 0,00 33,00
Russian Population Share 428 82,93 16,65 9,20 90,00
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4.B Full Models
Table 4.B.2: International Trade and Regional Protest - Full Models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
IKD IKD IKD IKD, lagged IKD with- IKD econ. MMA ICEWS KPRF
protests conditional full controls protests out oil protests protests protests protests
Trade Exposure −0.055 0.514∗∗ 0.564∗∗ 0.571∗∗ 0.503∗∗ 0.700∗∗ 0.551∗∗ 0.619∗ −0.078
(0.11) (0.24) (0.24) (0.27) (0.30) (0.28) (0.28) (0.35) (0.18)
Trade * Education −0.046∗∗∗ −0.050∗∗ −0.043∗∗ −0.047∗∗ −0.050∗∗ −0.045∗∗ −0.045∗ 0.004
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
Secondary Education −0.075∗∗∗ 0.068 0.084 0.074 0.077 0.096 0.160∗∗∗ 0.141∗ −0.001
(0.02) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.04)
FDI Inflows 0.116 0.118 0.087 0.186∗ 0.053 0.252∗∗ −0.127 −0.362∗∗ 0.015
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.14) (0.12) (0.11) (0.14) (0.06)
Population Size 0.430∗∗∗ 0.466∗∗∗ 0.488∗∗∗ 0.514∗∗∗ 0.352∗∗∗ 0.517∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗∗ 0.417∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.04)
Urban Population 0.008 0.018∗ 0.015 0.033∗∗∗ 0.022 0.011 0.032∗∗∗ 0.021 0.008
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
GRP per Capita −0.605∗∗∗ −0.622∗∗∗ −0.642∗∗∗ −1.429∗∗∗ −0.726∗∗∗ −1.094∗∗∗ 1.025∗∗∗ 0.399∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.20) (0.19) (0.16) (0.16) (0.20) (0.08)
GRP Growth −0.454∗∗ −0.457∗∗ −0.460∗∗ −0.117 −0.200 −0.593∗∗ 0.771∗∗∗ 0.105 0.062
(0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.30) (0.27) (0.23) (0.26) (0.13)
Unemployment Rate −0.029 −0.032 −0.035 −0.014 −0.035 −0.068∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.025 0.022
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02)
Newspaper Coverage −0.107 −0.035 −0.051 −0.014 −0.066 0.028 0.295∗∗ 0.049 0.187∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.14) (0.13) (0.12) (0.15) (0.07)
Distance to Moscow 0.219∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗ 0.157 0.124 0.186∗∗ 0.322∗∗∗ 0.106 0.149∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.06)
Road Density −0.118 −0.124 −0.076 −0.150 −0.104 −0.282∗∗ 0.399∗∗∗ 0.214∗ 0.262∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.13) (0.16) (0.11) (0.10) (0.12) (0.06)
Natural Resources 0.011 0.031∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Press Freedom 0.065 0.101
(0.09) (0.11)
KPRF Mandate Share −0.026∗∗ −0.029∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)




Constant 7.526∗∗∗ 4.716∗∗ 4.537∗∗ 12.597∗∗∗ 6.489∗∗ 10.185∗∗∗ −24.106∗∗∗ −11.256∗∗∗ −5.793∗∗∗
(1.89) (2.13) (2.30) (2.72) (2.83) (2.60) (2.51) (3.07) (1.33)
# of observations 428 428 417 354 300 428 428 428 428
# of regions 75 75 74 74 53 75 75 75 75
Prob >Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log likelihood −1254.27 −1250.82 −1220.24 −1025.62 −833.07 −914.41 −747.70 −722.22 −1278.93
AIC 2536.54 2531.64 2478.49 2091.24 1696.13 1858.82 1525.40 1474.44 2587.85
Note: Negative binomial regression models with regional-level random effects; standard errors in parentheses; significance levels: *** < 0.01, **
< 0.05, * < 0.1.
- Model 1: unconditional model; DV: IKD protests; including baseline control variables.
- Model 3: conditional model; DV: IKD protests; including baseline and extended control variables.
- Model 4: conditional model; DV: IKD protests; including baseline and extended control variables and lagged protest events.
- Model 5: model 2; DV: IKD protests; excluding all regions with onshore oil and gas.
- Model 6: model 2; DV: IKD economic protests.
- Model 7: model 2; DV: MMA protests.
- Model 8: model 2; DV: ICEWS protests.
- Model 9: model 2; DV: KPRF protests.
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Table 4.B.3: International Trade and Regional Economic Welfare
Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3)
Wage Levels Personal Consumption Employment Share
Trade Exposure −0.363∗∗∗ −0.525∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.07) (0.00)
Trade * Education 0.024∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Secondary Education −0.049∗∗∗ −0.084∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.00)
Population Size −0.502∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.04) (0.00)
Urban Population −0.007∗∗∗ −0.003 0.001∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GRP per capita 0.055∗∗ 1.728∗∗∗ −0.000
(0.03) (0.16) (0.00)
GRP Growth −0.137 0.037 −0.011∗
(0.11) (0.46) (0.01)
Unemployment Rate 0.028∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Newspaper Coverage 0.005 0.100∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.05) (0.00)
Distance to Moscow −0.134∗∗∗ 0.007 0.003∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.00)
Road Density −0.126∗∗∗ 0.064 −0.005∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.07) (0.00)
Constant 0.234 −16.564∗∗∗ 0.411∗∗∗
(0.31) (1.71) (0.03)
# of Observations 995 690 770
# of Regions 80 80 80
R-squared 0.80 0.83 0.56
Prob >Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: Multilevel (ordered) probit regression models, where survey waves (2000-2013)
are clustered in individuals; standard errors in parentheses. Constants, cutoffs, and
year fixed effects not reported; significance levels: *** < 0.01, ** <0.05, * < 0.1.
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Table 4.B.4: International Trade and Regional Economic Welfare – Full Models
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unemployed, Concerned Dissatisfied Lower Perceived
but Wants Work about Necessities with Economy Social Rank
Trade Exposure 0.164∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.035
(0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Trade * Education −0.070∗∗∗ −0.050∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.011∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Education Level 0.388∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ −0.058∗∗
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
FDI Exposure −0.032∗∗∗ −0.043∗∗∗ −0.007 −0.005
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Female −0.002 0.189∗∗∗ 0.023 0.078∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Age in Years 0.011∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Income −0.125∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗ −0.040∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Married −0.255∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗ −0.155∗∗∗ −0.137∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Second Job −0.119∗∗∗ −0.142∗∗∗ −0.047∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Self-employed −0.230∗∗∗ −0.382∗∗∗ −0.392∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Public Sector −0.043∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗ −0.117∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Regional Center baseline category
City −0.189∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Small Town −0.212∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Village 0.254∗∗∗ 0.513∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
# of Observations 51291 79657 79849 78035
# of Individuals 17359 22447 22488 22311
Prob >Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log likelihood -22113.48 -105658.09 -106275.85 -124495.87
AIC 44270.97 211372.17 212607.70 249043.74
Note: Multilevel (ordered) probit regression models, where survey waves (2000-2013) are clus-
tered in individuals; standard errors in parentheses. Constants, cutoffs, and year fixed effects
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